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The Anglo-American Destroyers-Bases Agreement,
September, 1940
This dissertation is a historical study of the I960 agreement to ex-
change fifty old United States destroyers for the right to establish naval
and air bases at eight British possessions in the western Atlantic, Start-
ing with early proposals to transfer destroyers and to acquire bases, the
Study follows the development and implementation of the exchange, dis-
cusses the problems encountered in negotiating the agreement and building
and operating the bases, and analyzes the impact of the exchange. It con-
cludes with an over-all evaluation of the exchange. The part of the dis-
sertation dealing with the period prior to September 1940 is based largely
on published materials; Navy and State Department archives plus service-
prepared manuscript histories provide the principal source for the sections
covering the subsequent period.
In the summer of 1940, Britain needed destroyers to protect its vital
economic lifelines and the United States had old destroyers which were of
marginal value to national defense. At the same time, the United States
wanted off-shore bases for national and hemispheric defense and Britain
had possessions which would have been suitable locations for such bases.
Although the ingredients of a mutually beneficial exchange were pres-
ent, the exchange was delayed because the United States government was pre-
vented by legal restrictions from transferring defense materials and the
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British government was reluctant to exchange British soil for over-age
ships, fearing it would incur public disapproval. President Roosevelt
finally decided he could transfer the destroyers if they were part of
an exchange which improved national defense. Prime Minister Churchill
was willing to give the bases to the United States with the hope that the
United States would respond with a gift of destroyers, but he opposed an
outright exchange. The transaction was finally accomplished on a com-
promise basis. Britain gave the United States base rights at Newfoundland
and Bermuda, and the United States exchanged its old destroyers for six
additional sites in the Caribbean. This was formalized by an exchange of
notes on September 2, I960.
The exchange was well received in Britain where the Prime Minister
emphasized its gift aspects and its political significance as a United
States move away from neutrality. The President portrayed the exchange as
a swap of old ships for strong bases. As a result, the "Destroyer Deal"
received public approval but the President was criticized for failing to
obtain Congressional approval of the exchange before he made an agreement.
The Axis powers criticized the exchange as a breach of American neutrality
and international law, but chose not to make it a casus belli
.
The notes exchanged on September 2, 1940 did not contain the whole
transaction. Although not publicly described as such, the British pledge
not to scuttle or surrender the British fleet was part of the real quid
pro quo, as was certain additional military equipment which the United
States later gave to Britain.
The destroyers were transferred to the Royal Navy before the end of
I960. They made a significant contribution to convoy escort operations
during 1941 and were then gradually reverted to non-operational uses.
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Those that survived the war were scrapped soon after the war ended.
The actual base sites were first selected in September and October
1940, but it was 1941 before construction could start in roost cases, and
still later when operations began. The base leases were negotiated at
London in early 1941. The principal problem facing the negotiators was a
conflict of national interests: the United States wanted to exercise
quasi -sovereign powers in and near the leased areas; Britain wanted to
limit American powers; and the local governments wanted to minimize the
impact of the bases on local interests and, if possible, make the bases a
source of revenue. The central issues of defense and United States powers
had to be referred to the Prime Minister for final decision, but the Base
Lease Agreement of March 27, 1941, granted the United States, for 99 years,
substantially all of the rights and powers it had requested.
Development of the bases was extremely difficult due to the severe
shortage of shipping space, the primitive conditions at the isolated sites,
poor local transportation facilities, and a shortage of skilled labor.
Nevertheless, the bases were built and they provided support for convoys,
convoy escorts and air anti-submarine patrols throughout the early war
years. As the course of the war grew favorable for the Allies and hostili-
ties moved eastward, the level of activity at the bases declined, and many
were closed.
After the war ended, consolidations and lnactivations continued as the
value of the Atlantic bases diminished when the primary threat to American
security shifted from a transatlantic one to a transpolar one. The Lease
Agreement has undergone several revisions since 1945, and at the West Indies
sites, it was superseded by a Defense Areas agreement in 1961. When in-
activatlon of the Trinidad Naval Station is completed in June 1967, the
-iii-

bases at Argentia, Newfoundland and Bermuda will be the only operational
bases remaining at the leased areas which were acquired in the Destroyers*
Bases exchange.
As a result of the study of the exchange and the subsequent history
of the bases, it is concluded that the exchange was a benef icial trans-
action for all involved. The United States benefitted primarily in a
military sense through the development of a strong outer line of defense.
Britain benefitted militarily to a small degree from the services of the
old destroyers, but its main benefits were political. The exchange marked
an American commitment to the British war effort; it changed neutrality
to non-belligerency and began a process which led next to the Lend-Lease
program and finally to an alliance.
The bases also had long-run beneficial effects on the base-site
territories. They may have upset local life and caused some unpopular ad«
justments in local affairs, but they were also the source of an economic
boom and they introduced modern life to the territories.
The United States has abandoned almost all of the bases it acquired
in i960 partly because they have lost much of their military value and
partly because local political development did not favor the continued
presence of foreign military forces. Having maximized the military bene-
fits derived from the Destroyers-Bases exchange, the United States is now
aiinimizing the political costs of the exchange.
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On September 2, 1940, by an exchange of notes between Secretary of
State Cordell Hull and the British Ambassador to the United States, Lord
Lothian, Britain gave the United States the right to establish naval and
air bases at eight British possessions on the Western Hemisphere. The
base rights at Bermuda and Newfoundland were described as a grant, given
"freely and without consideration," while those at the other six sites
were to be leased for a period of 99 years "in exchange for naval and
military equipment and material." In the United States note, this
equipment and material was more specifically described as "fifty United
States Navy destroyers generally referred to as the twelve hundred-ton
2type." This was the formal completion of the historic Destroyers-Bases
Deal, as it was generally known.
This work is a historical study of the Destroyers-Bases exchange.
Starting with the background against which the exchange was developed,
it will recount the progress of the negotiations which resulted in the
September 2 exchange of notes. This will be followed by an account of
the developments which occurred after the exchange of notes: the public
response to the exchange; the selection of actual base sites; negotiation
of base lease agreements; and a summary of the development, use and even-
tual disposition of the bases thus acquired. The transfer and subsequent
service of the destroyers, having been presented in detail elsewhere,
will only be summarized. The paper will be concluded by a general evalua-
tion of the Destroyers-3ases exchange, made in the light of developments
in the 27 years that have passed since the agreement was consummated.
I* U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Acquiring; Certain Naval and
Air Bases in Exchange for Certain Over-age Destroyers , 76th Cong.,
3d sess., House Document iNo. 943 (Washington, 1940), p. 2.


































In January 1940 the world was in a tumult, with the second great
war of the twentieth century having erupted in Europe in September 1939.
While Europe was at war to the east of the United States across the At-
lantic, Japan was threatening domination of the Western Pacific and its
Asian littoral. The United States, isolationist sentiment still strong
among its people, was trying to avoid entanglement in either the European
or Asian strife.
It was against such a developing background in the late 1930' s that
American military planners drafted plans for defending the Western Hemi-
sphere in general and the United States in particular. These defense
plans were the product of many factors, but several elements of danger to
the United States and its interests were predominant.
Technological developments in warfare--especially the rapid growth
of air warfare--had greatly decreased the effectiveness with which the
geographic isolation of the Americas served as a barrier to attack.
Moreover, the deterioration of the European power structure in late 1938
tnade it appear that certain European possessions in the Western Hemisphere
could fall under hostile control. The development of air power meant that
a direct threat could be imposed on the United States from a hostile base
almost anywhere in the Western Hemisphere.
The desire to strengthen Western Hemisphere defenses was intensified
by a concern over Germany's interests and involvements in South America,
especially in Argentina and Brazil, and by the military necessity of




ln Brazil which, if it materialized, would be a serious threat to the
Canal. The United States tried to strengthen Hemisphere defense by giv-
ing aid to pro-United States countries in Latin America which had good
strategic locations, and by making preparations to assist any Pan-
American state against a possible attack by Brazil. The situations in
Brazil and Argentina and the necessity of protecting the Panama Canal
were used as a justification for a general increase of United States
military strength and defense efforts. Congress and the public were
more willing to accept defense build-ups which were described in terms
of Hemispheric defense than in terms of American security involving
Europe or Asia.
In early 1940, specific plans for the defense of the Western Hemi-
sphere were prepared by both the Army and Navy War Plans Divisions.
These plans recognized the strategic value of certain European posses-
sions in the Western Hemisphere and indicated that among other places,
Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Trinidad would be of significant military
value. At the same time, however, the planners stated that M the potential
military value of the areas • • • is insufficient, when weighed in the
light of political and economic considerations, to justify their acquisi-
2
tion." Thus, in the months before open warfare broke out in Western
Europe in April 1940, the military situation made additional bases for
home defense both desirable and advantageous but did not make their ac-
quisition essential. This conclusion was influenced to some degree by
1* Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff; Prewar Plans and Preparations
,
a volume in the series United States Army in World War II: The War
Department (Washington: Historical Division, Department of the Army,
1950), pp. 94-97.
2. Stetson Conn and 3yron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense
,
a volume in the series United States Army in World War II: The Western
Hemisphere (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, De-
partment of the Army, I960), p. 45.
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the belief that if war came to the Western Hemisphere and bases in Latin
America were necessary, they would be made available by the other American
Republics. President Roosevelt made this very clear in a memorandum to
the Secretary of the Navy in March 1940. Replying to a Navy suggestion
that additional bases be acquired to support patrols protecting the
Panama Canal, the President wrote: "It is intended in no way that the
United States should acquire or lease in peace time any Islands, anchor-
ages or landing fields, because it is believed that in the event of war
independent Republics bordering on the Caribbean would be on the side of
3
the United States in a common defense."
The idea of leasing bases for hemisphere defense was not new. Even
before the world situation became critical in 1938-1939, some newspapers,
and especially those with isolationist and nationalistic editorial poli-
cies, had been proposing that European nations settle their war debts to
the United States by ceding all or part of their possessions in the West-
4
ern Hemisphere. In December 1939, Frank Knox, who later became Secre-
tary of the Navy, expressed approval of a plan to acquire French and
British possessions in the West Indies to improve the defenses of the
Panama Canal, A few months later, in February 1940, Representative
Sol Bloom of New York submitted a draft resolution on the subject to the
State Department for comments» The Bloom proposal called for the pur-
chase of land bases having strategic value for defending the Panama
Canal and the Western Hemisphere, with the purchase to be paid for partly
with gold and partly with credits against overdue debts. The most
3« Ibid ., and William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to
Isolation, 1937-1940 , volume 1 of The World Crisis and American Foreign
Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 624.






specific proposal for acquiring bases in exchange for war debts and the
one which probably received deepest consideration by the Roosevelt Ad-
ministration was presented in the late spring of 1940. This plan, which
had some Congressional support, was delivered to the President by Secre-
tary of State Hull. It proposed a reduction of the British debt with the
balance used to pay for leases of 18 bases on British territory in the
Western Hemisphere. The bases, at sites ranging from Newfoundland to
Trinidad, were to be selected by the United States. There were reports
that several members of the British Embassy staff were willing to accept
such a write-off since it would remove Britain from the category of "bad
debtor" and possibly also exempt her from the restrictions of the Johnson
Act.
All the proposals to exchange bases for a write-off or reduction of
war debts were rejected by the Administration* Both the President and the
State Department thought that any move to acquire the European territories
in the Western Hemisphere would cause sharp domestic controversy and have
adverse effects on United States international interests. Such a move
would be interpreted as a reversal of previous statements in which the
United States denied having any desire for territorial expansion. As
noted above, the President also believed such a step unnecessary because
he expected the Latin American states to provide the United States with
any necessary bases if the war spread to this hemisphere.
7. Financing was proposed as follows: The 3ritish debt, which then ex-
ceeded $5.6 billion (including accrued interest) would be reduced to
$2.8 billion by giving a retroactive reduction of the interest rate
from 3.57, to 0.42% and applying Britain's payments of $1.4 billion to
the funded principal. The 18 bases were to be leased for 99 years at
an average annual rental fee of $2 million per base. The current cash
value of the resulting 99-year stream of future income was set at $2.8
billion. Cancellation of the debt would thus constitute acceptable
payment of all the lease rental fees. Harold B. Hinton, "Propose to




In spice of this decision not to use "war debts'* to acquire addi-
tional bases in the Western Hemisphere, the United States had taken
steps to obtain the right to use certain ports as naval operating cen-
ters. In the process of drawing up the RAINBOW war plans (based on the
assumption of an anti-United States alliance of Germany and other major
states), a clear need for supporting and operating facilities in the
British West Indies region was identified. The RAINBOW plans called for
an air and sea patrol of the Western Atlantic, which was intended to
deny use of those waters to belligerents and thus to isolate the hemi-
sphere from war. These plans created a need for operating bases beyond
g
the continental United States and its Caribbean possessions.
Mainly in pursuit of the latter objective, the President, Secretary
of State Cordell Hull, Undo: Secretary Sumner Welles, and the Chief of
Naval Operations (Admiral Harold R. Stark) notified the British Ambas- •
sador, Lord Lothian, in June and July 1939 that if war broke out, the
United States planned to establish patrols of the Western Atlantic for
the purposes mentioned above. The Ambassador was also informed that in
order to support those patrols, the Navy desired (and 3ritain was asked
to grant) permission for United States ships and aircraft to use the
ports and waters of certain British possessions and to have the privilege
9
of leasing buildings and landing supplies there. The places specified
were Trinidad, St. Lucia, Bermuda and Halifax (Nova Scotia). This was a
8. There seems to have been little concern for the fact that the United
States had no legal right to control the use of the high seas. Conn
and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense
, p. 22; H. Duncan Hall,
North American Supply (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office and
Longmans, Green and Company, 1955), p. 43; Sir Llewellyn Woodward,
British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: Her Majesty's
Stationery Office, 1962), p. 39.
9. Hall, North American Supply




curious request, since Britain was almost certain to be one of those
belligerents to whom the patrols were supposed to deny the use of the
Western Atlantic It is not surprising that when this request was ap-
proved, the British government (and, with respect to Halifax, the Cana-
dian government) made reservations to protect their own belligerent
rights and interests. The rights granted to the United States were non-
exclusive because responsibility for colonial defense was retained by
the Royal Navy and it required full use of the ports and facilities.
Arrangements for United States use of the requested facilities were made
through direct negotiation with the local Colonial governments after
Britain had sent them the appropriate instructions and authorizations!,
The necessary arrangements were completed in August 1939.
Although the rights to use these sites as bases of operation for
the Neutrality Patrol (as it was later named) were obtained and arrange-
ments for use were worked out, it appears that the United States never
exercised the right. This ncn-use has been attributed in part to a
shortage of the appropriate type of aircraft (long range patrol planes)
12
and in part to a concern for the domestic effect of such use. Leading
isolationists certainly would have charged that the arrangements were in-
tended to entangle the United States in the European War. Rather than
create an opportunity for political debate, the acquired rights were
allowed to lapse.




, also, Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense
,
p. 11 (footnote 21).
12. Hall, North American Supply
, p. 142; Woodward, British Foreign Policy ,
p. 83 (footnote 1); J.R.M. 3utler, Grand Strategy , a volume in the
series History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Military Series
,
(3 vols., London; Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957), Vol. 2,
p. 244; J.R.M. Butler, Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) 18S2-1940 (London:
Macmillan and Company, I960), p. 294.
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Still another aspect of the early programs to acquire bases for the
defense of the Western Hemisphere was the role played by Pan American
13
Airways. When, in 1939, military planning suggested the development
of military air routes within the hemisphere, the Army suggested that
commercial facilities be leased where available and that others be con-
structed if needed,, The contemplated installations were to consist of
an airstrip, a small detachment of mechanics and communications personnel
and small quantities of stores and fuel. The State Department objected
to the Army's involvement and opposed the installation or operation of
airfields outside the United States by any government agency. After con-
sidering the alternatives, including the creation of a new government
agency to operate the proposed air transport system and the negotiation
of agreements with the countries in which airfields were desired, the
course suggested by the State Department was adopted: construction and
operation were managed by a private airline under contract to the govern-
ment*
As a result of this decision, in early 1940 Pan American Airways
was awarded a $12 million contract to act as the effective agent of the
United States government in the construction and operation of an airline
network within Latin America and between Latin America and the United
States. Specifically, Pan American was to construct or improve, by the
end of June 1942, flight facilities at 25 locations. The contract also
required Pan American to maintain the installations and supply the
necessary fuel for their use during the construction period. The con-
tract underwent several modifications and the company finally worked at
21 sites, including preliminary survey work at several sites which were
13. See Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense
, pp. 249 ff.
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later included in the Destroyers-Bases exchange.
Another idea which contributed to the subsequent development of the
Destroyers-Bases exchange was reflected in a series of proposals to
seize European possessions in the Western Hemisphere. This proposed ac-
tion was justified as a move to prevent German acquisition of the terri-
tories through conquest of the European owners. This proposal probably
reached its most specific form in late May 1940 as German forces swept
westward across France. An unsigned memorandum, presumably originated
in the Army War Plans Division, recommended "immediate steps to acquire
British and French possessions in the Atlantic" to the Chief of Staff,
14
but apparently it did not produce any direct result. This memorandum
was prepared on May 21, 1940, the day the German army reached the French
coast of the English Channel. It was followed on the next day by a
similar memorandum in which the War Plans Division suggested that "pos-
sible protective occupation" of European territories was part of the best
course of action for the United States in the immediate future. ' On
May 23, the President received a letter from Ambassador Joseph E. Davies,
a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, urging a transfer of pos-
sessions in return for a cancellation of war debts. On May 25, probably
in response to the proposals by the Chief of Staff and the urgings of
Ambassador Davies, both of which were augmented by a British report that
6,000 German troops were en route to the Guianas or Brazil, the President
directed the Army and Navy to prepare emergency plans for pre-emptive
16
seizure of British, French and Dutch possessions. While the Army and
Navy War Plans Divisions worked on these plans, the Chief of Staff asked
14. Watson, Chief of Staff
, p. 105.
15. Ibid
., pp. 105, 477.




the State Department, on May 27, to make diplomatic arrangements with
Britain to permit emergency occupation of British possessions in the
Western Hemisphere by United States forces. The Navy War Plans Division,
acting in cooperation with its Army counterpart, forwarded an emergency
plan to the Chief of Naval Operations on May 28, This plan called for
the United States to occupy and assert sovereignty over British, Dutch
and French possessions in the Western Hemisphere immediately and without
advance public notice if Germany demanded cession of any of those poses-
sions. This proposal was modified to provide for advance diplomatic
clearance with the governments in power at the time of occupation and it
was expanded to include the Danish possessions (Iceland and Greenland).
It was then incorporated in the May 30, 1940, war plan, RAINBOW, 4, where
it was identified by the code name POT OF GOLD.
"Protective seizure" reached its final form in one of the documents
produced by the Consultative Meeting of Pan American Foreign Ministers
at Havana, July 21-27, 1940. Entitled the Act of Havana, this agreement
provided for temporary administration of European possessions by the
American Republics if such became necessary to prevent transfer of those
properties to another non-American power. A supplementary resolution
established an emergency committee to implement the provisions of the
Act in the event it was necessary to do so before the Act itself came
Into formal effect. This resolution also recognized that each American
Republic has "a right to act in the manner which its own defense or that
of the Continent requires," (i.e., seizure of European possessions) uni-
laterally or jointly, when "the need for emergency action • . • fisj so
17. Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense , p. 47; also Watson




urgent that action by the committee cannot be awaited."
These numerous antecedents on the 3ases side of the Destroyers-
Bases exchange had two counterparts on the Destroyers side. First, the
United States Minister to Norway, Mrs. J. Borden, Harriman, suggested
to the President in January 194.0 that some of the United States old,
unequipped destroyers be transferred to Norway. This suggestion was re-
jected by the President on two grounds: the ships were needed for the
Neutrality Patrol which had been established the preceding September and
19
the sale would be unlawful. It should be noted, however, that Norway's
situation at that time was not nearly so desperate as was Britain's
eight months later.
The second counterpart event was a French request for destroyers.
It was first made on May 14, 1940, just after the German invasion of
France. The United States Ambassador to France, William C. Bullitt,
supported the request. He had heard convincing arguments from the
French fleet commander and from the Minister of Marine, and he thought
the United States had an excess of old "four-stack" destroyers (above
the fifty in use on the Neutrality Patrol) which France could use to
counter Italian attacks on British and French shipping in the Mediter-
ranean. On May 16 the United States informed France that no destroyers
could be spared, and that any sale or cession would weaken the defenses
of the United States and perhaps have serious repercussions in the
18. U.S., Executive Agreement Series , No. 199, "Provisional Administration
of European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas," p. 16.
19. Donald F. Drummond, The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937-1941
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955), p. 166; and
Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1923-1945
(2 volumes, New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), Vol. 2,
p. 986.
20. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 volumes, New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1948), Vol. I, p. 831.
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Pacific. It was also pointed out that the question would have to be de-
cided by Congress and that Congressional approval seemed unlikely at that
21
time.
The French did not consider this a final rejection, however, and
the plea for destroyers was renewed in a telephone call from Premier
22
Reynaud to President Roosevelt on June 5, 1940. This request was also
denied because of the Navy's large sea patrol commitment, the anticipated
unwillingness of Congress to grant its approval, and the inability to
declare the old destroyers obsolete at the very tirae when they were being
23
reconditioned and prepared for recommissioning. As the French situation
grew more desperate, the President considered transferring a few de-
stroyers, but the Chief of Naval Operations was adamant in his opposition
for the reasons already noted and because replacing the destroyers would
24
take too long (two or three years). The fall of France and the Franco-
German Armistice of June 22, 1940, put to rest all plans for transfer-
ring destroyers to France, but by that time the Anglo-American discus-
sions which eventually produced the Destroyers-Bases exchange had already
begun.
21. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull
,
Vol. I, p. 832.
22. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation
, p. 513.
23. The Memoirs of Corde'li "Hull , Vol. 1, p. 832.





Development of the Anglo-American Exchange, Hay - August 1940
The Anglo-American exchange had a long and turbulent gestation.
Development of the exchange was possible because British and United
States interests were complementary. For the United States, a strength-
ening of the Royal Navy meant a strengthening of the main barrier pre-
venting any transatlantic moves by Germany. The strategic value of
bases in the Western Hemisphere was recognized and preventing the transfer
of such bases to antagonistic powers was considered essential, but the
United States Army was too small to use or develop any additional bases
effectively. As mentioned earlier, the Navy already had a non-public ar-
rangement by which its ships and aircraft were authorized to enter and
use the ports and facilities at Bermuda, Trinidad, and Newfoundland.*
These observations tend to support the conclusion drawn by one author that
the bases were not acquired in response to military demands, but as a
political move: the Army and Navy were given the bases and directed to
2integrate them into their plans for hemispheric defense. It is also pos-
sible that the bases were acquired in part as a political •smokescreen,*
designed to make direct aid to Britain more easily accepted by Congress and
the general public by presenting it in the guise of an exchange rather than
an outright gift.
Such political motivation was certainly a part of the environment from
which the Destroyers-Bases exchange emerged, but it was not the sole or
1. See pp. 7-8 above.





even the principal source of inspiration. There was an awareness that
in a long-term context, the bases (when developed) would be of much
greater military value than the old and obsolete ships which were trans-
ferred in exchange.
Britain's first request for destroyers was made on May 15, 1940,
via two channels: Prime Minister Churchill sent a telegram to President
Roosevelt and he had a conference with the United States Ambassador,
Joseph P. Kennedy.
In his telegram, the Prime Minister warned the President that the
Nazi conquest of Europe was proceeding at an astonishingly rapid rate,
and that if greater assistance from the United States were withheld much
longer, complete German victory might be achieved in Europe. Intimating
that Britain might not be able to withstand the threat of a Nazi-dominated
Europe, the Prime Minister asked the President to "proclaim non-belligerency,"
a status which he defined as helping "with everything short of actually en-
gaging armed forces."-* The first item of help requested was "the loan of
forty or fifty of your [America's 1 older destroyers" which the Prime Mini-
ster said were required to augment the Royal Navy until British ships that
had been started at the outbreak of the war could be completed. Assuring
the President that Britain would have plenty of ships by mid-1941, he said
he was afraid Britain might be "strained to the breaking-point" if, in
the meantime, Italy entered the war and turned her hundred submarines
against British merchant shipping and naval forces.
In his interview with Ambassador Kennedy, the Prime Minister took a
more determined attitude toward the future, saying that so long as he
3. Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour , volume 2 of The Second World




remained in a position of power or influence, Britain would never sur-
render, even if it were burned to the ground. He even suggested that
the British government and the Royal Navy would, if necessary, move to
Canada and continue the war from there. 5 In spite of this determination,
the Prime Minister still acknowledged that Britain needed American help.
When the Ambassador asked what the United States could do to aid Britain,
the Prime Minister suggested the loan of 30 or 40 old destroyers, as well
as any aircraft which could be spared. The Ambassador promptly reported
this conversation to the Department of State. The President thus re-
ceived the British request for destroyers directly from the Prime Minister
and via Ambassador Kennedy at about the same time.
The President answered the Prime Minister promptly. In a telegram
of May 16, 1940, he did not specifically deny the request, but offered
several reasons why the loan of old ships was unlikely. The President
told the Prime Minister that no loan could be made "except with the spe-
cific authorization of the Congress," and he added that he was not sure
any such suggestion would be wise at the moment. Aside from this con-
stitutional difficulty, the President indicated that he was very doubtful
whether even the temporary loan of the ships could be reconciled with the
demands placed on American forces by hemispheric defense requirements and
American obligations in the Pacific, Finally, he pointed out that if a
loan could be arranged, "it would be at least 6 or 7 weeks, as a minimum"
before the ships could enter active service with the Royal Navy. 7 Since
the Prime Minister had emphasized the urgency of the need for the destroyers
5, William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Cha l lenge to Isolation
.
1937-1940, p, 482, citing and quot_ng from Ambassador Kennedy's
telegram of Fay 15, 1940.
6, U.S., Department of State, Foreign Re lations of the United States:
Diplomatic Papers
,
1940 (Washington, 1953), Vol. Ill, p. 49.
7, Ibid ., p. 50.
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in the immediate future, this comment indicated that the President be-
lieved the American destroyers would not arrive in time to be of much
assistance, even if all other difficulties were resolved.
After this initial exchange between the heads of government, most
of the destroyer-transfer activity was shifted to another channel, the
one through which material aid to Britain and France had been arranged
since the war began. The key persons forming this channel were Jean
Monnet of France who was head of the Anglo-French Co-ordinating Committee
in London, Arthur B. Purvis, chairman of the British Purchasing Commission
and the Anglo-French Purchasing Board in Washington, and Secretary of the
Treasury Henry Korgenthau, who was responsible for arranging most Ameri-
can aid in the period before the United States entered the war. This
Monnet -Purvis -Korgenthau channel was particularly effective because
Korgenthau and Purvis were very close friends and shared a strong mutual
confidence and trust.
The destroyer transfer proposal entered this line of communication
immediately after the lay 15-16 exchange of telegrams between the Presi-
dent and the Prime Minister. On Kay 17, Konnet sent a statement of "most
urgent" supply needs to the President via Purvis and Korgenthau." This
list carried destroyers as a leading item. Although the President's re-
ply (via the same intermediaries) on Kay 18 repeated the position that
the time was not propitious for acquiring the necessary Congressional ap-
proval, the issue was not allowed to lapse.
On May 28, under instructions from the British Government, Purvis
sent a note on naval priorities to Morgenthau. This note asked for 48
destroyers and renewed an earlier request for motor torpedo boats. On
8. H. Duncan flail, north American Supply , p. 79.
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June 5, in the wake of "confidential information" that the President
was reconsidering the possibilities of transferring destroyers, Purvis
was directed to raise the subject of destroyers again and maintain pres-
q
sure for a loan or transfer.
By this time, it appears that even the British Admiralty had be-
come optimistic about the prospects of receiving some American destroyers,
due perhaps to the sane mysterious "confidential information" mentioned
above. On June 6, the Admiralty asked Purvis to find out the operating
characteristics of the available types of destroyers and advised him that
it placed first priority on maximum readiness for service, with maximum
operating endurance as its second preference.
There is evidence that during the first part of June, 1940, the
President was firmly opposed to any destroyer transfer. He held this
position for several reasons in addition to the difficulty in getting
Congressional approval and the demands created by the needs of United
States defense. In a memorandum to Under Secretary of State Welles on
June 1, he repeated his belief that the United States could not dispose
of the destroyers by declaring them obsolete because similar vessels were
then being used and the remainder were being refitted for use.**- On
June 6, at a luncheon with the Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes,
the President said he thought the old American destroyers would not be
of much use to the British because of their age, their limited fire power,
and their lack of anti-aircraft weapons. He also expressed a concern
that the effects of a destroyer transfer might be the reverse of those
9. Hall, North American Supply, p. 79. The source of the "confidential
information" is unknown, but it appears. to have been false.
10. Ibid ., pp. 78, 80.




anticipated by supporters of the proposal: It might antagonize f.<=rmany
and seriously weaken the United States without providing materia* as ~
sistance to Britain and her allies. It is likely therefore th»t when
direct British requests for destroyers were renewed on June 11, 1 0^0,
they encountered a strong inclination toward refusal.
One June 11, 1940, the day after Italy declared war and four weeks
after his first suggestion that the United States lend Britain s<»«ie old
destroyers, the Prime Minister sent another telegram to the President.
In this message he spoke again of the need for destroyers, describing itt
in view of "the Italian outrage," as "even more pressing" than tha need
for the aircraft and flying boats which were desired to help rep^l an an-
ticipated invasion of the British Isles.^ Noting the possibility that
the Italian submarine fleet might move to the Atlantic and perhaps operate
from Spanish ports, the Prime Minister stressed the need for additional
destroyers in anti-submarine and convoy work, saying: "Nothing h so
important as for us to have the thirty or forty old destroyers y«>u have
already had reconditioned."*^
Perhaps sensing the Presidents concern that a transfer might impair
United States defenses, the Prime Minister placed emphasis on th« tempo-
rary nature of the proposed transfer and the necessity for immediate
action:
... [the old destroyersl will bridge the gap of six months
before our wartime new construction comes into play. We will
return them or their equivalents to you, without fail, at
six months* notice if at any time you need them. The ne?<t
12. The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, Volume III: The Lowering Clouds ,
1939-1941 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), pp. 199, 200.





six months are vital. If while we have to guard the East Coast
(of Britain] against invasion a new heavy German- 1 tali an sub-
marine attack is launched against our commerce the strain may
be beyond our resources and the ocean traffic by which we live
may be strangled. Not a day should be lost. 15
If the President made a direct response to this message it is not
available, but the information received by the British government via
Purvis and the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, was not encouraging.
They reported that the President was not convinced that the destroyers
should be transferred and that he was concentrating his efforts on at-
tempts to fulfill other needs of the allies.^ It was probably in re-
sponse to this report that the Prime Minister's next messages included a
detailed statement of British destroyer losses.
On the night of June 14-15, the eve of the French defeat, the Prime
Minister submitted yet another request to the President, this time for
35 destroyers to "bridge the gap" until new construction became avail-
able. 1 This message contained a comprehensive summary of Britain's dif-
ficult position and an eloquent admonition of what the future might bear
for the United States if it failed to act quickly. The Prime Minister
warned that a German invasion could produce a pro-German government in
Britain and that this might mean that the Royal- Navy would fall under
German control. In such a contingency, Mr. Churchill said, the combina-
tion of the French, British, Japanese and Italian fleets supported by
German industrial power could reverse the balance of seapower, suddenly and
"certainly long before the United States would be able to prepare against itj*^
15. Churchill, Their Finest Hour
, p. 117.
16. Hall, North American Supply
, p. 141.




He also warned darkly of a Europe united under Nazi control that would
be "far more numerous, far stronger, far better armed than the New
World." 19
On June 26, following the fall of France, the British appeal was
strengthened by a personal request for destroyers from King George VI to
20President Roosevelt. The impact of this and the immediately preceding
requests is not clear. Certainly the persistence of the British appeals
gave added urgency to the situation and probably led to frequent recon-
sideration of the question, but there is no evidence to indicate that the
United States position had changed by the end of June 1940. The month of
June had instead brought the development of a new impediment to a destroyer
transfer. The product of another exchange proposal, it took the form of
an amendment to a military appropriations bill.
At the end of May 1940, the Chief of Naval Operations had approved a
request that 20 motor torpedo boats then under construction for the Navy
be completed for and delivered to British forces. In theory, the Navy
was returning the as-yet unfinished boats to the manufacturer in exchange
for craft of a better design to be built and delivered at a later date.
When this arrangement was uncovered in mid-June by Senator David I. Walsh,
isolationist chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, he raised a
loud cry of objection. On June 14, the Secretary of the Navy notified
the President that the whole Senate Committee had been stirred up over the
21
question of - val aid to the allies in all its forms. Aware of the ex-
tensive implications of this situation, the. President told the British
Ambassador on June 17 that as a result of the difficulties encountered in
19. Churchill, Their Finest Hour
, p. 167.
'
20. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation , p. 565.
21. Ibid ., p. 521.
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the torpedo boat arrangement, it would be impossible to get Congressional
22
consent for a transfer of destroyers.
On the following day the situation was complicated still further by
the Acting Secretary of the Navy, who issued a premature announcement
that the Navy had released 20 partially completed motor torpedo boats to
Britain, for later replacement with newer models. Senator Walsh and
others made such vigorous objection that the President referred the mat-
ter to the Attorney General for a determination of the legality of the
proposed transfer. The Attorney General advised the President that the
transfer would be contrary to the Neutrality Act of June 15, 1917, which
prohibited the sale of a vessel constructed with the intention of being
delivered to a belligerent. As a result, on June 25 the President can-
celled the earlier announcement and the whole torpedo boat transfer was
23
abandoned.
At first, it was thought that the proposed destroyer transfer would
be barred by the same Attorney General's opinion which forced cancella-
tion of the torpedo boat transfer; however, more direct and formidable
barriers to the destroyer transfer were soon established. In the wake of
the agitation over the torpedo boat proposal, the Naval Expansion Bill
which was then before Congress was amended. When enacted on June 28, it
included a provision reaffirming the Act of June 15, 1917, as a prohibi-
tion against the sale of vessels of war to a belligerent, and also a
clause prohibiting the disposal of any military or naval material unless
the Chief of Staff or Chief of Naval Operations, as appropriate, certi-
fied that such material was "not essential to the defense of the United
22. Hall, North American Supply
, p. 141. *
23. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation






States." The President interpreted this as effectively forbidding a
destroyer transfer. On July 2, 1940, he told Interior Secretary Ickes
that because of the amendment, destroyers could not be sent to Britain
unless the Navy could certify that they were not useful for American de-
fense. Since the sane ships were then undergoing renovation in order to
be used in naval operations required by national defense, any such certi-
fication would be contrary to the facts. "*
It was only about a week after the Prime Minister first requested
the loan of 50 American destroyers that Lord Lothian first suggested that
the United States be given bases in Britain's Western Hemisphere posses-
sions. In a message to the Foreign Office on Kay 24, 1940, he proposed
that Britain grant the United States the right to construct air and sea
bases on those British territories which occupied strategic locations
relative to the United States. He urged that these rights be granted
spontaneously to satisfy public opinion in the United States and smooth
the way for additional aid to Britain. In his recommendation, Lothian
specifically mentioned 3ermuda, Trinidad and Newfoundland, and he proposed
that the offer be limited to certain clearly defined rights, with no
change of sovereignty or sale of territory contemplated. '
Lothian's proposal was first referred to the British Chiefs of Staff,
who approved it on the grounds it would be advantageous to both countries
while contributing to the efforts to cultivate pro-British sentiment in
the United States. The proposal then went to the Cabinet. It anticipated
24. U.S., Public Law No. 67
1
,
76th Cong., 2d sess. (June 28, 1940),
Section 14(a).
25. The President considered the Act of June 28 to be a barrier to a
destroyer transfer or exchange as late as July 22, 1940, .as reflected
in his comment on the Cohen memorandum. See p. 38 below.
26. J.R.M. Butler, Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) 1882-1940
, p. 294; Sir
Llewellyn Woodward, Brit is h Foreign Policy in the Second World War
, p. 82,
27. J.R.M. Butler, Grand Strategy . Vol. 2, p. 244.
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disadvantageous side-effects from implementing the suggestion, such as
the likelihood that isolationists would accuse Britain of trying to
draw the United States into the war and the possibility that the move
would be interpreted everywhere as a sign of despair. Concluding that
the plan would not produce sufficient benefits to outweigh these dis-
advantages, the Cabinet, after discussing the suggestion on May 27 and
29, decided not to implement it.
Lord Lothian asked for a reconsideration of his suggestion on
June 22, 1940.28 Emphasizing his certainty that such an offer would
fulfill existing United States defense requirements, he implied that
the United States might be expected to reciprocate in some way, but this
had no immediate effect on the Cabinet's decision.
The subject of United States bases in British possessions had also
been raised by Canada. On June 16, the Canadian Prime Minister, William
Lyon Mackenzie King, in replying to a telegram from Prime Minister
Churchill, suggested that the gap in Canadian defenses be plugged by
urging the United States to develop bases in Iceland, Greenland, New-
foundland, and the British West Indies. 29 The United States learned of
this suggestion via its Ambassador to Canada, Pierrepont Moffat, who was
informed of it when he was arranging conferences with the Canadian De-
30fense Ministers before returning to Washington on July 1 for consultation.
Moffat received much more direct proposals from the Defense Ministers
themselves. They suggested that long range aircraft conducting reconnais-
sance of Greenland could make ostensibly * forced* stops in Canada and
28. Butler, Lord Lothian , p. 294.
29. J. W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, Volume I; 1939-1944
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 125.
30. Ibid ., p. 126.
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that American •volunteers' (with their aircraft) could be allowed to go
to Canada. They also said that the United States could aid Canada and
Britain, who were struggling to protect democracy everywhere, by renting,
purchasing or acquiring land for the development of United States air
bases in the West Indies and Newfoundland. 31
In the first days of July, Lord Lothian again presented to the
British government a recommendation that the United States be granted
the right to develop bases in strategically located British territories
in the Western Hemisphere. J£- In its initial reply, the Foreign Office
advised Lothian that such an idea could only be considered as part of a
broader arrangement for Anglo-American strategic cooperation. Lothian
submitted additional reports on July 8 and 10. In these he told of
Secretary of State Hull's fear that the forthcoming Pan-American con-
ference at Havana would produce a demand for the United States to seize
control of the Caribbean territories owned by non-American states. He
also said he had been contacted by Secretary of the Navy Knox with a
suggestion that the United States acquire bases in British possessions
in return for a cancellation of Britain's war debts, a proposal which
Lothian rejected on the grounds that the United States and Britain viewed
the war-debt issue from very different angles. Lothian also explained
that the failure of the United States to use the rights which had been
accorded to its forces at St. Lucia, Bermuda, and Trinidad in 1939 was
31. Colonel Stanley W. Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United
States and Canada, 1939-1945 , a volume in the series United States
Army in World War II: Special Studies (Washington: Office of the Chief
of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959), pp. 14-15; and
Nancy Harvison Hooker, ed., The Moffat Papers: Selections from the
Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, 1919-1943 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 317.
32. Butler, Lord Lothian





due to adverse public opinion in Che United States, He reported that
this situation had changed, however, and that public opposition had weak-
ened and the President now wanted positions from which the United States
could, if necessary, intervene in South America to oppose German sub-
version.
"
The idea of granting bases to the United States dropped out of dis-
cussion for about ten days and then it was revived by the Foreign Office
and presented to the Cabinet with the support of the Chiefs of Staff.
Five major arguments were presented in favor of offering the bases to the
United States:
1. The offer would encourage the United States to reciprocate with
greater quantitites of urgently needed aid.
2. It would impress upon the United States the significance of Anglo-
American ties.
3. It would aid in United States defense of the Western Hemisphere
while relieving the Royal Navy of some of its responsibilities in defend-
ing the Western Atlantic area. It would shift some of the burdens of sea
power to the United States Navy.
A. It would best be done as a unilateral act because an exchange or
sale would add to an existing debt difficulty that was expected to get
worse anyway.
5, It would reward the United States for tacitly assisting in the
war effort by tolerating British war measures such as the blockade, which
34
the United States could have profitted from ignoring, had it so desired.
The War Cabinet discussed for several days the proposal to give bases
33, Woodward, British Foreign Policy
, p. 83 and footnote, p. 83.
34. Ibid
., pp. 83-84; Butler, Grand Strategy , Vol. 2, p. 245.
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to the United States and on July 29 it decided to offer the bases es-
sentially as suggested by Lothian. For unknown reasons, however, this
decision was not communicated to Lothian, nor was an explicit offer made
to the United States until the first week of August, after the Prime
Minister had renewed his request for destroyers.
The destroyer transfer idea and the plan to grant the United States
bases in British territory thus developed along separate lines. In retro-
spect it appears logical that sooner or later the two should have been
combined into a single transaction. Determining just when this occurred
or who, if any single person, was responsible for it has not been possible.
One distinguished naval historian attributes an agreement "in principle"
on a Destroyers-Bases exchange to the President, the Prime Minister and
the Secretary of the Navy and sets the date of the agreement at July 24,
351940. Others cite an earlier date and recall that an exchange was
first mentioned by the President during a conference with William Allen
White on June 29, 1940. Still another team of historians does not
place a date on the development of the exchange idea, but attributes it to
the Century Group described below. They also observe that the remarkable
feature is not that the Century Group struck on the idea, but that it was
not developed sooner, especially since many newspapers had been promoting
a bases-for-war-debts exchange for several years.-''
35. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic: September 1939-May
1943 , volume 1 of History of United States Naval Operations in World
War II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947), pp. 33-34.
36. Philip Goodhart, Fifty Ships t hat Saved the World: The Foundation of
the Anglo-American Alliance (Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday and Company,
1965), p. 121; and Walter Johnson, The Battle Against Isolation
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1944), p. 91.




The Century Group referred to above was a small body of influential
persons with relatively internationalist ideas. They had joined together
informally in early June to educate the public in the dangers which the
European war held for the United States and to offer an offensive program
to meet those dangers. Generally speaking, the Group favored intervention
by the United States, and, as an alternative, aid to Britain in excess of
that permitted by existing laws. It was closely related to William Allen
White*s Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, mostly through
dual membership. The Century Group met on July 11, 19&0, to formulate a
program for American assistance to Britain. The proposals released on
July 12 called for a formal treaty (requiring ratification with the advice
and consent of the Senate) with Britain to cover massive aid (especially
food), using United States ships to convoy it to Britain if necessary;
the defense of Britain by American forces; legalization of loans to Brit-
ain; and a speeding up of munitions shipments. In exchange for this aid
the British were to be asked to guarantee that the Royal Navy would be
moved to the Western Hemisphere and continue to fight in the event the
British Isles were invaded and subjugated. 3°
In its discussions on July 11, the Group had also touched upon the
idea of exchanging destroyers for bases. Key members of the group, in-
cluding columnist Joseph Alsop, consulted with 3ritish and American mili-
tary and civil officials and discussed their ideas with and received as-
sistance from Lord Lothian. On July 25 the Century Group met again and
heard a report by Alsop which outlined the extent of existing support for
a Destroyers-Bases exchange and listed some of the ways in which the
38. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation , p. 711.
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39transaction could be accomplished. The report mentioned a Congres-
sional method in which new legislation would authorize the exchange, but
this was written off as hopeless because of the presence in the Senate
of a staunch isolationist bloc, A legal course involving evasion of
existing laws by making hair-splitting distinctions and debatable inter-
pretations was also available, but it was deemed inferior to a political
course based on the combined support of the President and his opponent in
the forthcoming election, Republican presidential nominee, Wendell Willkie.
From the contents of Alsop's report, the Century Group drafted a
memorandum to be submitted to the President and Mr, Willkie for their
approval. It would then be used as the basis of a campaign to raise public
support and generate political pressure. The memorandum said America's
most important protection against invasion was the presence of the British
Fleet in the North Atlantic, It also argued that the continued presence
of that fleet depended on the ability of the British Isles to resist the
Nazi invasion which then appeared imminent. Stating that "the British
chances of success are at present doubtful; but responsible British offi-
cials believe that they could successfully withstand invasion if they had
one hundred more destroyers," the memorandum outlined the availability of
United States destroyers and the ability of the Royal Navy to put them
into immediate service. It concluded that "in the interests of its own
national defense the United States should put a hundred of these destroyers
into British hands at once,"^" In return for the destroyers the memorandum
proposed a pledge by the British government concerning the future of its
fleet and "immediate naval and air concessions in British possessions in
39, Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation , pp. 766 ff.
40. Ibid,, p, 7A7.
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the Western Hemisphere." This memorandum and the plans of the Century
Group vere presented to the President by Clark Eichelberger, Herbert Agar
and Ward Cheney, three leading members of the Group, on August 1, 1940.
The President's apparently non-committal response was a disappointment
to the Group, but it decided to carry out its plan for building public
support in hopes that the President's hesitancy would be removed by
public approval of the exchange proposal. 1
One key development in the destroyer transfer scheme occurred on
July 19, 1940, when the President was sent a memorandum by his adviser,
Benjamin V. Cohen. This memo was a harbinger of much of the thought and
legal interpretation through which the Destroyers-Bases exchange was ul-
timately justified. It was prepared by Mr. Cohen at the instigation of
Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, who was deeply distressed by the
possibility of a British defeat. Justice Frankfurter also believed that
it would be possible to interpret United States laws in a way that would
make it possible to render more aid to Britain. ^ Entitled "Sending Ef-
fective Material Aid to Great Britain with Particular Reference to the
Sending of Destroyers," the Cohen memorandum was a twelve page legal
analysis which argued that under existing statutes the President already
had the power to transfer destroyers to Britain without further Congres-
sional approval. The memorandum deserves detailed study because it con-
tains almost all of the arguments and legal interpretations which were
employed to legitimize the Destroyers-Bases exchange.
41. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation
, p. 749; and Goodhart,
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Kr. Cohen began by pointing out the degree to which British sea
power contributed to the defense of the United States. By resisting
Germany- -even if she were ultimately def eated--Britain kept that ag-
gressor occupied and prevented an attack on the United States. Under
those circumstances, Mr. Cohen argued, assistance to Britain should
properly be considered a contribution to the defense of the United
States. He said it would be unwise to interpret laws which had been
enacted to assist in national defense in such a way that they prevented
actions which were required by a "realistic appreciation of the inter-
ests of our national self-defense.
"
Finding the issue of transferring some old but reconditioned
destroyers to be the most urgent question regarding aid to Britain, Mr.
Cohen listed the ways that such ships could be lawfully released from
the Navy and sold to private owners. An act of August 29, 1916 au-
thorized the Secretary of the Navy to sell certain classes of auxiliary
vessels that were 18 or more years old and "unsuited to the present
needs of the Navy"; another act (March 3, 1901) authorized the Presi-
dent to establish and to modify when needed the classification of naval
vessels. Mr. Cohan suggested that the President could reclassify the
old destroyers to put them into a category which the Secretary of the
Navy was authorized to sell under the Act of August 29, 1916, If the
Secretary of the Navy then certified the vessels to be "unsuited to the
present needs of the Navy" and the Chief of Naval Operations, in compli-
ance with the Act of June 28, 1940, certified that they were not essential
43. Memorandum, Ben V. Cohen to Miss Marguerite Le Hand, July 19, 1940,
with enclosed memorandum for the President, U. S. National Archives,
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Unless otherwise noted, subsequent




to national defense, they could be sold to private owners. Mr. Cohen
argued that it would be perfectly legal and proper for these certifi-
cates to be issued if both the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of
Naval Operations found that releasing the vessels would be more bene-
ficial to United States defenses than retaining them. Under Mr.
Cohen's assumptions regarding the role of the Royal Navy in American
defense, such a finding would be justified. To support his position
that it would be improper to interpret the details of the laws so lit-
erally as to prevent a course of conduct that would be consistent with
the basic objectives of the same laws, Mr. Cohen cited three Supreme
Court cases in which it was held proper to construe the words of a law
44
so as to give reasonable effect to the intent of the legislature.
As an alternative method for legally disposing of the ships, Mr.
Cohen cited an Act of August 5, 1882 which gave the Secretary of the
Navy authority to strike from the naval register those vessels found
unfit for further service and those under construction whose completion
would be excessively costly. Under an Act of March 3, 1883, the Secre-
tary of the Navy was empowered to sell any such vessels at public sale
for not less than their appraised value "or in such other manner as the
President may direct in writing." Mr. Cohen therefore suggested that
the Secretary could declare the destroyers unfit for service or unworthy
of the cost of rehabilitation and order them stricken from the register.
They could then be sold to private owners or, if the President gave the
requisite written instructions, they could even be transferred directly
to Britain.
44. U.S. v. Dickerson , S.E.C. v. U.S. Realty and Improvement: Corporation,
and U.S. v. American Trucking Association , all heard in the Supreme
Court's October 1939 term.
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Mr. Cohen even found a third method for a lawful transfer of the
ships. This scheme was based upon the fact that the Army was authorized
to exchange or trade-in obsolescent equipment for other military ma-
terial. Since there were provisions for free interchange of materials
between the Army and Navy, Mr. Cohen argued that naval materials should
not be placed under more severe restrictions than Army materials. Whon
applied to the proposed destroyer transfer, this meant that, pursuant
to the Act of July 11, 1919 authorizing inter-service exchanges, the
Secretary of War could request and the Secretary of the Navy could ap-
prove the transfer of the old destroyers to the Army. If the Army Chief
of Staff would then certify that the ships were not essential to national
defense (as required by the Act of June 28, 19&0), the Secretary of War
could, under an act of July 2, 19^0, enter a contract to exchange the
obsolescent material for other military supplies which were in short
supply. Mr. Cohen* s first step was thus to outline three ways in which,
under existing laws, the old destroyers could be transferred from the
government to private owners.
The next step was to establish the legality of a subsequent trans-
fer of the ships from private owners to Britain, Thus, in the third
section of his memorandum, Mr. Cohen analyzed and discussed the provi-
sions of international and United States law bearing on this point.
Noting that under international law, private persons in a neutral coun-
try are free to sell contraband materials to belligerents subject only
to the risk of confiscation by an opposing belligerent, Mr. Cohen stated
that the precise rules regulating the sale of armed vessels by private
neutrals to belligerents were the subject of considerable debate and
difference of opinion. Nevertheless, he found agreement among
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international law authorities that the pertinent basic rule prohibited
a neutral nation from allowing itself to be used as a base from which
a belligerent could conduct hostile operations. After citing the cases
of The Santissima Trinidad and The Meteor , in which warships, like arms
and ammunitions, were held to be absolute contraband (implying that they
could be sold by private persons at the risk of confiscation), Mr. Cohen
examined the rules of international law relating to duties of a neutral.
He studied "The Three Rules of Washington" formulated during negotia-
tion of the Treaty of Washington (1871) and the Alabama claims case,
and the rules contained in the Thirteenth Convention of the Second Hague
Conference (1907). In all these cases Mr. Cohen found nothing to pro-
hibit the sale of warships to a belligerent, provided the vessels had
not been built for or at the order of the belligerent. He also found
that the United States was free to let warships which passed the above
test depart from her ports so long as they were only supplied with suf-
ficient crew and provisions to transit directly to the belligerent's
nearest port without conducting hostile operations en route. Mr. Cohen
thus concluded the sale of a warship by a private citizen was, under cer-
tain circumstances related to the reason for constructing the vessel and
the extent of its manning, perfectly consistent with the duties of a
neutral under international law.
In discussing and analyzing pertinent domestic laws, Mr. Cohen once
again began by asserting that it would be necessary to keep the purpose
of legislation in mind and to interpret the words of the law so as to
achieve that purpose. On this point, Mr. Cohen argued that the purpose
of domestic legislation was simply to place the aforementioned rules of
international law into effect; there was no intent to extend or expand
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upon those rules and it vould be improper to interpret the laws in a
way that did so. It was with such a construction in mind that Mr.
Cohen examined the three pieces of domestic law which affected a
transfer of warships.
The first piece of legislation cited by Mr, Cohen is a criminal
law which had its origin in an act of June 5, 1794, That act was
passed to prevent the fitting out and supporting of French privateers
in United States ports; its contemporary version established the punish-
ment of one who engaged in the fitting out or arming of "any vessel
with intent that such vessel shall be employed in the service of , . ,
["foreign persons or governments! , , , to cruise, or commit hostilities
against any ["foreign persons or governments"; , , , with whom the United
States are at peace , , ,"^ 5 Mr. Cohen argued that the intent of this
law was properly interpreted and implemented by the Supreme Court in
the case of The Santissima Trinidad when it was found that the act did
not bar the sale of a warship as a commercial enterprise. There was
held to be no violation of neutrality unless it had been intended that
the vessel conduct hostile operations en route from the United States
to the belligerent's port.
The other two pieces of domestic legislation which Mr, Cohen found
to be relevant were both part of the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917,
Section 503 of this act reads as follows:
During a war in which the United States is a neutral
nation, it shall be unlawful to send out of the jurisdic-
tion of the United States any vessel built, armed, or
equipped as a vessel of war, or converted from a private
vessel into a vessel of war, with any intent or under any
agreement or contract, written or oral, that such vessel




shall be delivered to a belligerent nation, or to an
agent, officer, or citizen of such nation, or with
reasonable cause to believe that the said vessel shall
or will be employed in the service of any such bel-
ligerent nation after its departure from the jurisdic-
tion of the United States.^ 6
Mr. Cohen argued that this section, in spite of its ambiguous language,
only made it illegal to send out of the United States any warship
fitted out or converted on the order or specification of a belligerent
state, whether or not there was an intent or expectation that the ves-
sel would engage in hostilities before reaching a belligerent port,
Mr. Cohen declared that the act did not prohibit the sending out of
any warship when there was an intent or expectation that it would enter
the service of a belligerent, because an investigation of the act's
legislative history revealed that the Senate deleted a provision spe-
cifically prohibiting such a "sending out" from the House of Representa-
tives version of the bill and inserted instead the wording suggested
by the Attorney General. The Senate version was accepted by the House
in conference committee. Mr. Cohen concluded that Section 503 of the
Espionage Act only prohibited the sending out of warships built or con-
verted to the specification or order of a belligerent. Since the old
destroyers were clearly not in this group, Section 503 would not prevent
their being sent out of the United States.
Section 502 of the Espionage Act was also interpreted as being en-
acted to support the obligations placed on the United States by inter-
national law. This section gave the President the power to detain in
United States ports any vessel of war (except a foreign public vessel)
until he had received satisfactory procf that the vessel would not be




used to commit hostilities or be sold to a belligerent while it was
in United States territorial waters or on the high seas after leaving
such waters. This would not interfere with the departure of a vessel
which was to be transferred or sold in its next port, whether neutral
or belligerent. Mr. Cohen concluded, therefore, that the old destroyers
could be permitted to leave the United States and sail to a neutral
port (or a belligerent port not closed to United States vessels by the
Neutrality Act of 1939) provided the President was convinced that the
vessels would not engage in belligerent actions en route and even though
he knew that the ships would be sold or transferred to a belligerent
once they reached their destination. Mr. Cohen even went further and
suggested that if similar assurances were obtained the vessels could be
sold in a United States port and then depart immediately.
In a footnote, Mr, Cohen pointed out that his whole proposal was
based on the assumption that the destroyers would be transferred via
private owners. If it were done directly between governments, he ob-
served, the domestic legislation would be no problem, since it was ap-
plicable only to individuals and not to the goverment. At the same time,
Mr. Cohen acknowledged that a direct governmental transfer would be a
clear violation of the rules of international law as understood by him
and most authorities on the subject. Still, he suggested that this
course could be justified as a proper reprisal for Germany's violation
of the Kellogg Peace Pact. Stating that "International law rests upon
mutuality," Mr. Cohen argued that "There is no particular merit or mo-
rality in neutral countries observing rules of law in their relations




The Cohen memorandum closed with a brief summary of the existing
lawful methods by which destroyers might be sold to private owners who
could then issue the appropriate assurances, remove the vessels to
other ports and sell them to Britain. By bolstering the Royal Navy
and strengthening British sea power, an important element in America's
defensive array would be reinforced.
The Presidents reaction to the Cohen memorandum was recorded in
a note dated July 22 by which the memorandum was forwarded to the Secre-
tary of the Navy for his consideration. In this note the President said
be believed the Chief of Naval Operations/Chief of Staff certification
requirement in the Act of June 28, 1940, was "intended to be a complete
prohibition of sale," and that Mr. Cohen's legal interpretations could
not overcome such a direct Congressional mandate. ' After observing
that Congress was not then in a frame of mind to approve any form of
sale, the President suggested that the Secretary of the Navy consider
requesting Congressional approval for a sale of old destroyers to Canada
at some later date. Such a sale would be made conditional on the use
of the ships in the Western Hemisphere only ("from Greenland to British
Guiana including Bermuda and the West Indies"). The destroyers would
thus continue to be engaged in defending the Americas while releasing
other ships for use elsewhere. The sale would also transfer some of
the burdens of the Neutrality Patrol to Canadian forces.
Another naval matter was a significant factor in decisions affect-
ingthe destroyer-transfer suggestions: the question of the future of
47. Memorandum, President to the Secretary of the Navy, July 22, 1940,
U.S. National Archives, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; also in
Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R. : His Personal Letters, 1928-1945
,




the British Fleet if Germany defeated Britain or occupied the British
Isles. From the United States point of viev, this was a crucial ques-
tion not only because the Royal Navy played a major role in keeping
German military forces confined to Europe, but also because there was
a natural reluctance to release ships if those ships might someday fall
under the control of a potential opponent.
For Britain, the Royal Navy was its strongest card in bargaining
with the United States for support and assistance. Public statements
that the fleet would never surrender were used to prove Britain's stead-
fastness and its dedication to the task of defeating German tyranny;
private implications that a German victory might mean German control of
the seas via control of the British fleet were used to convince the
United States that Britain must be preserved.
As noted earlier, the Prime Minister had told Ambassador Kennedy
on May 15 that Britain would never surrender and implied that if the
worst were to come, the government and the fleet would move to Canada
69
and continue to fight.
The Prime Minister took the opposite tack in his message to the
President on May 20. After repeating that his administration would
never surrender, he warned that a substantial German victory would
probably produce a change of governments and that the current administra-
tion could not predict the conduct of those who "come in to parley amid
the ruins."50 He warned the United States that the British fleet would
be the main bargaining tool for such a government, and that if the
69. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation
, p. 682. These
comments may have been made largely for the Ambassador's benefit
since he was not at that time optimistic about the future of Britain,
50. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 51.
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United States did not come to Britain's aid, "no one would have the
right to blame those then responsible if they made the best terms they
could for the surviving inhabitants,"
This combination of determined statements, usually in public, and
grim warnings, always in private, continued in June. Speaking to Parlia<
ment on June 4, the Prime Minister expressed unwavering determination:
We shall never surrender; and even if, which we do
not for a moment believe, this Island or a large part of
it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond
the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would
carry on the struggle until, in God's good time, the New
World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the
rescue and the liberation of the Old. 52
The British Ambassador in Washington was concerned by this speech.
He notified the Prime Minister of his fear that it would encourage
those who believed there was nothing to be gained from aiding Britain
if the British fleet would move to the United States or Canada in the
event of a German invasion. In his reply, the Prime Minister told the
Ambassador that his public statements had been intended to encourage
the Dominions and to discourage Germany and Italy who sought a short,
swift war. He then informed Lothian of his private messages to the
President, warning of the possible accession of "some Quisling Govern-
ment" which would hand the fleet to Germany. He directed the Ambassador
to discuss this eventuality with the President and "discourage any com-
placent assumption on United States' part that they will pick up the
debris of the British Empire by their present policy." J Churchill
continued: "On the contrary, they run the terrible risk that their







sea-power will be completely over-matched." After predicting that a
victorious Germany would claim islands and naval bases to "hold the
United States in awe," the Prime Minister concluded his discussion-
instructions to the Ambassador with this forecast: "If we go down,
Hitler has a very good chance of conquering the world. "5^ it was a
month later before Lord Lothian was able to report that American public
opinion was beginning to grasp the likelihood that a British defeat
accompanied by American neutrality would mean loss of the British
fleet. Lothian also reported that in spite of this understanding, there
still was not sufficient public support to permit a destroyer transfer
unless it was coupled with a promise that the British fleet (or its
remnants) would move to the United States if Britain fell.
At the end of July, 1940, the many threads of the Destroyers-Bases
exchange began to converge. The proposals for transferring destroyers,
concerns about the future of the British fleet and the question of ad-
ditional bases for hemispheric defense were renewed in rapid sequence
and incorporated into a single complex issue.
On July 31 the Prime Minister sent another of his famous messages
to the President. He described Britain's need for the destroyers and
the other craft which he had requested as "most urgent." He outlined
the tactical and strategic demands on the British fleet, the progress
of ship construction, and the statistics on recent destroyer losses.
He expressed a fear that the whole war could be lost through Britain's
inability, if unreinforced, to withstand the current loss rate. Then
the Prime Minister renewed his plea for "fifty or sixty" of the old






American destroyers. He tactfully suggested that he was confident the
President, having been fully informed of Britain's true situation,
would "leave nothing undone" to make certain the destroyers were sent
to Britain immediately. After outlining how he intended to employ
the transferred vessels, the Prime Minister emphasized the seriousness
of the situation:
Mr, President, with great respect I must tell you that
in the long history of the world this is a thing to do
now. Large construction is coming to me in 1961, but
the crisis will be reached long before 1941, I know
you will do all in your power, but I feel entitled and
bound to put the gravity and urgency of the position
before you.^7
The Prime Minister proceeded to stress the priority attached to de-
stroyers and said that if they were sent, he was sure the other "in-
valuable" items, such as seaplanes and torpedo boats, could also be
supplied.
It was on the day after receiving this urgent message that the
President received the Century Group representatives who presented
their proposal for exchanging destroyers for military concessions in
58
British possessions and a pledge on the future of the Royal Navy.
The President's attitude toward this suggestion may well have been due
to the Prime Minister's grim message and a consequent desire to give
full but cautious consideration to all aid proposals. On the same day,
the President also talked to the British Ambassador, to whom he gave the
impression that he and his advisers were willing to sell 50 or 60 de-
stroyers. But, as Lothian reported to the British government, the
56. Churchill, Their Finest Hour , p. 356.
57. Ibid .
58. See p. 30 above.
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President and his staff felt certain that legislation would be needed
to authorize a transfer, and they anticipated substantial Congressional
opposition to such legi slat ion. ^9 Moreover, there was some apprehen-
sion that the matter might become a major issue in the forthcoming
election campaign, since the President's Republican opponent merely
supported a destroyer transfer "in principle" but refused to pledge non-
opposition to the enabling legislation. The President believed that
the necessary legislation could be passed only if the transaction were
depicted as a step to improve United States and hemispheric defenses
and one which would not increase the danger of entanglement in the
60
European war.
Lothian considered these difficulties facing the President and re-
sponded with two suggestions. On August 1 he presented them first to
the President and later to the Secretary of the Navy. His first pro-
posal was that the United States transfer the old destroyers to the
Royal Canadian Navy, with Canada then assigning the vessels to European
waters. In exchange, the British government would pledge that certain
British cruisers would be assigned to carry out Canada's share of
Western Hemisphere defense in the event Britain were occupied. The
second suggestion was that the destroyers be sold directly to Britain
in exchange for defensive bases in the Western Hemisphere. The
Secretary of the Navy said that only the second alternative had a chance
of receiving Congressional approval. *
Early on August 2, Secretary of the Navy Knox called Secretary of
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the Interior Ickes and related the contents of his discussions of
the previous evening with the British Ambassador. He also told Mr.
Ickes that he had discussed the situation with Secretary of War
Stimson. They had decided to raise the ratter at the Cabinet meeting
scheduled for later that day and to support a proposal to transfer de-
stroyers in exchange for bases and a fleet pledge. Secretary Knox then
asked Secretary Ickes to attend the Cabinet meeting and lend his sup-
63
port to the move, a request to which Mr. Ickes assented.
As the Destroyers-Bases exchange proposal thus approached the
point of formal consideration, the President had the opportunity to in-
form the public that the matter was being considered, but he chose not
to do so. At his August 2 press conference, he was asked whether, as
reported by a Century Group representative, he favored the sale of old
destroyers to Britain. The President replied that he did not think
there was any news on that situation. This response carefully con-
cealed the fact that the matter was about to receive official considera-
tion. When the Cabinet met late in the afternoon on Friday, August 2,
1940, the proposal was not only considered; it was approved.
63. Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes , Vol. 3, p. 283.

CHAPTER III
Negotiation of the Exchange Agreement
t
,
August - September, 1940
When the Cabinet met on August 2, 1940, Secretary Knox reported the
contents of his previous evening's conversation with the British Ambas-
sador, Lord Lothian, He also presented the two methods which the Ambas-
sador had suggested as possible ways to effect a destroyer transfer, with
Knox lending his personal support to the destroyers-for-bases exchange
proposal. This position had the firm support of several other cabinet
members (Ickes, Stimson, and Morgenthau) and seemed to have Presidential
approval as well. After a lengthy discussion in which there was general
agreement that 50 or 60 of the old destroyers should be transferred to
Britain, Secretary of State Hull, recently returned from the Havana con-
ference of Foreign Ministers, pointed out that a sale of British territory
in the Western Hemisphere (even when exchanged for destroyers) might vio-
late the new Havana agreements on non-acquisition and non-transfer of
2territories. Perhaps recalling the 1939 arrangements for using Trinidad,
St. Lucia, and Bermuda, the President suggested that this difficulty could
be avoided by leasing rather than buying the bases.
Having agreed that there would be an exchange of destroyers and bases,
the conversation shifted to the problem of finding a method by which the
exchange could be accomplished. It was decided that authorizing legislation
would be required and that substantial Republican backing would be needed
1, J.R.M. Butler, Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) 1882-1940 , p. 294; The Secret
Diary of Harold L. Ickes, Volume I IT
, p. 292.
2, William L. Langer and S, Everett Gleasoh, The Challenge to Isolation
1937-1940
, pp. 749-750; Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Frame-
work of Hem i sphere Defense
, p, 54,




to pass such legislation. Plans were made to consult with the Republican
leader, Mr. Willkle, and to ask his assistance. It was also decided that
it would be necessary to have an "ironclad guarantee" on the future of
the British fleet to obtain Congressional approval of the transfer. The
British Government would therefore be asked first "to give positive as-
surance that the British Navy, in the event of German success in Great
Britain, would not under any conceivable circumstances fall into the
hands of the Germans," and second, to promise that the vessels of its
fleet "would not be sunk, but would sail for North American or British
Empire ports where they would remain afloat and available."* The Presi-
dent viewed this decision to proceed with an exchange of destroyers for
bases and a fleet pledge as such an important step that he personally pre-
pared a memorandum account of the Cabinet meeting and its conclusions, an
action he reserved for rare and important occasions.
On the same day that the Cabinet approved a Destroyers-Bases exchange,
a draft memorandum on the subject was prepared within the office of the
Chief of Naval Operations. This memorandum, addressed to the Secretary
of the Navy, proposed that the United States demand a cession of all
British possessions in the Western Hemisphere (except Canada), in return
for 50 old destroyers. With respect to this British territory, first
priority was placed on the acquisition of Trinidad-Tobago, Newfoundland
and Bermuda. St. Lucia and British Guiana were included among the second
4. Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense
, p. 56.
5. Elliot Roosevelt, ed., FDR: His Personal Letters 1928-1945 , vol. 2, p. 1050,
6. Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy dated August 2, 1940. Navy
Department Archives. A notation on the face of this document indicates
that it probably never reached the Secretary of the Navy, It is impor-
tant as an indication of sentiments inside the naval staff. An accom-
panying memo of August 2, 1940, possibly a draft of this memorandum,
frankly recognizes any destroyer transfer as a violation of international




priority territories, while Jamaica and the 3ahamas were listed among the
third priority group and the Leeward Islands were assigned the lowest
priority. With respect to the ships, this memorandum said that they
should be delivered to the Royal Navy, fully stocked and supplied, at
Bermuda or Halifax. The memorandum supported a demand for a fleet pledge,
but pointed out that any commitment would not be binding on a successor
government which might be formed to accept a dictated peace or armistice.
One of the most revealing parts of the document concerned the legality
and ultimate effect of a destroyer transfer. The section follows:
Attention is invited to the fact that this transfer of naval
vessels to Great Britain will be contrary to certain revised
£u.S.T statutes and also contrary to international law and
it may be considered a cause for war by Germany. It will
thus require legislation by the Congress with full recogni-
tion of the probability of involvement in the war.^
Meanwhile, Lord Lothian reported to London his conversations with
Secretary Knox and submitted his alternative suggestions for transferring
American destroyers to Canada or exchanging them for Western Atlantic
bases. The Prime Minister's reply on August 3 was a directive to pro-
ceed at "full steam" with the exchange suggestion modified to provide for
o
indefinite lease of base sites rather than outright sale. The Prime
Minister also made it clear to his Ambassador that approval of the exchange
suggestion was strictly conditional and depended on the prompt delivery
of the ships and flying boats which had been requested. ^ He also told the
Ambassador to notify Secretary Knox that a request for bases would be
7. Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy dated August 2, 1940. Navy
Department Archives.
8. Butler, Lord Lothian
, p. 295; Winston S. Churchill, The! r_ Fi nest Hour,
p # 357; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation p. 751.





agreeable if it were accompanied by the immediate sending of the destroyers
and patrol seaplanes. The Prime Minister was aware of the inequality of
the proposed exchange if measured in physical or monetary terms, but he
believed the political value of an un-neutral act by the United States
served as an adequate counter-weight. The Prime Minister was convinced
that British and American survival were so interdependent that they formed
a single goal, and that bargains favoring one country or the other were
permissible so long as they contributed to the achievement of the common
goal.**' In approving a Destroyers-Bases exchange "in principle," the
Prime Minister and the War Cabinet stipulated that it would be necessary
to obtain the approval of the colonies and territories concerned, since
the bases would involve "a serious sacrifice and disturbance of their
life for the sake of the Empire. "**
On August 3, Lothian advised the Prime Minister that the President
believed some type of "public assurance" regarding the future of the
British fleet would be necessary to ensure Congressional approval of the
authorizing legislation. According to one report, the Ambassador said
that Secretaries Hull and Welles believed the odds against passage of the
12legislation were 4 to 1, even with a public fleet pledge.
On August 4, the British Ambassador called on Secretary of State
Hull to present anew the British requests for the old American destroyers
needed to carry Britain over her "emergency situation, "*3 The Ambassador
explained that he had discussed the matter with the President while the
10. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation
, p. 751.
11. Churchill, Their Finest Hour
, p. 358; Sir Llewellyn Woodward,
British Foreign Policy in the Second World War
, p. 84.
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13. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull » vol. 1, p. 831, quoting Lothian.
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Secretary had been in Havana, and that ho wanted to inform Hull of the
situation so that results could be achieved within the "next few weeks."*
At the same time, in compliance with his instructions from London, the
Ambassador told Secretary Hull that Britain was willing to make available
to the United States naval and air bases at certain British territories in
the Western Hemisphere, including Bermuda, Newfoundland and some of the
islands adjacent to Central and South America. ^
The Secretary's response to this offer was rather cool and cautious.
He first pointed out that the obligations accepted at Havana made it neces-
sary for the bases to be "for the benefit of all the American Republics. w*»
He described the complicated procedures involved in obtaining legislation
to permit the transfer of destroyers and he repeated his opinion that
there was only a slender chance that Congress would pass such legislation.
He concluded by assuring the Ambassador that the matter was receiving
"attentive consideration" by the United States. 1
On the following day, August 5, the British Ambassador delivered to
the President a list of the six concessions Britain was willing to grant to
the United States:
1. Continuation of facilities and rights previously granted to the
United States in Trinidad, Bermuda and Newfoundland.
2. Permission for American military aircraft to land at Jamaica,
British Guiana and Trinidad.
3. Authorization for Pan-American Airways, acting as agents of the
United States government, to lease a small area near the Trinidad airport
and use it as a supply center and radio station.
14. The Ke.TiOlrs of Cordell Hull, vol. 1, p." 832, quoting Lothian.
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4. Authorization for Pan-American Airways, again as agent of the
United States government, to lease an area near Georgetown, British
Guiana, and build an airport on it.
5. Authorization for Pan-American Airways, as an agent of the
United States, to build an airport near Kingston, Jamaica, under arrange-
ments similar to those by which the company was already operating a sea-
plane station in that area.
6. Authorization for United States Army aircraft to "make occasional
training flights to Newfoundland and make use of the airport there. "*-°
On August 8 another note modified this list by inserting a require-
ment that any facilities established by the United States be opened to
''unconditional use," subject to reasonable charges, by any designated
British airline operating between the West Indies and North and South
America.* 9
On the same day (August 8) the British Ambassador submitted another
new statement of British needs:
1. Twelve flotillas of destroyers (96 ships) completely equipped
and supplied with torpedoes and ammunition.
2. Priority acquisition of 20 motor torpedo boats under construction
for the United States Navy, also fully equipped and stocked.
3. 50 patrol seaplanes and an unspecified number of dive-bombers.
4. 250,000 Lee-Enfield rifles from existing American stock.
*
u
Since Secretary Hull had left Washington on a vacation, these three British
18. U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, of the United States,
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notes and another one referring to the fleet pledge were forwarded to
the President by Acting Secretary Welles, but only after Welles had
added his own comments. He strongly opposed any use of Pan-American Air-
ways as an agent for the government and apparently his argument was con-
vincing, for there was no further consideration of the idea.
One of the clearest statements of United States reaction to the
British notes was in a telegram from Secretary Welles to the American
Ambassador in London. Welles told Ambassador Kennedy that the British
notes included "certain restricted and entirely unsatisfactory suggestions"
regarding Pan-American Airways rights and the use of Newfoundland facili-
ties, and "a very ample statement of British desiderata for naval vessels
and airplanes far greater both in scope and in kind than it would be
possible to consider. "2*
As early as August 3 or 4, the British Ambassador had reported to
London the American desire for a fleet pledge, and the President had sub-
mitted a specific request for such a pledge to the Prime Minister on
22August 6," Earlier, the Prime Minister had told his Ambassador that he
would make such a pledge only if Britain remained the sole judge of "when,
if ever, the moment had come for the fleet to leave Great Britain. "23
The United States could obtain a voice in that decision only by entering
an outright war alliance and the Prime Minister knew the President could
not obtain approval for such a drastic step.
The Prime Minister remained reluctant when the President's request was
21. Foreign Relations, 1940 , Vol. Ill, p. 56 (Telegram, State Department
to U.S. Ambassador in London, No. 2330, August 14, I960).
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received. On the following day, in a note to the Foreign Secretary, he
expressed his opposition to a pledge and based it on two grounds. He
said public morale would be damaged and German leaders encouraged by an
implicit admission that Britain might be overrun, and he feared the United
States might acquire, as one of the rights received in exchange for the
destroyers, an apparent authority to demand the redeployment of the
British fleet. The Prime Minister derived some satisfaction from the
Presidents request because it indicated that his warnings about the pos-
sibility of a pro-German government in Britain had made an impression,
but he still did not want to renew his promises on behalf of the existing
government.^ In the reply which was delivered to the President on
August 8, the Prime Minister tried to separate the fleet pledge from the
destroyers-and-bases discussions:
... all this ^Destroyers-Bases negotiations]] has nothing
to do with any bargaining or declaration about the future
disposition of the British Fleet. ... there is no warrant
for discussing any question of the transference of the Fleet
to American or Canadian shores. ... no such declaration
could ever be assented to by us for the purpose of obtaining
destroyers or anything like that. ... we could never agree
to the slightest compromising of our full liberty of action,
nor tolerate any such defeatist announcement, the effect of
which would be disastrous. 6
In the same message, however, the Prime Minister also made his first
statements indicating acceptance in principle of an exchange of destroyers
and bases. After reasserting the British need for destroyers and the
opinion that sending destroyers would ba the best assistance the United
States could give Britain in the ensuing months, the Prime Minister said
24. Churchill, Their Finest Hour , pp. 358-359.
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that Britain had already decided to "offer the United States indefinite
lease facilities for naval and air bases in the West Indian islands" and




"-' He found it "most agreeable" that the United




While specific exchanges such as this were occurring at the highest
levels of government, public attention was baing drawn to the destroyers-
for-bases idea by organized efforts to arouse and mold public opinion.
Public statements by well known persons were developing public sentiment
in favor of aid to Britain in general and the transfer of destroyers in
particular. William Allen White's Committee to Defend America by Aiding
the Allies had been drumming up support for such a proposal since its
July policy statement, but probably the most influential single statement
was that made by General John J, Pershing on August 4, 1940.
In response to urging by the White Committee and the Century Group,
the nation's favorite *old soldier* made a nationwide radio address in
which he warned that European events posed a serious threat to the United
States and that appeasement would not succeed. He therefore urged that
Britain be given all possible aid:
By sending help to the British we can still hope with con-
fidence to keep the war on the other side of the Atlantic
Ocean, where the enemies of liberty, if possible, should
be defeated. ... I say to you solemnly that today may
be forever too late to keep war from the Americas. Today
may be the last time when by measures short of war we can
still prevent war.™
27. Churchill, Their Finest Hour , p. 359,
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General Pershing then offered a specific suggestion to bolster Britain
by transferring to the Royal Navy some excess World War I destroyers which
could be used in convoy escort, anti-submarine and anti-invasion operations
If a proper method can be found America will safeguard
her freedom and security by making available to the
British or Canadian Government at least fifty of the
over-age destroyers which are left from the days of the
World War. If the destroyers help save the British
Fleet, they may save us from the danger and hardship
of another war. 3 *-*
This speech aroused a considerable amount of discussion and popular
support for the proposals it contained. It received the approval of
several other well-known military figures. In an article which appeared
a week later, retired Rear Admiral Harry Yarnell, former Chief of the
United States Asiatic Fleet, endorsed the proposals to aid the Royal
Navy by a destroyer transfer. * A similar statement was issued by a
retired Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William H. Standley. 32 Still
another retired Admiral pointed out that the old destroyers were of little
or no use to the United States so long as the Royal Navy maintained con-
trol of European and Eastern Atlantic waters, whereas they could make an
active contribution to United States defenses by joining the British Fleet.
As far as the legal issues were concerned, he argued that "both airplanes
and destroyers are warships" and if the laws were evaded or violated for
33
aircraft, they should not be permitted to bar the transfer of destroyers.
Through such statements the public first became aware that leading
30 » The New York Times , August 5, 1940.
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public officials were considering a transfer or, as could be implied
from some of the proposals, a "swap" involving destroyers. These state-
ments by military figures were supplemented by widespread editorial ap-
proval in newspapers and by favorable comments from leading columnists.
At this time and throughout the subsequent month, the British Ambassador
accepted every opportunity to present Britain's case to the American
public in a style intended to elicit support for proposals to aid Britain.
He even worked in cooperation with the Century Group." In August, 1940,
that organization, along with the Committee to Defend America by Aiding
the Allies, intensified its campaign for public approval of a destroyer
transfer. Operating as pressure groups with direct personal access to
ineri in the highest echelons of government, these two organizations urged
that the old destroyers be sent to Britain, Working through their local
affiliations and branch organizations, they sought to generate popular
support for a destroyer transfer and thus enable the President to accept
the proposals without fear of adverse public reaction.-'"
Acceptance of the destroyer transfer idea was hot unanimous, however.
Charles Lindberg led a staunch isolationist opposition,-'' In addition,
the outlook in most of Washington during the summer of 1940 tended to be
pessimistic. Except at the White House and State Department, a British
defeat was generally expected. Ironically, one of the least optimistic
of persons concerned was the United States Ambassador to London, Joseph P.
Kennedy. His messages were "an unrelieved study in indigo. "38 jn t jie
34. Including Walter Lippmann, Herbert Agar, Joseph Alsop and Archibald
MacLeish. Forrest Davis and Ernest K, Lindley, How War Came (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1942), p. 91,
35. Butler, Lord Lothian , pp. 289-293,
36. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkrns: An Intimate History (New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), pp. 174-175; Walter Johnson, The
Battle Against Isolation, pp. 99-117.
37. Davis and Lindley, How War_Came , p. 92.
38. Ibid ., p. 95.
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face of such influential opposition, even the President and his Secre-
tary of State were cautious in spite of their conviction that Britain
could endure.-*9
Another noteworthy event which occurred in the early days of August
was the first effort to pass legislation authorizing a destroyer transfer
or exchange. On August 4, Secretary of State Hull sent the President a
draft bill which would have authorized the sale of destroyers by amending
the Act of June 28, 1940.^° After Hull and the President had discussed
the draft bill, they realized that it had two serious disadvantages: it
would take a long time to be enacted, and it would evoke strong Isola-
tionist opposition. l The President also knew that no legislation could
be passed over concerted Republican opposition. To avoid this eventuality,
the President needed the help of his opponent in the election campaign
which was then in progress. Mr. Willkie's approval "in principle" of a
destroyer transfer was not sufficient. To ensure passage of the bill, he
had to take an active lead in persuading the Republicans in Congress to
support it. The latter step Mr. Willkie declined to take, leaving the
President practically no hope of obtaining the legislation which he then
/ o
thought was essential.
The legal issues and points of law involved in a destroyer transfer
also received serious attention in early August. On August 2, the State
Department Legal Adviser, Green Hackworth, submitted a memorandum listing
the three acts which interfered with plans to transfer destroyers. It also
39. Davis and Lindley, How War Came , pp. 95-96.
60. This act prohibited disposition of military or naval material unless
the Army Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations certified
that it was not essential defense material. See pp. 22-23 above.
41. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull , vol. 1, p. 833.
62. Ibid ., Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation , pp. 753-754.
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contained a proposal to amend the most difficult legal barrier, Section 503
of the Espionage Act of 1917, to make the sale and/or transfer of warships
lawful if it improved the defenses of the United States. Having dis-
posed of domestic law through the proposed amendment to the Espionage Act,
Mr. Hackworth found international law less yielding. The closing comment
In his note was: "None of the foregoing would relieve us of the charge
that the sale of war craft by this Government to a belligerent government
44
would be unneutral."
On August 11, 1940, The New York Ti mes published a letter to the
editor bearing the signatures of four well-known lawyers, Charles C.
Burlingham, Thomas D. Thacher, George Rublee and Dean Acheson, It con-
tained a legal analysis of the destroyer transfer proposal and the first
public argument that no new legislation was needed to permit a transfer of
destroyers. Using the same assumptions and arguments presented in the
Cohen memorandum, the letter suggested that a destroyer transfer could be
accomplished under existing laws by an executive agreement.
The similarity between the Burlinghani letter and the Cohen memorandum
was not a coincidence. Mr. Cohen drafted the letter which appeared in
The New York Times . * He had discussed the matter with Justice Frankfurter
again and they had decided that Mr. Cohen's original memorandum had made
an impression on the President, but it had not convinced him that he could
and should proceed to arrange a destroyer transfer. Mr. Cohen and Justice
Frankfurter decided that the next step should be a public statement which
43. Foreign Relations, 1940, Vol. Ill, p. 59 (Memorandum by the Legal Ad-
viser, August 2, 1940). The portinent section of the Espionage Act is
quoted and discussed above, pp. 35-36.
44. Ibid
., p. 61.
45. Interview with Benjamin V. Cohen, October 25, 1966, also the source of




would place the idea before the President again and also draw public
support for the proposal. Justice Frankfurters status as a member of
the Supreme Court and a personal friend of the President precluded him
from originating any such public statement; Mr. Cohen's role of adviser,
personal friend and consistent supporter of the President would have
branded anything he proposed as the 'party line* and a product of offi-
cial inspiration. In order to lend prestige and an aura of impartiality
to the proposed public statement, other men were asked to sign it.
After drafting the letter to the editor, Mr. Cohen forwarded it to
Dean Acheson, who made several revisions and additions. Mr. Acheson was
selected to sign the letter because he was sympathetic to the proposal
and was not serving in the government at the time. Ho had opposed many
of the President's legislative and policy proposals, but retained an ex-
cellent reputation both within and without the government. Charles
Burlingham was chosen as a signer because he had great influence as an
old friend of the President. He had a degree of impartiality because he
had broken with the President over several policy issues, particularly
the attempt to enlarge the Supreme Court, Originally, JohnFoster Dulles
was selected as a Republican signer, but he was unable or unwilling to
become involved in the matter, ostensibly because of the pressure of
other work. In place of Mir. Dulles (and possibly at his recommendation),
Thomas Thacher was asked to sign. Aside from being a Republican and more
or less in sympathy with the President's policies, Mr. Thacher had a fine
legal reputation as a former Solicitor General. George Rublee was asked
to sign because of his good reputation as a lawyer and his previous
government service. He was also one of Mr. Acheson* s law partners.
As published, the letter to the editor not only concluded that it

-59-
vould be perfectly legal to turn the destroyers over to private con-
tractors who might then sell them to Britain, but went further and warned
that an "unnecessary aff irmation" of existing powers by Congress would
produce a dangerous delay. One of Mr. Acheson's revisions to the Cohen
draft of the letter contained an indirect suggestion that the ships might
be part of an exchange rather than an outright sale: "It is quite possible
that in connection with the transfer, arrangements might be made which
46
would increase our defensive power in this hemisphere."
In spite of these expert legal opinions, the President still thought
any destroyer transfer would encounter legal difficulties. He was par-
ticularly concerned by the law of June 28, 1940, which he considered a
Congressional statement of opposition to any destroyer transfer. More-
over, as the President read that act, he interpreted it to mean that it
would be necessary for the Chief of Naval Operations to declare the old
destroyers "useless
. . • for defense purposes" before they could be trans-
ferred. If the Chief of Naval Operations made such a declaration, it
would directly contradict testimony he had recently given before a Con-
gressional committee. On that occasion, he attributed considerable po-
tential value to the ships and denied that keeping them in storage was a
waste of public funds.
The destroyer-transfer issue received Presidential scrutiny again on
August 13 when the President met with Acting Secretary of State Welles,
Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Knox and Secretary of the
Treasury Morgenthau. Under the pressure of an increasingly strong and
^ 6 « The New York Times , letter to the editor, August 11, 1940.





serious Gentian air assault on Britain, the President and his advisers
concluded that it was necessary to proceed at once with a Destroyers-
69
Bases exchange of some sort. They reviewed the British proposals of
August 5 and 8 but, as noted above, the proposals wore found unacceptable. °
After submitting a formal request to the Attorney General for an opinion on
the transfer (especially the legal interpretations contained in the Cohen
memorandum and the Burlingham letter), the President drafted a memorandum
in which he listed the main points of the proposed exchange. In return
for the old destroyers the President wanted a pledge on the future of the
British Fleet and an authorization to lease base sites in seven British
possessions.
In his August 13 telegram to the Prime Minister, the President said
he had considered the earlier British messages requesting aid and had con-
cluded that it might be possible to give Britain "as immediate assistance
at least fifty destroyers, the motor torpedo boats , , , and ... five
planes of each of the categories mentioned, the latter to be furnished
for war testing purposes."-^ But, the President added, Congress and the
people would only approve such aid if "in return therefor the national
defense and security of the United States were enhanced,
"
J -> If it proved
possible to give the indicated aid, the President said it would also be
necessary for the British Government to grant the following in exchange:
U9, Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation
, p, 758,
50, See p, 51 above,
51. E, Roosevelt, ed., FDR: His Personal Letters, Vol, II, p. 1052,
52, Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation
, p, 758; Foreign Relations,
19A0, Vol. Ill, p, 65 (Telegram, State Department to U.S. Ambassador
at London, No. 2316, relaying message from President to Prime Minister,
August 13, 1940).
53. Foreign Relations, 1940 , Vol. Ill, p. 65. Same telegram cited above.
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1. Assurance on the part of the Prime Minister thit
in the event that the waters of Great Britain become un-
tenable for British ships of war, the latter would not be
turned over to the Germans or sunk, but would be sent to
other parts of the Empire for continued defense of the
Empire,
2» An agreement on the part of Great Britain that
the British Government would authorize the use of New-
foundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia,
Trinidad and British Guiana as naval and air bases by the
United States in the event of an attack on the American
Hemisphere by any non-American nation; and in the meantime
the united States to have the right to establish such bases
and to use them for training and exercise purposes with the
understanding that the land necessary for the above could
be acquired by the United States through purchase or through
a ninety-nine year lease.
^
The President said that details of the bases could be detex-mined later.
He closed with an indication that he understood the Prime Ministers
reluctance to make public comments about the future of the British fleet
and said he would be willing to accept a personal reiteration of the
Prime Minister's June 4 statement to Parliament.
This offer to accept a private fleet pledge may indicate that the
President had decided not to seek authorizing legislation. Originally,
the President requested a public pledge because it would have engendered
support for the aid and destroyer transfer policies and made it possible
to get the necessary legislation through Congress. There is conflicting
evidence on the President's intentions at this time, however, since he
had not yet received the Attorney General's opinion which obviated the
54. Foreign Relations, 1940 , Vol. Ill, p. 65. Same telegram cited in
footnote 52. These paragraphs are almost verbatim copies of the
memorandum which the President had prepared earlier on the same day.




need for legislation. In addition, subsequent comments by the Secre-
taries of War and the Navy implied that any transfer would be accomplished
only through enabling legislation,-5 " One likely explanation is that the
President believed that if the Prime Minister accepted the extensive
United States demands, the exchange would be so attractive that public
and, if requested, Congressional consent would be forthcoming. ' The
President could proceed with negotiations and if the bargain were suffi-
ciently beneficial, the question of legislation would be decided later.
Turning to the British scene, on the morning of August 14, 1940, the
War Cabinet had before it an unambiguous offer by the President to supply
"at least fifty destroyers" and other material in exchange for a long
term lease of specified bases and a promise not to sink or surrender the
British fleet. It seems difficult to believe that there could have been
any doubt that this was a quid pro quo offer. The Prime Minister 1 s mes-
sage to the President, sent after the Cabinet had approved the exchange,
confirms this opinion. In an unusually prompt reply, the Prime Minister
told the President on August 15 that he and his Government could "meet
both points ... necessary to help ... with Congress and with others
concerned" but he added that their willingness to help was conditional on
their being assured that there would be no delay in supplying Britain with
the ships and seaplanes it had requested. *° The Prime Minister also agreed
to reiterate to the President his June 4 statement to Parliament. The
President was cautioned, however, that if he used this pledge in public,
56. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation
, p. 759, footnote 47.
57. Ibid ., p. 759.
58. Foreign Relations
.
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he should "bear in mind the disastrous effect" from the British, and
perhaps the American, point of view, of permitting anyone to get the im-
pression that Britain regarded "the conquest of the British Islands and
its naval bases as any other than an impossible contingency."^ The
message also agreed to the idea of granting long term leases rather than
selling the base sites. The President was reminded that it would be
necessary to consult with Canada and Newfoundland before any final agree-
ment could be made regarding sites at Newfoundland, but the Prime Minister
said he was sufficiently optimistic of the outcome of those consultations
to start sending British crews to Nova Scotia in anticipation of receiving
the destroyers.
At about this same time, the Prime Minister of Canada, William L.
Mackenzie King, instructed his Ambassador at Washington to see the President,
advocate a destroyer transfer and suggest a discussion of naval defenses
on the western shores of the Atlantic. When he saw the President on
August 15, however, the Canadian Ambassador was told that the British gov-
ernment had made satisfactory assurances with respect to the British fleet
and the naval bases and that the President "intended to act in the near
future." This implies that on August 15, the President thought a bar-
gain had been reached. It appears that the British Foreign Office inter-
preted the situation in the same way because on the same day the United
Kingdom High Commissioner to Canada told Prime Minister Mackenzie King that
arrangements to exchange destroyers for bases and a fleet pledge had been
made.
59. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 360.
6°. Foreign Relations, I960 , Vol. Ill, p. 67 (Same telegram cited in foot-
note 58); Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense , pp. 55-
56.




Although it appeared that an agreement had been reached, the prob-
lem of domestic legal restrictions still existed. The opinions contained
in the Burl Ingham letter were openly approved by Supreme Court Justice
Felix Frankfurter on August 15. Apparently, the President was unaware
of Justice Frankfurter's role in formulating the Cohen memorandum and the
Burlingham letter. He was pleased and encouraged to learn that this dis-
tinguished jurist thought the law of 1917 was intended to prevent fili-
bustering and should not be interpreted to interfere with legitimate
national defense.
The legality issue received further scrutiny during the following
days. In a Cabinet meeting on August 16 the President discussed the
matter at length with the Attorney General, who had yet to issue his formal
opinion on the matter. On August 17, the Attorney General sent a letter
containing an informal preliminary draft opinion to the Secretary of the
Navy. Directing his attention to a possible transfer of destroyers to
Britain using Canada as an intermediary, the Attorney General accepted the
arguments and interpretations of the Cohen memorandum of July 19 and the
Burlingham letter of August 10. He concluded that "the Chief of Naval
Operations may, and should, certify ... that such destroyers are not es-
sential to the defense of the United States if in his judgement the exchange
of such destroyers for strategic naval and air bases will strengthen rather
than Impair the total defense of the United States."6^ It is likely,
therefore, that by this time (August 17) the President and his advisers had
decided to proceed without specific or new legislative authorization.
63. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation
, p. 762, footnote 53.
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As a result of the discussions and consultations between Britain and
Canada to which the Prime Minister referred in his message of August 15,
Canada* s Prime Minister sent the President a telegram suggesting that
they meet to discuss the Destroyers-Bases exchange. The President agreed
to this suggestion but expanded the agenda to include the broader issues of
Canadian and American defense relationships. It appears that the Presi-
dent had a dual purpose in mind: to ensure a favorable public reaction to
the Destroyers-Bases exchange by linking it with Hemisphere defense, and
to obtain a base site in the Maritime Provinces of Eastern Canada (in ad-
dition to Newfoundland, which was not then part of Canada).
The two heads of government and selected Cabinet members met at
Ogdensburg, New York, on August 17 and 18. The President read Prime Mini-
ster Mackenzie King the messages which he had received from Prime Minister
Churchill and the proposed exchange was discussed in detail. The President
said he would sell about fifty old destroyers to Britain without asking
Congressional approval. He said his lawyers were working on a way to ac-
complish the transaction without having to face extended Congressional de-
bate. The President also said he was confident that both the public and
the Navy would accept the transfer in view of the strategically valuable
bases that would be received in return. The President indicated that he
hoped to have the details worked out to permit announcement of the exchange
within the subsequent week (i.e., August 18-24). 6o The plans for trans-
ferring the destroyers at Halifax were discussed and approved. After
noting that Britain had finally given a satisfactory pledge on the future
65. Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense , p. 371.
66. Nancy Harvison Hooker, ed., The Moffat rapers
, p. 328; Pickersgill,
Mackenzie Kin^; Record , Vol. I, pp. 132, 136.
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of the British fleet, the President said that with respect to the selec-
tion of base sites, the bases could be divided into three groups: (1) those
in the West Indies, to be selected by the United States and Britain;
(2) those at Newfoundland where Britain was the legal owner and lessor but
Canada bad more direct and immediate interests in a strategic as well as a
geographic sense; (3) "The Canadian base or bases, which would be selected
by the United States and Canada alone."6 ' After further discussion of the
proposed Canadian base, attention shifted to the matters for which the
Ogdensburg meetings have become more famous: defense cooperation and estab-
lishment of the Permanent Joint Board for Defense. As expressed at Ogdens-
burg, the Canadian reaction to the proposed Destroyers-Bases exchange was
one of general approval, especially with reference to the "islands of the
Atlantic," a carefully chosen phrase which presumably included Newfoundland
but excluded the Canadian Mari times. °°
The records of the Ogdensburg discussions also provide some insight
into the Presidents thoughts about the prospective base sites. With
reference to permanent changes of sovereignty, a point which caused serious
fears among the colonial governments, the President reportedly said he did
not want sovereignty over the British West Indies locations "even if they
were given to him," because " they were a source of continual local
69trouble." This was confirmed on other occasions when the President, who
had become familiar with the poverty of the natives during his visits and
fishing trips, stated his reluctance to assume responsibility for the
67. Hooker, Moffat Papers, p. 329 (quoting Prime Minister Mackenzie King's
version of the Ogdensburg discussions as recorded by Pierrepont Moffat,
U.S. Ambassador to Canada. Not a quote of President Roosevelt.).
68. Pickersgill, Mckenzie Kin?; Record, Vol. I, p. 132.
69. Ibid




admini strati on or improvement of the areas. At Qgdensburg, however,
the Fresident also criticized British reluctance to make the sites avail-
able. The British attitude seemed unreasonable to him. He believed that
if the United States became involved in a war with Germany and possession
of those islands was essential to American security, he would, if neces-
sary, seize them. It thus appears that the pre-emptive or preventive
seizure idea was not completely forgotten.
In mid-August, the State Department drafted an exchange of notes which
could be used to trade the destroyers for the bases; the President approved
72
it on August 19. The draft included a lengthy note from the British
Ambassador to the Secretary of State and the Secretary's reply. The pro-
posed British note reaffirmed the Prime Minister's statement of June 4
relative to the future of the British fleet and offered to "make avail-
able" to the United States, under 99 year lease, naval and air bases in
73
various British possessions in the Western Hemisphere. The proposed
offer gave the United States a preponderant voice in site selection and,
except for criminal jurisdiction over non-United States citizens, assigned
to the United States "all rights, power, and authority within the bases
leased, and within the limits of the territorial waters and air spaces
adjacent to or in the vicinity of such bases, which the United States would
possess or exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory and waters
mentioned above." The proposed American response, after commenting that
the valuable British offer would greatly enhance the cooperative efforts
70. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull , vol. 1, p. 834.
71. Pickersgill, Kackenz 1 e Kin^ Record , Vol. I, p. 135.
72. Langer and Gleason, Chall enge to Iso lation , p. 762; Conn and Fair-
child, Framework of Hemisphere Def .-nse , pp. 56, 57.
73. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation , pp. 762, 763.
74. Ibid ., p. 763.
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being made to defend the Western Hemisphere, accepted the offer and said
that "in consideration," the United States government would transfer to
the British government certain "naval and military materiel" which was
to be listed in the final paragraph of the United States reply. 75 Although
no list was compiled or entered in the draft note, the materiel referred to
included the fifty destroyers, five B-17 bombers, 250,000 rifles and
5 million rounds of ammunition.
At about the same time, the Chief of Naval Operations clearly stated
his opinions on several aspects of the proposed Destroyers-Bases exchange.
In a memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy on August 17, Admiral Stark
opposed the suggestion that the transfer be accomplished by declaring the
vessels unfit for service, striking them from the register and selling
them to private persons who could then sell them to Britain. Although he
was certain that "such an opinion [of unfitness^] would be false else the
British would not be so anxious to get these same destroyers," the Chief
of Naval Operations also speculated that no three-officer board of survey
77
could be found which would make such a finding. Admiral Stark was con-
vinced that the destroyers were not unfit, and in his memorandum he said
that if a survey board rendered a finding of unfitness, he would disap-
prove the report.
Referring to the Act of June 28-, i940, Admiral Stark indicated that
he was experiencing doubts about his ability to issue the required certi-
fication that the destroyers were not essential to the defense of the
United States. While reaffirming his earlier assertions that a trade of
75. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation
, pp. 763.
76. Ibid.
77. Memorandum for the Secretary (from the' Chief of Naval Operations),
August 17, 1940, Navy Department Archives.

-69-
destroyers and bases would be "to the advantage of the United States,"
he modified his position slightly, making it subject to the proviso that
the United States acquire sovereignty over all or the desired parts of
the islands on which the bases were to be located. Admiral Stark pointed
out that a lease, in contrast to sovereign control, meant that agreements
would have to be reached with en additional level of government, that
problems of access to and egress from the bases would arise when only one
party to the lease was a belligerent, and that a lease could be cancelled
by the grantor. In so stating, Admiral Stark implied that he was less
certain that a trade of destroyers and leased bases would be advantageous
to the United States.
The memorandum also pointed out that the Chief of Naval Operations
was conscious of his dual responsibility: as a naval officer, he had a
duty to comply with the directives of the President, who is Commander-in-
Chief; as Chief of Naval Operations, he had a duty to comply with the
Congressional directive limiting the disposal of ships to those which were
not essential to national defense. In the light of this double responsi-
bility and his uncertainty whether or not the destroyers were "essential
to the defense of the United States" when they could be traded for valu-
able bases, the Chief of Naval Operations reached two conclusions:
1. If, in the opinion of the Attorney General, the destroyers could
be considered non-essential when the net effect of a Destroyers-Bases
exchange would be an improvement of American defense, then, as Chief of
Naval Operations, he could issue the certificate required by Congress.
2. If the President decided that he could not let his actions be
restrained by a Congressional duty placed on the Chief of Naval Operations
and he directed that the ships be transferred, Admiral Stark would comply,

-70-
78but without issuing any certifications.
In a post-script to the same memorandum, dated August 19 and written
after the Destroyers-Bases proposals had been discussed with the Secretary
of the Navy and the Army Chief of Staff (General George C. Marshall),
Admiral Stark noted that he was concerned about the impact this exchange
might have on his relations with Congress. If the exchange required doing
anything that "would jeopardize the good-will and the reputation for honest,
frank, open dealing" that he then had with Congress, Admiral Stark said he
79
"might just as well be relieved."
Even as the Chief of Naval Operations wrestled with his legal duties
and responsibilities, plans for a destroyer transfer had worked their way
through the higher levels of command and into the operating forces. The
commander of the Atlantic destroyer force began drafting preliminary plans
early in August on the basis of "persistent rumors" that some of his older
Of)
ships would be transferred to Britain. It was not until August 20 that
he was called to Washington and informed by the Chief of Naval Operations
that fifty of the 1200-ton destroyers "would probably be turned over to the
British Government."8 * By August 22, preliminary plans had been approved.
They set September 6 as the date the first group of destroyers would arrive
at the turnover port. On August 30, the first group of ships was ordered
oo
to Boston to prepare for transfer. *
78. Memorandum for the Secretary (from the Chief of Naval Operations),
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Britain and Six (6) to the Canadian Government Commencing September 6,
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Back at the policy-making level, the decision to proceed with a
direct Anglo-American Destroyers-Bases exchange weathered its last period
of hesitancy on August 21 when a group of Presidential advisers met in the
Attorney General's office for a final discussion of the matter. 83 Some-
one suggested that it might be better to transfer the destroyers to
Canada, a hemispheric neighbor, who could later send the ships to British
waters or transfer them to the Royal Navy, The idea received enough sup-
port to make Secretary Stimson feel compelled to offer a statement in op-
position. He argued that no one would ever believe the ships were intended
for Canada and that sending them there would "simply add a discreditable
subterfuge to the situation."8^
It also appears that at this meeting the Attorney General revealed
the general nature of the formal opinion which he was preparing for the
85
President. In a memorandum of the same date (August 21), the Chief of
Naval Operations advised the President that independently of other con-
siderations, he could not certify that the destroyers were non-essential.
Since he had doubts about the essentiality of the destroyers if they could
be part of a beneficial exchange, Admiral Stark said he had referred the
matter to the Attorney General. Mentioning a "formal opinion," the
Admiral's memorandum said the Attorney General had ruled that the Chief of
Naval Operations could, and should, issue the required certification if
the net result of the entire transaction tended to improve rather than
83. The group included Secretary of War Stimson; Secretary of the Navy
Knox; Acting Secretary of State Welles; the Army Chief of Staff,
General Marshall; and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark.
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War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 357.
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86. Memorandum for the President, August 21, 1940 (contains pencilled
initials "F.K." on last page of file copy suggesting that Secretary
Knox signed the original, but phrasing and other internal evidence




damage national defenses."' The Chief of Naval Operations then stated
that, in Iiis opinion, the exchange would "strengthen rather than impair
the total defense of the United States," and he could thus issue a certi-
fication in compliance with the Act of June 28, °° This commitment by
Admiral Stark was subject to the following conditions: (1) that adequate
sites were leased, (2) that the lease provisions were broad enough to allow
development and use of the bases, and (3) that the necessary funds for de-
velopment would be made available. Thus, from the United States point
of view, the Destroyers-Bases arrangement was set for clear sailing.
Unfortunately the situation regarding the Destroyers-Bases transfer
was not as clear in Britain as it was in the United States. The British
response to the draft notes of August 19 first became known on August 20.
In an address to Parliament, the Prime Minister made the following com-
ments:
Our Navy is far stronger than it was at the beginning
of the war. ... We hope our friends across the ocean will
send us a timely reinforcement to bridge the gap between the
peace flotillas of 1939 and the war flotillas of 1941. . . ,
Some months ago we came to the conclusion that the in-
terests of the United States and of the British Empire both
required that the United States should have facilities for
the naval and air defense of the Western Hemisphere against
the attack of a Nazi power. ... We had therefore decided
spontaneously, and without being asked or offered any in-
ducement, to inform the Government of the United States that
we would be glad to place such defense facilities at their




87. Although he referred to a "formal opinion," the Chief of Naval Opera-
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Presently we learned that anxiety was also felt in the
United States about the air and naval defence of their At-
lantic seaboard, and President Roosevelt has recently
made it clear that he would like to discuss with us, and
with ... Canada and with Newfoundland, the development
of American naval and air facilities in Newfoundland and
in the VJest Indies. There is of course no question of any
transference . of sovereignty - that has never been sug-
gested , . . 9l
At first glance this seemed to confirm the exchange agreement, but it
was actually the beginning of a rejection of the exchange idea. The Prime
Minister's remarks were intended to emphasize the unilateral nature of the
British offer of bases. In his eyes, it was simply a happy coincidence
that a prospective destroyer transfer should have developed at about the
same time. His references to sovereignty reflected his annoyance at one
particular clause in the United States draft note. According to that
clause, the United States powers at the bases would have been the same as
99those it would have had "if it were the sovereign."
On August 22, the President phoned Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie
King to say that he had overcome the legal problems of the destroyer ex-
change and that negotiations with Britain were proceeding nicely. On the
same day, however, Prime Minister Churchill sent the President a message
• ejecting almost everything contained In the August 19 draft notes. 93 He
91. Churchill, Their Finest Hour , p. 362.
92. See pp. 67-63 for draft note; also Conn and Fairchild, Framework o f
Hemisphere Defense
, p. 57.
93. Pickersgill, Mackenzie King Record , p. 139. On August 22, the Presi-
dent also wrote a long, persuasive letter in favor of an exchange
to Senator David I. Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Com-
mittee. Senator Walsh had led the successful fight against the
transfer of torpedo boats to Britain and on August 20, he had an-
nounced plans to lead a floor fight against any sale of destroyers
to either Britain or Canada. The New York Times , August 2i, 1940;
E. Roosevelt, ed., FDR: His Personal Letters , Vol. II, pp. 1056-1058.
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declined to codify or expand upon his statement of June 4 with respect
to the British fleet. Moreover, the Prime Minister contradicted the
obvious implications of his message of August 15 by denying that he had
ever "contemplated anything in the nature of a contract, bargain or sale"
between the United States and Britain. 9^ After repeating his Parliamentary
comment that the British offer of bases was voluntary and unilateral, he
said the offer was still extended. The United States could lease the
bases even if it was impossible to transfer the destroyers. In short, the
Prime Minister proposed that two unilateral and unrelated gifts be made.
Britain would give bases and the United States would give destroyers. Each
would be given in furtherance of mutual interests and not as part of a
quid pro quo
.
It seems likely that the Prime Minister had suddenly developed a deep
concern over the British public reaction to the Destroyers-Bases ideas.
Kis Parliamentary comments of August 20, made with the approval (in prin-
ciple) of President Roosevelt, portrayed the transactions in the best pos-
sible light from the British point of view. Both the Prime Minister in
his message to the President, and the War Cabinet in its decision to sup-
port the Prime Minister, emphasized that any overt linkage of the destroyers
and bases would be bad because it would lead to a comparison of the mone-
tary value of the properties being exchanged. The British felt that such
a monetary reckoning would be inappropriate; it would not take into account
the strategic military and political values involved. They also thought
94. See pp. 62-63 above for the message of August 15, 1940; Foreign
Relations , 1940, Vol. Ill, p. 68 (Telegram, U.S. Ambassador at
London to State Department, No. 2856, relaying message from Prime
Minister to the President, August 22, 1940); Churchill, Their Finest
Hour
, p. 362; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation , p. 764-765;
Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemi sphere Defense, p. 57.
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it might give the impression that the United States was getting the
95better of the exchange. "* There was some fear that the British public
would demand cancellation of Britain's war debts in addition to transfer
of the destroyers as compensation for the bases.
In the United States, the Prime Minister's telegram produced sur-
prise and irritation. The latter was aggravated by the fact that when the
British Ambassador delivered his copy of the telegram, it had appended to
it a new list of additional materials desired by Britain: flying boats,
pursuit and fighter aircraft, tanks and rifle ammunition. 9 ' The British
Ambassador was informed by the State Department that the proposed gift-
and-gift method was "utterly impossible," and the President, in a confer-
ence with the Ambassador which was attended by Secretaries Hull, Knox and
Stimson, told him the same thing.^ The President even telephoned the
Prime Minister to explain that the destroyers could not be transferred un-
less they were declared non-essential for United States defense, and that
such a declaration could not be made unless their transfer was part of a
larger exchange which was beneficial to national defenses."
During the next few days there were several conferences between the
British Ambassador and the Secretary of State. The President's difficulties
with respect to domestic law were fully explained to Lord Lothian and he
realized that the United States could not change its position. He knew
9^» Foreign Relations, 19^0 , Vol. Ill, pp. 68-69 (Same telegram cited in
footnote 94); Churchill, Their Finest Hour , pp. 362-363; Langer and
Gleason, Challenge to Isola tion, p. 765; and Woodward, British Foreign
Policy
, p. 86.
96. Woodward, Brit ish Foreign Policy , p. 86.
97. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolat ion, p. 765.
98. Ibid
. , p. 765-766 and Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere
Defense, p. 58.




that the United States and Britain were beginning to organize a joint de-
fense for tlorth America, a development which might mature into an alli-
ance. Aware that the United States was then ready to aid Britain by
transferring destroyers, even though it might be interpreted as an act of
war, he was convinced that extensive delays in completing the transaction
would let the isolationists erect an impenetrable legal barrier. Knowing
that the people of the United States thought the destroyers and the bases
were related, Lord Lothian favored the conclusion of a quid pro quo trans-
action by an exchange of notes. He believed this could be explained to
the British public as the only legal method to implement the policy an-
nounced by the Prime Minister in his speech on August 20. Lord Lothian ad-
vised the British Foreign Office by telephone on August 23 that only an
exchange was possible and that it had to be consummated quickly or the op-
portunity would be lost. 1™
Even after this message had been relayed to the Prime Minister, how-
ever, Mr. Churchill was adamant. He tried to explain his hesitancy
in a message which he sent to the President on August 25. The Prime Mini-
ster first objected to the difference between the obligations assumed by
Britain and by the United States under the draft proposal of August 19,
1940, The United States obligation was limited to providing certain
material aid, but Britain was asked to make "undefined concessions ...
from Newfoundland to British Guiana" consisting of such base sites "'as
may be required in the judgement of the United States. 1 " * Britain could
100. Woodward, British Foreign Policy , pp. 86-87.
101. Ibid
., p. 87.
102. Churchill, Their Fi nest Hour, p. 364. There are minor differences in
the version appearing in Foreign relations, 1940 , Vol. Ill, p. 70.
Churchill was quoting from the United States draft notes of August 19,
1940. Subsequent quotations in this and the following paragraph are
from the same source.
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be accused of breach of contract if at some later date it was unable to
concur in everything the United States requested. The Prime Minister did
not want to risk such a serious misunderstanding with the United States.
He said that if the transaction were to be considered a contract, the
specific obligations of both parties would have to be spelled out in more
detail. Drafting such a detailed agreement would be very time-consuming.
Since the destroyers were only needed to bridge a temporary shortage, a
long delay would seriously reduce their usefulness: the ships would not
be available until after the need for them had become less urgent. The
Prime Minister refused to give "a blank cheque" on all Britain's "trans-
atlantic possessions merely to bridge this gap." He expected the nation
to survive the crisis anyway, although there would be less "risk and suf-
fering" if the destroyers were transferred.
In the second half of his message, Prime Minister Churchill suggested
an alternate plan for accomplishing the mutually desirable exchange,
Britain would offer "certain fairly well defined facilities" to illustrate
the type of gift it proposed to make. These facilities could be discussed
by united States and British authorities and modified to some extent, with
Britain "remaining the final judge" of \jhat it could give. The key to the
Prime Minister's proposal lay in this sentence: ' "All this we will do
freely, trusting entirely to the generosity and goodwill of the American
people as to whether they on their part would like to do something for us."
The Prime Minister thus persisted in his desire to interpret the exchange
as a glft-and-gift transaction. He suggested that if a quid pro quo was
essential to the United States Navy under domestic laws, the desired effect
could be achieved by a unilateral statement such as an announcement that .
the gift of bases could not be accepted without granting some gift in return.
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These British objections and counter-proposals were discussed by
Lothian and Secretary Hull on the afternoon of August 25 and again that
evening before the two met with the President. On both occasions Hull re-
iterated the legal necessity for a direct linkage between the base acquisi-
tion and the destroyer transfer. He also pointed out to the Ambassador that
aside from the legal conditions making an exchange mandatory, the President
had no authority to give public property to anyone, *"*
In spite of Secretary Hull's statements, Lord Lothian presented the
Prime Minister's objections and proposals to the President with only a
slight modification. Instead of preparing a list of the facilities Britain
was willing to grant to the United States and using it as a basis for
further negotiation, Lord Lothian suggested that the list be compiled by
a joint Anglo-American Committee. ° The Ambassador presented his proposal
in the form of two draft notes. The first dealt with the British offer of
bases; the second pledged not to surrender or scuttle the fleet. With
the President expressing agreement, Hull quickly told Lothian that this
arrangement, .which was simply another gift-and-gift suggestion, was not
acceptable to the United States. It failed to solve or evade the domestic
legal problem and it called for the President to act beyond his authority.
Apparently, Lord Lothian clearly understood the United States posi-
tion. When he submitted his draft notes to London (following the August 25
meetings with Secretary Hull and the President) he warned that they would
not solve the President's dilemma. He predicted that the President would
find it necessary to join the two notes and the destroyers to make the
103. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 1, p. 835,
104. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 836.




On August 27, Prime Minister Churchill sent a message to President
Roosevelt approving, in general, the terms contained in the pair of notes
Lord Lothian had drafted. He was unaware that Lothian's proposal had al-
ready been rejected by the United States. The Prime Minister also approved
a list of bases which the Ambassador had submitted and described as those
which the President had in mind. On the recommendation of British military
advisers, the Prime Minister suggested that a base at Antigua be added to
the list. This addition was probably very agreeable to United States
military authorities because they had already developed an interest in
using Antigua. 10S
The Prime Minister's message also stated that Britain, as the donor,
would necessarily be "the final judge of what the gift is to consist of,"
with the understanding that every possible effort would be made to meet
United States desires, 109 He thus rejected the proposal that sites would
be selected solely by the United States and the alternative suggestion
that disputes over site selection would be a matter for arbitration.
Finally, the Prime Minister asked that the note regarding the future of
the fleet be kept private for previously stated reasons of public morale. 110
Before this message from the Prime Minister was received, however,
the United States had developed a new proposal. At the end of the
106. Woodward, British Forei gn Policy, p. 87.
107. The Memoirs of Cord el l "lull , vol. 1, p. 839; Churchill, Their Finest
Hour
, p. 365; Lord Lothian had proposed bases at Newfoundland, Ber-
muda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana.
108. "Memorandum Endorsement: Antigua, BWI., Suitability as base for
operation of patrol planes." Director, 'Jar Plans Division, to
Director, Ship Movements Division, June 27, 1940. Navy Department
Archives. This memorandum suggested that two or three seaplanes
of Patrol Wing 5 visit St. Johns, Antigua. The proposed visit was
to be described publicly as "general training" and "familiarization,"
but it would have had the covert purpose of determining the value of
Antigua and possibly Martinique as operating bases.




Roosevelt-Hull-Lothian meeting on August 25, the President had directed
the Secretary of State, recently returned from vacation, to work out a
new plan. 111 The Secretary met with State Department Legal Adviser
Green H. Kackvorth and Newman A. Townsend of the Justice Department on
August 26. After they had discussed the problem for a short time, Mr.
Hackworth suggested a compromise. Since the Prime Minister had not spe-
cifically stated which bases would bo leased to the United States as a
unilateral gift, the list of desired bases could be divided into two
groups. One group, consisting of Bermuda and Newfoundland, where sig-
nificant Canadian and Imperial interests were involved, could be granted
as a gift. The second group would contain the West Indies and South
American sites where American interests in defending the Panama Canal pre-
11?dominated. Those bases could be leased in exchange for the old destroyers.
Hull immediately recognized this idea as the potential solution to
the problem. While Hackworth and Townsend revised Welles* draft notes of
August 19, Hull called the President to arrange a meeting to discuss the
Hackworth formula. Townsend and Hackworth explained the proposal to the
President on the afternoon of August 26 and the President approved of it.
The Hackworth compromise received the final approval of the President and
Secretaries Hull, Knox and Stimson on the morning of August 27, after it
had been revised to comply with the preferences expressed by Prime Minister
113Churchill in his message of that date. All references to sovereignty
111. The Memoirs of Cordell Hu ll, vol. 1, p. 837; Conn and Fairchild,
Framework of Hemisphere Defense
, p. 58.
112. The Memoirs o f_ Cordell Hull ^ vol. 1, p. 837, and Langer and Gleason,
Challenge to Isolation, p. 766.
113. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull , vol. 1, p. 837; Langer and Gleason,
Challenge to Isolation
, p. 767; for the Prime Minister's message of
August 27, see p.. 79 above.
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vcre deleted. The arbitration provisions were replaced by a clause making
Britain sole judge of the terms of the gift 1 bases, while any disagree-
ments about the others were to be settled by the Secretary of State and
the Foreign Secretary.
The compromise draft was next sent to the Chief of Naval Operations.
He had requested an opportunity to study it to ensure that it would per-
mit him to certify that the destroyers were not essential to national de-
fense. He then delivered it to Secretary Knox and Lord Lothian aboard the
Secretary's yacht, Sequoia . The three discussed the proposal in detail
during the evening. Later they called at Secretary Hull's apartment where
the few remaining problems were worked out to the satisfaction of all con-
cerned. Lord Lothian then submitted the compromise gift-plus-sale draft
to London for approval.
Along with the exchange proposal, which he again described as essen-
tial, Lord Lothian reported that the Fresident was willing to separate the
fleet pledge from the destroyers and bases. The President proposed to ask
if the Prime Minister's statement of June U was still valid; an affirma-
115tive reply by the Prime Minister would constitute a satisfactory pledge.
While the British were preparing their response to the Hackworth pro-
posal, negotiations were practically suspended." The only thing worth
noting was a telegram from the President to Ambassador Kennedy on August 28.
This message instructed the Ambassador to explain again to the Prime
ll^» The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 1, pp. 833-839; Langer and Gleason,
Challenge to Isolation
, p. 763.
115. Woodward, British Foreign Policy , p. 87.
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Minister the necessity for an element of exchange in the Destroyers-
bases transaction. 1 1&
There was also a significant development in the domestic legal aspect
of the exchange; the Attorney General delivered his opinion. Following
a chain of legal reasoning very similar to that devised by Benjamin Cohen
six weeks earlier, Attorney General Jackson formally advised President
Roosevelt that he could conclude the Destroyers-Bases exchange as an
executive agreement without reference to Congress. He also said the
President could transfer the ships under existing powers if he obtained the
appropriate certification by the Chief of Naval Operations. 1 '' With this
opinion to authenticate the legality of his actions, the President was at
last fully prepared to complete the exchange.
On August 29 the British 'war Cabinet considered the Kackvorth com-
promise proposal. There was controversy within the Cabinet. An attempt
was made to reserve the right to explain to the British public that the
bases were first offered as gift but had been made part of an exchange
116. E. Roosevelt, ed., FPU; His Personal Letters, Vol. II, p. 1061.
The President was also trying to explain to the Ambassador why he
had been excluded from the exchange negotiations. The occasion was
a very long and extremely bitter message from Ambassador Kennedy in
which he indicated that he learned more about the negotiations from
his discussions with Prime Minister Churchill than he did from the
State Department. He included a suggestion that such a failure to
keep him informed would normally be adequate reason for submitting
his resignation; he did not do so only because he considered it
essential for the United States to have an Ambassador in Britain to
observe her anticipated defeat. U.S., national Archives, Department
of State, Document Mo. 811.34544/2 4/9: Telegram, Ambassador Kennedy
to President Roosevelt, August 27, 1940.
117. The opinion is printed in U.S., Congress, House of Representatives,
Acquiring Certain I!aval and Air Ba ses in Exchange for Certain Over -
age Destroye rs , 76th Cong., 3d sess., House Document No. 943. Since
the Attorney General's opinion was a primary target for those who
criticized the Destroyers-Bases Exchange, further consideration of
its contents has been deferred to the next chapter. See pp. 104-107.

to solve "legal and constitutional difficulties in the United States."
This move was rejected. Other members of the Cabinet thought the exchange
vas a poor bargain, but the Foreign Secretary's preference for complying
1 1
9
vith the demands of the United States prevailed. The Hackworth pro-
posal was accepted with only a few minor changes: the bases at Bermuda and
Newfoundland were described as a gift made "freely and without consideration,"
1 ?0
and more precise sites were specified in several cases.
The British draft was delivered to Secretary Hull late on August 29;
he examined it with Admiral Stark and Mr, Hackworth and found that only
small changes had been made. Lord Lothian was called in, the changes were
discussed and agreement was reached.* 2 '- On the following morning Secre-
tary Hull phoned the revisions to the President who was vacationing at
Hyde Park, They were approved. The State Department drafted the final
documents for the exchange of notes and also a Presidential message inform-
ing Congress of the transaction. These were forwarded to the President on
August 31. 122
In the meantime, the fleet pledge had been made through an exchange
of telegrams between the President and the Prime Minister. On August 30,
118 « Foreign Relations, I960, Vol. Ill, pp. 71-72 (Telegram, U.S. Ambas-
at London to State Department, No. 2948, August 29, 1940).
H9» Ibid
. , p. 72 (Telegram, U.S. Ambassador at London to State Depart-
ment, No. 2952, August 29, 1940).
120. Langer and Gleason, Chal lengc to I so lat i on, p. 763. The Bermuda
bases "/ere to be located on the eastern coast and the Great Bay; the
base at St. Lucia was to be on the west side of the island. Those
in Newfoundland were to be on the Avalon Peninsula and the southern
coast. The Bahamas site was specified as being on the eastern side
of the chain, while the Jamaica base was to be on the southern coast
of the island. The site for the Trinidad base was designated as the
west side of the island in the Gulf of Paria; the British Guiana base
was to be within 50 miles of Georgetown.
121. langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolati on, p. 763; The Memoi rs of
Cord ell Hull, vol. 1, p. 840.
122 » The Memoirs of Cordell Hul l, vol. 1, p. 840.
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the President asked if the Prime Minister's statements of June 4 repre-
sented "the settled policy of the British Government." The Prime Mini-
ster replied that it did but observed that the "hypothetical contingencies"
referred to seemed "more likely to concern the German Fleet or what is
left of it" than the British Fleet. *-^3 xhis exchange was formalized by
an aide-memoire between Hull and Lothian on August 31. At the request of
the Prime Minister, it was withheld from the public pending announcement
of the Destroyers-Bases exchange. 2
The documents which had been forwarded to the President were returned
to Secretary Hull on September 1 along with a signed statement placing
the President's "full and cordial approval" on the notes. Lord Lothian
and Secretary Hull signed the notes in Hull's apartment at 7 p.m. on
September 2, 1940. The historic agreement was thus completed, but the
task of announcing it to the world and the problems of putting it into
effect remained to be solved.
123. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 1, pp. 840-861; Churchill, Their
Finest .Hour, pp. 366-367.
124. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 1, p. 841.
125. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 840.

CHAPTER IV
Announcement of the Exchange and Public Reaction
Throughout August 1940, the President had been evasive in answering
questions about the destroyers and the bases. On August 2, he admitted
at a press conference that discussions with Britain about bases were pro-
ceeding satisfactorily. At the same tine, however, he cautioned news-
men against speculating about a possible sale of old destroyers.
In spite of this official reluctance to make statements about either
the bases or the destroyers, press reports said that agreement was near.
Britain and the United States had reportedly reached agreement in prin-
o
clple on some sort of destroyers and bases arrangement. Announcement of
the agreement was expected as soon as final details, such as whether the
ships would go to Canada or directly to Britain, had been resolved. But
the President continued his public silence on destroyers and bases, and
said at press conferences on August 23 and August 27 that there was "no
3
news" on either subject.
The President's first revealing comment was made on September 2, but
it was buried within the text of a speech dedicating the Great Smokey
Mountains National Park. The President outlined the steps needed to im-
prove American preparedness and bring it to a minimum level capable of de-
fending the nation. Re said that new naval bases should be established in
order to enable the United States fleet to defend American shores.^ Ke
1. The Public Paper s and Addresses o f Frankli n D. Roosevelt, 1940: War -
and Aid to the _Dcmoc ra c i e s (Compiled by Samuel Rosenrnan, New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 333.
2 » The New York Times , August 21, I960.






undoubtedly had in mind the Caribbean and North Atlantic sites to be ac-
quired in the Destroyers-Bases exchange.
The Destroyers-Bases agreement was announced to Congress and the
American people on September 3, 1940. The President held a press conference
on board his train en route to Washington after his trip to Tennessee and
read to the reporters present the message which had been prepared for Con-
gress. He emphasized in his statement to the press that his message to
Congress was not a request for authority to make the agreement but was only
an announcement of what had been decided by the executive. He indicated
that the President had implied powers under the Constitution to do what
was necessary for the defense of the nation, and compared his act in this
instance with the purchase of Louisiana by ftr. Jefferson. He seemed to
be totally unaware that there was no analogy between the two acts since
Louisiana was purchased by a treaty with the advise and consent of the
Senate. After discouraging any attempts to compare the monetary values of
the ships and the bases, the President disclosed that the Prime Minister
had also reiterated his statement of June 4 regarding the British fleet.
He said this pledge was not part of the quid pro quo ; it simply occurred
"fortuitously" at the same time.5
The Presidents message to Congress began by stating that its purpose
was to transmit "for the information of Congress," certain documents --
namely, the notes by which the United States "acquired the right to lease
naval and air bases" in specified British possessions and the Attorney
General's opinion on the President's authority to complete the transaction.
->• Public Papers and Addresses, 1940, p. 332.
6. U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Acquiring Certain Nava l and
Air Bases in Exchange for Certai n_ Over-age Destroyers , 76th Cong.,
3d sess., House Document Mo. 943. Unless otherwise noted, all quo-
tations in the following discussion of the President's message, the
notes, and the Attorney General's opinion are taken from the documents
printed in this source.
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The President pointed out that the rights to Bermuda and Newfoundland
sites were "gifts - generously given and gladly received," whereas the
lease of the other bases had been exchanged for fifty old destroyers. The
President described the exchange as "an epochal and far-reaching act of
preparation for continental defense in the face of grave danger." Ke did
not consider it a threat to any nation or a violation of the United States
"status of peace," but considered the acquisition essential to national de-
fense, "an inalienable prerogative of a sovereign state," and of value in
maintaining the security of the entire Western Hemisphere, The wording of
the President's message and his inclusion of the Attorney General's opinion
among the documents submitted with it, underscored the fact that he was
not requesting congressional authorization or legal sanction for what he
had done. He was complying, however, with a law of June 28, 1940, which
obliged him to inform Congress about any disposition of naval material.
The President sent to Congress a note from the British Ambassador to
the Secretary of State which opened with an offer to "grant to the Govern-
ment of the United States, freely and without consideration," leases for
the immediate establishment of "naval and air bases" in Newfoundland and
in Bermuda, The Newfoundland sites were further specified as being "on
the Avalon Peninsula and on the southern coast;" while those at Bermuda
were "on the east coast and on the Great Bay." The offer was attributed
to a "friendly and sympathetic interest , , . in the national security of
the United States" and a desire to enhance the ability of the United States
to "cooperate effectively" with other American nations in defending the
Western Hemsiphere.
The British note also offered to make available, under 99-year lease,
sites for the immediate establishment and use of naval and air bases in
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six other British possessions. The sites vere to be located on the
eastern side of the Bahamas, on the southern coast of Jamaica, on the
western coast of St. Lucia, on the western coast of Trinidad in the
Gulf of Paria, on Antigua, and within fifty miles of Georgetown, British
Guiana. These sites were offered for the same reasons which motivated
the gifts at Bermuda and Newfoundland, and also because the United States
was known to be seeking additional bases in the Caribbean and in the
northern part of South America. The noted stated that "without endeavor-
ing to place a monetary or commercial value upon the many tangible and
intangible rights and properties involved," these six base sites were of-
fered "in exchange for naval and military equipment and material" to be
given Britain by the United States.
The British note also stated several provisions which the leases were
to contain. There would be no rent or other charges, but the United States
would have to compensate owners of private property expropriated or damaged
by the establishment of the bases. Such compensation \7as to be "mutually
agreed on." During the leasehold the United States would exercise "all
the rights, power and authority ... necessary to provide access to and
defence of" the bases. These privileges were not United to the bases
themselves, but extended also to the "territorial waters and air spaces
adjacent to or in the vicinity of the bases. Reconciliation of jurisdic-
tional details and arrangements between the United States and the local
authorities were to be accomplished "by common agreement." Also left for
determination "by common agreement" were the exact sites and bounds of the
bases; the seaward, coastal and anti-aircraft defenses required; and the




In order to work out these "common agreement" items, the British
government offered to appoint a board of experts to meet with a similar
board from the United States. Except in the cases of Newfoundland and
Bermuda, any points not resolved by the boards of experts were to be
settled by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Secretary.
In his reply to the British note, Secretary Hull expressed apprecia-
tion for the "generous action" of the British government and said the
United States accepted the proposals "gladly." He said the United States
would designate its board of experts at once so that they could meet with
the British experts to "determine the exact location of the naval and air
bases." Finally, the United States, "in consideration of" the British
offers, promised to "immediately transfer to His Majesty's Government
fifty United States Navy destroyers generally referred to as the twelve
hundred-ton type."
Several discrepancies are evident in these notes. Foremost is the
fact that Britain offered six bases in exchange for "naval and military
equipment and material" but the United States only promised to transfer
naval equipment: fifty destroyers. Another difference arises from the
fact that Britain's proposed board of experts was to be charged with set-
tling all "common agreement" items and details, whereas the United States
only offered to appoint experts to determine the exact location of the
bases. Finally, the British note exempted Newfoundland and Bermuda from
the procedure for settling matters not resolved by the experts. Presum-
ably, Britain intended to reserve to itself the right to resolve any
differences of opinion about the gift bases. As written in the British
note, however1
, those bases remained subject to negotiation among the ex-
perts but there was no provision for resolving any points on which the ex-
perts could not agree.
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Tho third document which the President delivered to Congress was
the Attorney General's opinion of August 27, 1940. In this opinion, the
Attorney General addressed himself to certain specific questions arising
in connection with the proposed Destroyers-Bases exchange. He assumed
that the exchange would have three principle characteristics. First, the
United States would acquire the right to develop and use specified bases.
Second, the United States would transfer to Britain "certain over-age
ships and obsolescent military material
. . .
and certain other small
patrol boats which though nearly completed are already obsolescent."
Finally, upon completing the transfer of equipment, all United States
obligations would be discharged (i.e., the United States acquired rights
to develop bases without any obligation to exercise those rights). On
the basis of these assumptions, the Attorney General, limiting his atten-
tion to "constitutional and statutory authority," sought to answer three
questions:
1. Could the bases be acquired under an Executive Agreement rather
than a formal treaty requiring Senate approval?
2. Did the President have the authority to dispose of the "ships
and material," and if so, under what conditions?
3. Did the belligerent status of Britain make it illegal, under
United States statutes, to deliver the destroyers or the partially com-
pleted but obsolescent torpedo boats to Britain?
With respect to the first question, the Attorney General found that
an Executive Agreement would suffice to acquire the bases. He based his
decision in part on the President's constitutional power as Commander-in-
Chief of the Army and Navy. The Attorney General said that the assignment
of such a duty to the President also placed on him "a responsibility to
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use all constitutional authority which he may possess to provide ade-
quate bases and stations for the utilization of the naval and air weapons
of the United States at their highest efficiency in our defense.*' Further
constitutional authority to accomplish the exchange was attributed to
l!that control of foreign relations which the Constitution vests in the
President as part c.T the Executive function, *' especially as that power
had been defined by the Supreme Court in the Curt i ss-Wright case.? More-
over, the proposed exchange involved only the acquisition of rights; it
did not contain any obligation requiring Congress! o:\al action for accom-
plishment. The Attorney General therefore said: "It is not necessary for
thc Senate to ratify an opportunity that entails no obligation." The
Attorney General also found several historical precedents for acquisition
of property by Executive Agreement and cited as another precedent the
statutory authority for the President to acquire diplomatic and consular
property, to negotiate and conclude trade agreements, and to acquire naval
and coaling stations in Cuba.
In answering tho second question, the Attorney General concluded that
the President did have the right to dispose of nr.val vessels and excess
naval equipment. He based his finding on two acts of Congress and a de-
cision of the Supreme Court. He cited the Act of March 3, 1883, as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court in hwinspn.J^_JL^.J^d__Stat es, as evidence of
the Presidential power to dispose of ships. That act had placed
7 » Iftiited States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., et al. . 299 U.S. 304
(1936), Although the Attorney General chose to use the word "control"
rather than "conduct" to describe the President's powers with respect
to foreign relations, he also pointed out that those powers, while
"delicate, plenary, and exclusive," (quoting the Curt i ss-Wr ight case)
were not unlimited.
^» ^^^SlI^f^^^±Sl ^IL--Il—^r_ erid A*** .^p-se^s, House Document 943. The Attorney
General's opinion cites Chapter 141, 22 Statutes 533, 599-600, and United
States Code, title 34, section 492 for the Act of March 3, 1883; and
Levinson v. United State.-, 258 U.S. 198, 201,
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limitations on the methods by which the Secretary of the Navy could sell
naval vessels and prohibited their sale for less than their appraised
value except when the Preside it had directed otherwise in writing. The
Supreme Court held that the President* s power extended to changes in the
method of sale as well as acceptance of a price less than appraised value.
The Attorney General thus concluded that "this statute
. , .
leaves the
President as Commander in Chief of the Navy free to make such disposition
of naval vessels as he finds necessary in the public interest ..." The
only other statute which the Attorney General found to bear en the Presi-
dent's right to transfer the ships was that of June 28, 1940, which required
that the Chief of Naval Operations certify that the ships were "not essen-
o
tial to the defense of the United States." The Attorney General noted
that it was "of questionable constitutionality" to restrict the action of
the constitutionally-established Commander-in-Chief except on authorization
of a statutory officer of subordinate rank and position. Ho then avoided
the issue, however, by observing that the President would, as a matter of
course, desire some such certification by the Chief of Naval Operations
even if the statute did not require it. Investigating the legislative
history of the Act of June 28, 1940, the Attorney General found evidence
that Congress had not intended to prohibit all transfers or sales of naval
and military equipment; it only sought to prevent those which would be
damaging to the defenses of the United States. Determining the legality
of any specific transfer thus became a matter of judgement. In calculat-
ing the impact of the proposed transfer or exchange on the defenses of the
United States, the Attorney General thought it wholly proper to take into
9. Acquiring Certain Naval and Air_ Eases, House Document 943, quoting
section 14a of the Act of June 28, 1940 (Public Law 671, 76th Congress).
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consideration the "remaining useful life, strategic importance, obsoles-
cence, and all other factors affecting defense value" of the material
transferred end of that received in exchange. He concluded that in
general, "the appropriate staff officers may, and should, certify under
section 14(a) [of the Act of June 2S, 1940] that ships and material in-
volved in a sale or exchange are not essential to the defense of the
United States if in their judgement the consummation of the transaction
does not impair or weaken the total defense of the United States, and
certainly so where the consummation of the arrangement will strengthen
the total defensive position of the nation." With specific reference to
the proposed Destroyers-Bases exchange, the Attorney General said the
"Chief of ^aval Operations may, and should, certify ... that the destroyers
involved are not essential
. .
. if in his judgement the exchange ...
will strengthen rather than impair the total defense of the United States."
The Attorney General then further justified his response to the first
question by pointing out that since the lav; thus authorised an exchange
of ships for bases, it was "an inescapable corrollary" that it authorized
acquisition of the materials received in the exchange.
In replying to the third question, the one concerning the effect of
Britain's belligerent status, the Attorney General followed a line of
reasoning very similar to that laid down in the Cohen memorandum. He inter-
preted the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, to do no more than implement
existing international law. He therefore concluded that the act only
barred the sending out of vessels "built, armed, equipped as, or converted
into vessels of war" if, at the time of such building, arming, fitting out
or converting, there was an intent or anticipation that the vessel would
be used in the service of a belligerent. He also cited a well known
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textbook to support his contention that under international law, pre-
existing warships were merely conti-aband which could be sold by a neutral
to a belligerent but which wore subject to seizure by opposing belliger-
ents. By contrast, both the textbook and United States statutes made
it illegal to build or fit out an armed vessel to the order of a bel-
ligerent (i.e., with the intent or expectation that the vessel would serve
a belligerent).
The Attorney General therefore concluded that although the destroyer
transfer was consistent with United States statutes and the relevant por-
tions of international law as expounded by Oppenheirn, the transfer of the
motor torpedo boats was not. The destroyers had been built during World
War I without any anticipation that they would ever serve a foreign belli-
gerent. But the torpedo boats had not yet been completed. Performing the
work necessary to finish them would constitute construction "with the intent,
or with reasonable cause to believe, they would enter the service of a
belligerent." Therefore, the motor torpedo boats could not be "sent out of
the jurisdiction of the United States."
In Britain, the Destroyers-Bases exchange agreement was announced by
Prime Minister Churchill in a speech to Parliament on September 5, 1940.
He described the exchange as "simply measures of mutual assistance rendered
to one another by two friendly nations, in a spirit of confidence, sympathy,
and goodwill." 11 He then invoked his mastery of the English language to
defend the exchange against anticipated criticisms: "Only very ignorant
persons would suggest that the transfer of American destroyers to the British
flag constitutes the slightest violation of international law, or affects
10. L. F. Oppenheirn, Internat i ona 1 Law , 5th edition.
11. Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 367.
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in the smallest degree the non-belligerency of the United States." . The
Prinze Minister did not deny that the exchange was illegal or impaired
American non-belligerency (not neutrality, it should be noted); he merely
said that "only very ignorant persons" would say so. The ignorance to
which he referred probably was a failure to recognize the benefits Britain
received from the exchange and the significance of the United States com-
mitment which it represented. The critics also could have been considered
ignorant for taking a position which tended to antagonize the segments of
United States public opinion and the factions of Congress which opposed
any aid to Britain. It is evident that the Prime Minister did not con-
sider critics of the exchange to be ignorant In terms of their understand-
ing of international lav. He later wrote that the exchange was so incom-
patible with neutrality that "according to all the standards of history' 5
it would have justified a German declaration of war against the United
States. 13
At first, the British Ambassador seemed to be uncertain which aspect
of the exchange was most important. At one point, he said that the great-
est significance of the exchange lay in the fact that it formed a strategic
alliance of sorts. The Royal Navy, based in the British Isles, became
America's outer line of defense; the island bases of the North Atlantic
and Caribbean became the inner line. 1 On another occasion Lord Lothian
said that for the United States the fleet pledge was the most important
element. According to Lothian the British thought the bases were granted
as a concession in exchange for the destroyers, but he thought they were
12. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 367.
13 » Ibid ., p. 358.
*




actually "demanded largely to satisfy Congress and the public."'^ This
interpretation was based mainly on the fact that the so-called fleet
pledge, had been linked to the proposed destroyer transfer long before the
base leases were suggested. This lengthier association notwithstanding,
interest in the bases had long been an element of United States military
thought and planning. This part of the British Ambassadors analysis
thus seems to be incorrect; the bases were at least as important to the
United States as the fleet pledge.
The gloss placed on the exchange by the United States and British
governments differed considerably. Each side described it in the terms most
palatable to its electorate. In the United States the exchange was por-
trayed as a transaction which yielded a net benefit for the United States
and its national defense. This interpretation was most likely to receive
the acquiescence of the Congress, the Navy Department and the public.
Satisfying the public was most important to the President, since a presi-
17
dential election was only two months away.
Prime Minister Churchill admitted that this interpretation "was in-
deed true, but not exactly a convenient statement" of the exchange for the
British government.*^ In public statements, therefore, the Prime Minister
did not emphasize the exchange aspects of the transaction. Parliament
and the people would have objected to a "naked trading away" of historic
British possessions. 9 They would accept more readily a giving away of the
15. J. R. M. Butler, Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr^ 1882-1940, p. 296.
16. See pp. 6-12 above.
17. Churchill, Their Fin est Hour, p. 361; Louis William Koenig, The
Presidency and the jCrl sis (Mew York: King's Crown Press, 1944), p. 29.




bases, especially if the gift were motivated by the high purpose of common
defense. The Prime Minister thus stressed the statement he had made on
August 20, offering to give bases to tha United States, and he emphasized
the mutual nature of the benefits to be derived from the transaction. He
opposed any attempt to compute the costs and benefits of the exchange in
terms of the monetary value of the properties exchanged,
Mr. Churchill , s personal motives for concluding the Destroyers-Bases
exchange, from which his personal gloss on the exchange may be inferred,
were quite complex. From the least complimentary side, his critics be-
lieved he wanted the United States to defend "the very ramparts behind
which the British [would continue^} the struggle."20 The Prime Minister
himself has acknowledged that the strategic and political importance of
acquiring the destroyers outweighed the fact that the intrinsic value of the
"antiquated and inefficient" ships was incomparably less than that of the
21
bases. He has pointed out, however, that the bases held greater strategic
value for the United States than they did for Britain. But for Britain,
the very nature of the act was more important than satisfaction of the
British need for destroyers or the United States desire for bases. It
marked a change of position by the United States from neutrality to
22friendly non-belligerency.
In summing up his account of the Destroyers-Bases exchange in his
memoirs, Mr. Churchill disposed of the differences of interpretation
quite nicely:
Thus we obtained the fifty American destroyers. We
granted ninety-nine-year leases of the air and naval bases
20. Koenig, Pre sidency an.d the Crisis, p. 28,
21. Churchill, The i r Pi nest^Hour
, p. 357.
22 « I bid.., P. 353.
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specified in the West Indies and Newfoundland to the United
States. And, thirdly, I repeated rny declaration about not
scuttling or surrendering the British Fleet in the form of
an assurance to the President. I regarded all these as
parallel transactions, and as acts of goodwill performed
on their merits and not as bargains. The President found
it more acceptable to present them to Congress as a con-
nected whole. Ue neither of us contradicted each other,
and both countries were satisfied. 23
There was a general belief in both the United States and Britain
that the exchange would not, by itself, bring the United States into the
war. The leaders of both nations believed that any German decision to
rake war against the United States would bo based on German interests.
If and when Germany thought a war with the United States would serve
those interests, there would be war. Some pretext for declaring war
would be found. The Destroyers-Bases exchange was not expected to be-
come a casus be lli unless, at the same time, Germany decided a war with
the United States would help implement the aims of German foreign policy.*
The British government thought it most unlikely that Germany would make
such a decision. The Prime Minister reasoned that Hitler* s method was to
engage his opponents one at a time. He would make every effort to avoid
a war with the United States until Britain had been defeated. In Church-
hill's words, the President saw "no danger" and the Prime Minister "no hope,"
that Germany would provide a "simple solution" to the situation by declaring
95
war on the United States. J
In the United States, immediate public reaction to the announcement
of the exchange was generally favorable. This approval may have been dvie
largely to the complimentary fashion in which the President described the
23. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 368.
24. Interview with Benjamin V. Cohen, October 25, 1966. The Fresicent had
reversed his opinion since his luncheon with Harold Ickes on June 4,
1940. See pp. 18-19 above.
25. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 358.
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exchange in his announcement, although a Gallup poll had reflected sub-
stantial popular support for a destroyer transfer as much as a month
earlier. Opposition to the exchange cane mainly from isolationists who
saw it as part of the Roosevelt raster-plan for getting the United States
01involved in tha European war,"1 ' Even the isolationists, however, were
pleased by the acquisition of the bases, a move which they had long sup-
ported. 2 8
Perhaps the opinion which reflected the general public* s attitude
toward the exchange most accurately was that expressed by the Republican
presidential candidate, Wendell Willkie, He approved of the trade in
principle, but objected vigorously to the method by which the President ac-
complished it. He said it was "the most arbitrary and dictatorial action
90
ever taken by any President in the history of the United States,"^ One
direct result of Mr. Willkie's decision to limit his criticism to the
method by which the exchange was accomplished (i.e., without prior public
notice or Congressional consent) and to avoid criticizing the exchange it-
self, was to prevent the exchange and national defense in general from bc«
coming issues in the presidential election campaign. Lacking the leader-
ship of its presidential candidate, the Republican Party did not even es-
tablish an organized opposition to the exchange in the Senate or the House
of Representatives.
In his contemporary analysis of the exchange, one writer on military
affairs made four main observations: 1. The political implications
—
26. The lie ; York Times, September 6, 1940.
27. Donald F. Drummond, Tho Passing of American Keutra l_ity r 1 937-1941 ,
p. 168; Time, September 16, 1940, p. 70 (Editorial from the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch); The New York Times . September 4, 1940.
28. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 772.
29. The l-i cw York Times , news article by J. A. Hagerty, "Willkie Condemns
Destroyer Trade," September 7, 1940.
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establishnGiit of an Anglo-American alignment—were the most significant
aspects of the exchange; (2) the weakening of the United States Navy as
a result of the loss of destroyers was offset by a corresponding strength-
ening of the Royal Navy; (3) the exchange would not have a crucial impact
on the war because the addition of fifty destroyers would not reverse the
tides of war if, in fact, Britain was losing; and (A) the United States
received a net gain in military terms because the bases, when developed,
would be Eiore valuable to national defense than the ships which had been
traded away. About a year later, the same writer still thought the
exchange was advantageous in terms of national defense, but he was much
more critical of the method by which the exchange was accomplished. With
respect to national defense, he noted that the exchange "had extended
American outposts from 700 to 1,000 miles out into the Atlantic," spreading
United States domination eastward past the mid-Atlantic and southward to
31
the mouth of tho Amazon. On the negative side, he also observed that
"the fluid pro quo of the naval-base deal was not, in the British mind,
destroyers alone b\Jt our [American"] participation in the war; the ojui_d
pro quo was American blood,"-"1 Even that type of quid pro quo might have
received his approval if the exchange had been made with full public and
Congressional understanding of its contents.
The British Parliament met the announcement of the Destroyers-Bases
exchange with cheers. The exchange also received general public and press
approval in Britain, where attention was focussed on the political rather
than the material aspects of the exchange. It was seen as "practical
30. The I:ew York Times, ners article by Hanson W, Baldwin, "U.S. Seen
Gainer in Destroyer Deal," September 4, 1940,
31. fenson V.7 . Baldwin, United We Standi^Defense of t he "Western Hemisphere
(New York: Whittlesey House, 194T), p. 107.
~
32 » Ibid ., pp. 49-50.
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evidence" that the defense of Britain and America was complementary, and
that a growing number of Americans were becoming aware that Britain was
"their only line of defence that [was"] fully manned and in fighting trim. "33
There were, of course, some hard-bitten Empire loyalists who thought the
United States was taking advantage of Britain, In their eyes, the United
States had coveted the VIest Indies for years, and was now forcing Britain,
in its weakest hour, to buy "50 destroyers which were on their way to the
scrap heap" and to give up pieces of the Empire in payment.
As in Britain and the United States, announcement of the exchange
produced generally favorable reactions at the prospective base sites. This
local approval was probably derived in part from a sense of relief. After
the Prime Minister announced on August 20 that bases had been offered to
the United States, the base-site colonies had been apprehensive about
their future. They were pleased to find that the exchange did not affect
35their constitutional status as parts of the British colonial system.
The exchange was also received favorably in Latin America. Here, too,
the response was due in part to a sense of relief. Having acquired bases
in British territory, the United States was less likely to seek military
concessions in the Latin American Republics. The exchange was also ap-
plauded because it meant an improvement of Western Hemisphere defense.
Reaction to the exchange in Germany, as reflected in press comments,
stressed several points. The exchange was said to be evidence of Britain*
s
33. The Economist , editorial "Fair Exchange," September 7, 1940, (Vol. 139),
pp. 299-300.
34. The National Review, editorial "[Necessity, " October, 1940 (Vol. 115),
p. 389.
35. The L ow__York Times, news items from the Bahamas, Jamaica, British
Guiana, and St. Lucia, September 5, 1940.
36. The Kew York Times , news article by John '.J. White, "Americas Greet
our Love for Bases," August 25, 1940; I bid ., news items from Colombia
and Brazil, September 5, 1940.
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dirc position and an indication that Britain was already contemplating
defeat and trying to negotiate for a rescue by the United States. It.
was also said to reveal the true motives of the United States, which was
37perfectly willing to reap a profit from the difficulties of its friends.
There was no direct accusation that the United States had violated its
neutrality, but many of the press and foreign office statements clearly
implied that the exchange was inconsistent with neutrality under domestic
and international law. It was also widely predicted that fifty addi*
tional destroyers in the Royal Navy would not influence the course of the
war.
Privately, German leaders reacted to the exchange with a greater
sense of concern and annoyance than their public statements indicated. As
reported to them by the German Charge d* Affaires at V/ashington, the ex-
change was intended to prove to the American public that the United States
government was convinced Britain could withstand the German offensive and
ultimately defeat Germany. The tactic of presenting the people and Con-
gress with a fa i
t
accompl i was reported to be evidence that the President
had decided to "disregard parliamentary limitations and arrogate to him-
39
self dictatorial functions."
On the basis of such information, the German leaders were annoyed by
the apparently hostile intentions of the United States and concerned that
the United States might become involved in the war before Germany was pre-
pared for it. The decision was made, therefore, to avoid any response
37. The i.ew York Times, August 27, 1940; Forrest Davis and Ernest K.
Lindley, How ".'ar Came
, p. 107.
38. The Mev7 York Times , news article "Berlin Holds Deal is Unneutral Act,"
September 5, 1940.
39. U.S., Department of State, Documcntson German Foreign Policy, 1918-
1945, Series D (1937-1945), Vol. XI: The jar"'Years : September" 1» 1940-
January_31, .1941 (Washington, 1960), p. 13.
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which might further antagonize the United States.^ Press statements
were deliberately restrained and military recommendations for expanded
41
operations in the Atlantic wex-e rejected.
Underlying all this effort to avoid irritating the United States was
a firm conviction that the United States, so long as it was not a belliger-
ent, could not affect the result of the war. The United States was ex-
pected to spend two or three more years building up its own defenses be-
fore it could lend Britain anything more than nominal aid. Germany ex-
pected to conquer Britain before America could render much assistance.
Although not decisive, announcement of the Destroyers-Bases exchange
was probably a contributory factor in another aspect of German foreign
policy: the Tripartite Pact of September 27, 1940. -* In conjunction with
the Ogdensburg Agreement of August 18, the Destroyers-Bases exchange
helped convince Hitler that it would be useful to coordinate policy with
Japan. Hitler thought he could use Japan to divert United States atten-
tion toward the Pacific and avray from the Atlantic and Europe.^
Japan was receptive to the proposal of a Tripartite Pact for similar
reasons. The Ogdensburg Agreement was thought to apply to New Zealand
and Australia as well as Canada. Moreover, there was anticipation of a
Pacific Ocean version of the Destroyers-Bases exchange, possibly involving
40. Drummond, The Passing of American Neutrality , p. 169.
41. H. L. Trefousse, Germany and American neutrality 1939-1941 (New York:
Bookman Associates, 1951), pp. 57-58,61.
42. Langcr and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation
, p. 774; Office of Naval
Intelligence, Navy Department, Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Deal-
ing with the German Navy , 1940, Vol. II, pp. 19-20.
43. Drummond, Tho^ Pas si ng _of Am.cr i can. Njoutra 11 1 y, p. 169; Trefousse,
Germany^ and Amar i can N cut ra 1 i ty , p. 64; '.Jilliam L, Langer and S. Everett
Gleason, The_ Undeclared Jar: 194JM9M.., Vol, II of The World Crisis
and Amer ican Fore ign rol icy Ciew York J Harper and Brothers, 1953),
pp. 24-26.
44. Trefousse, Germany ar.d^Amer i can Ncutra 1 i ty , p. 64.
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United States bases in Singapore and the Dutch East Indies. * In such
circumstances Japan was willing to enter a coalition against the United
States.
As in Germany and Japan, Italian authorities publicly derided and
criticized the Destroyers-3ases exchange, but in contrast to the appre-
hensive response elsewhere, Italiax\ leaders privately expressed their in-
difference toward it. The official press said the exchange was "a very
grave offense against neutrality.'' The personal diary of an Italian
official, however, cites Mussolini's indifference as a contrast to the
47
"excitement and indignation" in Berlin. The same official later recorded
the Italian dictators belief that the exchange proved the United States
was on Britain's side. This did not seem very important to Mussolini,
however, because he was also convinced that the United States could do
little more than it had already done to aid Britain.
Returning to the reaction to the exchange within the United States,
the sharpest controversy developed over the Attorney General's opinion.
It was attacked from many sides and on many grounds. It found few de-
fenders.
There were a multitude of points on which legal authorities took
issue with the Attorney General. They questioned his interpretation of
45. Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War , pp. 24-26; Time, September, 1940.
46. The Mew York Times , quoting Relazioni International! , in news article
"Deal on Destroyers Hostile, Rome Holds," September 8, 1940.
47. Hugh Gibson, ed., The Ciano Diaries; 1939-1943 (New York: Doubleday
and Company, Inc., 1946), p. ~290.
48. Malcolm Muggeridge, ed., Ciano* s Diplomatic Papers (London: Odhams
Press Limited, 1948), pp; 392, 397, recording meetings between
Mussolini and German Foreign Minister von Ribbentropp at Rome,
September 19, 1940; and Mussolini and Hitler at Brenner Pass.'octo-
ber 4, 1940.
49. See the following articles in ;A/r ;r i can _Jourrial of Internationajjlaw^
Vol. 34, No. 4 (October, 1940): Edwin Borchard, "The Attorney"
General's Opinion on the Exchange of Destroyers for Naval Bases "
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the three relevant domestic lavrs. The Act of 1883 was said to apply only
to vessels unfit for service--a description manifestly inapplicable to
ships which were being transferred for use as operational units of the
Royal Navy. There was a bitter dispute over the Act of June 15, 1917,
Some argued that it was intended to outlaw all ship transfers; others
said Congress cnly intended the ban to apply to those ships built or con-
verted with the intent to transfer them to a foreign belligerent. Finally,
it was argued that the Act of June 28, 1940, was intended to prohibit the
transfer of ships except under specified limitations; it was not intended
to be used as an authorization to transfer ships in any case where the
limiting conditions were fulfilled, 50
The opinion was further criticized for transposing legal rights from
the individual to the state. It may have been legal for John Doe to sell
an armed vessel to Britain, subject to seizure and confiscation as contra-
band, but that did not make it legal for the United States government to
do so. It was also noted that the Attorney General's assumption that
only rights, not obligations, to build bases implied that Congress would
have its voice in the transaction when the President requested funds to
develop the bases. Critics, however, quickly pointed out that the President
already had ample funds for base development in several "blank check" appro-
priations for airbases and for national defense. The bases could thus be
49, (Continued) pp, 690-697; Herbert W, Briggs, "Neglected Aspects of the
Destroyer Deal," pp. 569-587; C. G. Fenwick, "Neutrality on the De-
fensive," pp. 697-699; Quincy Wright, "The Transfer of Destroyers to
Great Britain," pp. 6S0-689. Also see The Mew York Tines, letter to
the editor by Edward S. Corwin, Professor of International Jurispru-
dence, Princeton University, October 13, 1940; The New York Times ,
letter to the editor by Alexander N, Sack, Professor of Lav;, New York
University, October 27, 1940; Langir and Gleason, Challenge tol solu-
tion, pp. 772-773; Koenig, The Presidency and the Crisis , pp. 31-34.
50, Notably Briggs, Borchard, Koenig, and Corwin in works cited above.
51, See Briggs article and Sack letter cited above.
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built without any further reference to Congress.
Almost all the liters noted the Attorney General's failure to comment
in depth on the international law pertaining to the exchange. As has been
mentioned, the Attorney General restricted his attention to "questions of
59
constitutional and statutory authority." ^
The Attorney General's interpretations of the constitutional powers
and duties involved were also taken to task. It was argued that the Presi-
dent's implied powers as Commander in Chief could not overcome the power to
dispose of property which under the Constitution had been explicitly as-
signed to Congress. The lack of constitutional authority for the President
CO
to acquire territory was also noted. JJ
The nature of the war then in progress was also disputed. Soma argued
that it was an illegal war, an aggressive war in violation of the Pact of
Paris. Under such circumstances, it was asserted, the old, traditional
duties of a neutral did not apply. Rather than demanding impartiality,
the "new neutrality" permitted, and perhaps required, the neutral to lend
support to the nation(s) engaged in lawful defensive action.
There was also a marked difference of opinions with respect to the
relevancy of the Hague Convention of 1907. The Department of State ar-
gued that under the provisions of Article 28, the entire convention was
irrelevant because it had not been assented to by two of the belligerents
55(Italy and Britain). Others admitted that this was technically correct,
but argued that the convention was really a declaratory document, which
did not create new laws but simply codified existing international lav.7
.
52. Attorney General's Opinion of August 27, 19&G, see note 6 above.
53. Mainly Borchard, Koenig, and Corwin in works cited above, note £9.
54. See article by Quincy Wright cited above, note 49.
55. langer and Gleason, Cha 1_1 cnge t o Isolation, p. 773.
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Thc United States was accused of violating the existing international laws
which the convention sought to state in explicit fashion. Still another
position has been expressed by Secretary of State Hull. He argued that
by attacking Poland, Denmark and the Low Countries, the Axis powers had
violated one of the conventions fundamental propositions that belliger-
ents were "bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral Powers."
Therefore, the Secretary argued, the united States actions were proper be-
cause "It would be absurd to contend that the convention, which repre-
sented a compromise between the rights and duties of belligerents on the
one hand and neutrals on the other, should bind only the neutrals."
Two pertinent conclusions can be drawn from a study of these legal-
istic disputes. First, they were rather useless. Mone sought to over-
throw the exchange, and one writer even suggested that it receive exjgost
CO
facto approval from the Congress. The debate cast considerable doubt on
the legality of the President's actions, but it did not affect those actions
in any way.
The second conclusion is that the conduct of the United States,
whether legal or illegal, was not in keeping with the concept of neutrality
as it had been understood during the 18th and 19th centuries. The Attorney
General even admitted this fact himself, when he finally commented on the
59international legality of the exchange in a speech delivered in fiarch 1941.
He argued that the rules of international law had changed since the start
of the twentieth century. Starting with Elihu Root's 1918 letter presaging




58. Irofessor Corwin in his letter to the editor cited above, note 49.
59. Speech to the Inter-American Bar Association, Havana, Cuba, March 27,
1941. The speech was delivered by George S. Messersmith, U. S. Am-
bassador to Cuba, because bad weather prevented the Attorney General,
who was cruising with the President, from flying to Havana. Text of
address in The New York Times , March 23, 1941.
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the League of Nations Covenant, the Attorney General traced the develop-
ment of a new body of international lav: through the final version of the
Covenant, the Pact of Paris, and the Saavedra-Lamas Ant i -War Pact. Under
this alleged new law, an aggressive war was illegal and a breach of the
international peace was a matter of concern and interest to all states.
As part of the sanctions against aggression, neutrals were released from .
any obligation to act impartially when one belligerent was acting illegally
and the other was engaged in lawful self-defense. Neutrals were permitted
to discriminate against the nation which, had gone to war in violation of
international law.
The Attorney General even argued that this new international lav: was
actually a return to a much older lav?, the 18th and 19th century interpre-
tations having been mere aberrations. Ke quoted Grotius:
It is the duty of neutrals to do nothing which may strengthen
the side which has the worse cause, or which may impede the
motions of him who is carrying on a just war.
After the debate was over, the Attorney General's opinion, although
battered and perforated, had served its purpose: "An adequate, if somewhat
imperfect, attempt to carry a necessary policy through a maze of legal
hesitations which had become? largely unreal." *
Not long after the ink was dry on the exchanged notes (and perhaps
before it was dry), the first difficulty arose regarding the exchange. The
problem was related to one of the discrepancies between the notes: the
60. As quoted by the Attorney General. This is a good approximation of the
version in Hugo Grotius, The Rightsof War and Peace (Universal
Classics Library Series, Washington: M, Walter Dunne, 1901), p. 377.
Grotius* dictum falls short of authorizing assistance to "him who
is carrying on a just war," however.
61, Drunraond, The Passing of American Neutrality , p. 169.
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diffcrence between "naval and military equipment and material" and "fifty
United States Kavy destroyers," To review the development of this
situation, it will be recalled that Prime Minister Churchill's initial
request had been for destroyers and motor torpedo boats. In his reply,
the President had mentioned PBM-typc seaplanes and some surplus rifles.
Subsequent com mini cations also included materials other than destroyers:
motor torpedo boats, PBY's, Curtiss fighter planes, rifles, tanks and
ammunition. These materials were included in nearly every note in July
and up through the middle or end of August, In his opinion, dated August 27,
the Attorney General repeatedly referred to "vessels and material" vhich
might be exchanged for bases. Unfortunately, Britain and United States
differed sharply on the question of how the material other than destroyers
was excluded from the final exchange notes.
The British contended that it was decided on August 2.7 that the de-
stroyers would "stand alone" in the exchange. Any additional aid would
have to be arranged separately. The United States, in turn, contended that
the omission was inadvertent. Secretary Hull claimed that when he returned
from vacation and was assigned the task of resolving the tangled destroyer
transfer situation, he was not informed that anything other than destroyers
and bases was involved. Consequently, when the Hackworth formula was
developed and the final drafts prepared, the 20 motor torpedo boats, 5
heavy bombers, 5 PBY's, 250,000 rifles and 30 million rounds of ammunition
were onitted from the list of material the United States would transfer to
62. See p, 89 above.
63. Hall, North Amar i
c
an ^Supp ly, p. 144; Butler, Lord Lothian , p. 293,
64. Langer and Gleascn, Challenge to Isolation , p, 769; Stetson Conn and
Byron Fairchild, The Framework of
_
/femi sphere Defense, p. 59. With
respect to proposals to transfer B-17 aircraft, see Mark Skinner
Watson, Chi ef of_S taf_f : Prewar Plans^ and^ Preparat i ons, p. 306,
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Britain. According to one account, Lord Lothian "scrutinized and criti-
cized the various draft letters without noting the inadvertent omission
of the other items. ""^ Hull and his negotiators thus had no reason to
believe any other material was involved. Following the exchange of notes,
newsmen asked State Department representatives about the apparent discrep-
ancy between the notes. They were told that although the destroyers might
be inadequate payment for the bases, the agreement had been signed, and
delivery of the destroyers would complete the transaction from the United
States point of view.
Some light is shed on this situation by a memorandum from Prime Mini-
ster Churchill to his. Foreign Secretary on September 5. After suggesting
that a telegram be sent from the War Cabinet to Lord Lothian complimenting
him on his handling of the Destroyers-Bases negotiation, he added:
At the same time, what is being done about getting our
twenty motor torpedo boats, the five P.B.Y. [flying boatsj],
the one hundred and fifty to two hundred aircraft, and the
two hundred and fifty thousand rifles, also anything else
that is going. I consider we were promised all the above,
and more too. Not an hour should be lost in raising these
questions. "Beg while the iron is hot." 6 '
This implies that the Prime Minister did not necessarily expect the addi-
tional equipment and supplies to be set forth explicitly as part of the
Destroyers-Bases exchange, even though he felt the United States was ob-
ligated to provide them.
Officially, the United States did not change its position that only
65. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 769; in contrast, Conn
and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense , p. 59, says Lothian
did note the omission prior to signing the notes and protested it.
He finally signed the notes as drafted, but with reluctance.
66. Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 59.
67. Churchill, Their. Finest Hour




the destroyers had been exchanged for the bases. Shortly after the ex-
change of notes, the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
submitted a proposed House Resolution to the Secretary of State for corn-
ment,
c
The resolution ashed the President if anything other than 50 old
destroyers would be given to Britain in exchange for the naval bases. In
a letter dated September 19, the Secretary replied, "The answer to the
69inquiry in the resolution is no," A similar request for comment on an
identical Senate resolution received the same reply on September 2&.
Nevertheless, the President evidently felt obligated to supply
Britain with the additional material. At the urging of Secretary of War
Stimson, he agreed on September 12 to re-open the negotiations to correct
the omissions. By the following day, however, Secretary Hull had convinced
the President that a re-opening would produce criticism and suspicions of
skullduggery, so the Fresident reversed his decision. The omissions were
corrected by separate arrangements.'*
Shortly thereafter, General Marshall certified that 250,000 rifles
(Britain's most urgently needed equipment) were not essential to United
States defense and they were transferred to Britain. ^ Fifty million,
rounds of small arms ammunition was also released for transfer. Much to
the satisfaction of the Army Air Corps, the British were never given the
five B-17 bombers they had been promised from United States stocks. In-
stead, the British received a more valuable arrangement: the production
of new B-24 bombers was to be equally divided between the United States
63. House Resolution 599, 76th Congress, 3d sess.
69. U.S., National Archives, Department of State, Document 811. 34544/82.
70. Senate Resolution 317, 76th Congress, 3d sess.; U. S., National
Archives, Department of State, Document 811.34544/105.




anc! Britain. Previous arrangements had allocated only one aircraft to
Britain for each two received by the United States. -
The next problem to arise concerned access to the new United States
bases by British forces. I mined iately after the exchange of notes on
September 2, Secretary Hull insisted on reconciling the Destroyers-Bases
exchange and the agreements vhich had recently been made with the Latin
American nations at Havana. A circular note vas sent to the other American
Republics informing them of the exchange and stating that the facilities
thus acquired would be open to all American Republics for cooperative de-
fense of the hemisphere. l
In a note to the Secretary of State on September 26, the British Am-
bassador observed that although access to the bases by British forces was
a subject for separate agreement, Britain assumed the privileges granted
its forces would be at least equal to those granted the American Republics.
He also renewed the request that the planes of a British airline be granted
access to air facilities in the leased areas on an equal footing with United
75States commercial aircraft.
The first reaction to this request was favorable, but ' further con-
sideration led to a reversal. Granting Britain the desired access would
have conflicted with the Declaration of Panama barring activities in the
Western Hemisphere by belligerents. It could also have set a precedent
for the establishment of German bases in the area. In his reply of
December 30, the Secretary of State summarized the community effort that
73. Conn and Fairchild, F ramework of Hemj. sphere Defense, pp. 59-60.
74. _I_bid., p. 60; State Department Bull etin, September 7, 1940 (Vol. 3,
No. 63), ?. 195.
75. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of .the United States ,
1940, Vol. Ill, p?. 75-76 (ilote, British Ambassador to State Depart-
ment, September 26, 1940, and Secretary of State* s reply of December 30,
1940). See p. 50 above for initial request.
76. Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared "ar, pp. 170-171.
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had been organized for hemispheric defense. He pointed out that Britain,
aside from being a belligerent, was not a ir.ember of the hemispheric com-
munity and could not be expected to limit its use of the bases to hemi-
spheric defense. In such circumstances, the Secretary said, the United
States could not extend a general right of access to Britain. He added
that requests for use of the base facilities by British forces in specific
cases would be considered on their merits. With respect to use of air
facilities by commercial airlines, the Secretary pointed out that pro-
posals to develop the air bases through an agency agreement with Pan-Ameri-
can Airways had been abandoned. No general commercial operations by
United States airlines were expected to occur at the ba^es so it would be
meaningless to grant a British airline an equivalent operating privilege.
The Secretary agreed to reconsider this request and give it "sympathetic
consideration" if the policy on commercial operations v;as later changed.''
This issue was discussed again in January 1941, The British objected
to the United States decision on the grounds that it had aroused resent-
ment in Britain and at the base sites and because it placed Britain "in a
position of inferiority to all of the Latin American countries."' Reply-
ing for the United States, Under Secretary of State Welles again declined
to grant Britain a general right of access. He said that use of the bases
by the American Republics was part of the reciprocal obligations established
among the states of the Western Hemisphere. It \vTas part of their efforts
to maintain the defense and the integrity of the hemisphere. Welles sug-
gested, however, that Canada, as an American Republic, would be eligible to
use the bases if it so desired.
77, Foreign Relations, 1940 , Vol. Ill, pp. -76-77 (Reply cited above, note
75)".
78. Foreign Relations., 1941 , Vol. Ill, p. 56 (Memorandum of conversation




The initial difficulties encountered by the Destroyers-Bases ex-
change having thus been disposed of, it is necessary to return to the




Del.ivory o f the Destroyers and S elect ion
jv
o f the Base Sites
The first steps in transferring the fifty destroyers to Britain ac-
tually occurred several weeks before the notes were exchanged. 1 The
vessels had been selected in late August. The transfer was to begin at
Halifax, Nova Scotia, on September 6, with eight ships being transferred
every two weeks. The first eight ships were soon recalled from the Neu-
trality Patrol and the task of replenishing all stores, spare parts and
ammunition began.
The first group of ships was ordered to Boston on August 30 to com-
plete preparations for transfer. Sailing from Norfolk, the ships stopped
at Philadelphia and at Newport, Rhode Island, to. pick up stores and tor-
pedoes. When they arrived in Boston on September 3, they learned thnt all
ships which had not been dry-docked in the preceding six months were to
be docked for a scraping and painting of the underwater hull.
Also on September 3, the Chief of Naval Operations complied with the
Act of June 28 by submitting the following letter to the President:
1. See p. 70 above. This account of the destroyer transfer is based on
the report of the transfer contained in Commander Destroyers, Patrol
Force, report of December 13, 1940, to the Chief of Naval Operations:
"Report of Transfer of Forty-Four (44 ) 1200-ton Destroyers to Great
Britain and Six (6) to the Canadian Government Commencing September 6,
1940," Navy Department Archives; The "Town" Class Destroyers: The
Story of t he "Four Stackers, 1 ' (T.S.D. Historical ^Section, British
Admiralty, London, 1949); and Philip Goodhart, Fifty Ships that Saved
the World, A brief but readable account is also presented in Daniel S.
Greenberg, "U.S. Destroyers for British Bases - Fifty Old Ships Go to






To the President of the United States:
1, Concerning tha proposed transfer of destroyers to Great
Britain in exchange for naval and air bases, the Attorney
General of the United States in an opinion held as follows:
"It is ray opinion that the Chief of Naval Operations
may, and should, certify under Section 14(a) that such
destroyers are not essential to the defense of the United
States if in his judgement the exchange of such destroyers
for strategic naval and air bases will strengthen rather
than impair the total defense of the United States."
2. It is my opinion that an exchange of 50 over-age de-
stroyers for suitable naval and air bases on 99-year leases
in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Santa Lucia,
Trinidad, Antigua and in British Guiana will strengthen
rather than impair the total defense of the United States.
Therefore, I certify that on the basis of such an exchange,
and in accordance with the opinion of the Attorney Genera]
of the United States, the 50 over-age destroyers of the so-
called 1,200 ton type are not essential to the defense of
the United States.
(signed) H. R. Stark
Admiral, United States Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations2
The extent to which Admiral Stark quoted the Attorney General and the
similarity of phrasing between his statement and the Attorney General's
opinion have been interpreted by some as an indication that Admiral Stark
was reluctant to make the certification. These critics imply that it was
the Attorney General, not the Chief of Naval Operations, who decided the
ships were not essential to the defense of the nation. This is diffi-
cult to accept in the light of the unambiguous statement in paragraph 2
2. U.S., Congress ional Record, 76th Congress, 3d Sess., September 3,
1940, p. 17279; Briggs, "Neglected Aspects of the Destroyer Deal,"
Amer i can Jouma 1 of Internat ional Law, October, 1940, p. 574.
3. Briggs, "Neglected Aspects of the Destroyer Deal" and Borchard, "The
Attorney General* s Opinion on the Exchange of Destroyers for Naval
Bases," both in American Journal of International .Law, October 1944,
pp. 574 and 692-693, respectively.
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that Admiral Stark did hold the opinion that the exchange would be bene-
ficial to national defense. The Attorney General's entire recommendation
as to what the Chief of Naval Operations "nay, and should" do was depen-
dent upon that belief. It is more likely that the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions followed the Attorney General 1 s phrasing in order to be certain' his
certificate was legal and free of defects or deviations from the lav/. A
more interesting point is the inclusion of the word "suitable" to describe
the bases. This may, indeed, have reflected some uncertainty about the
value of the base rights (as distinguished from bases themselves) which
were being received in the exchange. f Nevertheless, certification was ac-
complished and the transfer proceeded.
late on September 3, the first contingent of destroyers was ordered
to leave Boston. Departing for Halifax early on September A, they arrived
there on September 6. By what the Prime Minister chose to describe as "the
long arm of coincidence," the first group of British crews arrived at
Halifax as several of the desti'oyers were entering port. Within hours,
the skeleton crews aboard the United States destroyers were instructing
their British counterparts about the iitti-icacies and idiosyncracies of the
aged ships. This training, along with checking stores and spare parts and
conducting operational trials, continued for the next two days.
On September 9, the first eight destroyers were transferred by a curi-
ously formal ritual. The ships were no longer considered to be in United
States naval service, but they still flew the United States ensign. At
8:00 a.m. all but a group of four or five key members cf each ship's crew
left the ship and formed into ranks on the pier. There was not a British
sailor in sight. The ensigns were hauled down and the ships declared
4. See pp. 68-59 above for Chief of Naval Operations opinion.
5. Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 36S.
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decommissioi"icd. One officer from each ship stayed aboard, having been
designated its custodian. The United States Navy crews inarched off the
pier, boarded waiting trains and departed for the United States and
their new duty stations. After they were gone, at about 10:00 a.m., the
British crews marched onto the piers. They boarded the ships, accepted
custody of them, and placed them in commission as ships of the Royal
Navy. After a few more days of trial and training under the guidance of
the custodian-officer and his key enlisted men, the remaining United
States personnel departed and the ships prepared to sail for England.
The first group left on September 15. Plagued by mechanical and opera-
tional problems, three of these ships were forced to return to Nova
Scotia.. This was typical of the circumstances which prevailed as the
remainder of the destroyers were transferred. On November 26 the trans-
fers were completed. Six of the fifty ships were commissioned in the
Royal Canadian Navy, and Canada retained custody of one additional ship
which had been seriously damaged in a grounding in Halifax harbor. Of
the A3 ships remaining for the Royal Navy, three were manned by crews
from the Royal Norwegian and Dutch navies.
Upon re-commissioning, the ships were re-named after British and
United States towns which had the same names (exceptions: USS Herndon
became HMS Churchill and USS .Hunt became HliS Broadway) . As a group,
they were known as the Town class destroyers.
The destroyers continued to encounter difficulties, both mechanical
and man made, and were slow to assume the breech-filling role for which
they had been intended. But six to eight months after their transfer,
the old ships had begun to play a significant part in the war; in 19A1
they accounted for 20 to 25 percent of the escort ships available for
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cenvoy protection in what has since been designated the Battle of the
Atlantic.
The Town class destroyers continued to serve the Allied cause through'
out the war, although in widely, varying ways. Only a few remained opera-
tional as the British and United States navies expanded and assumed the
offensive in the war. Some were lost in battle, while others performed
heroically." Most were converted to target vessels, training ships or
float ing barracks, and several were stripped for spare parts. In 1944,
eight were transferred to the Russian Navy. Soon after the war ended, the
last of the "antiquated and inefficient: 1 ' ships which became the Town class
destroyers met its long overdue fate, the scrapper's torch.
The expeditious fashion in which the destroyers were transferred
stands in sharp contrast to the long, slow process by which the bases were
located and developed. By the end of 1940 all the ships had been trans-
ferred, forty had arrived in Britain, and at least one had participated in
action against a U-boat. But, by the same date, base construction had be-
gun at only one site and there were only token forces there and at two
other sites. There were no formal lease agreements for any of the sites;
everything was proceeding on the basis of interim understandings.
Like the transfer of destroyers, the selection of base sites had
actually begun some time prior to conclusion of the exchange agreement on
September 2. Soon after 1'rime Minister Churchill announced a plan to
grant base-leases to the United States in his speech of August 20, the
6. Ten were lost to enemy action. The most spectacular exploit was that
°f H.M.S. Campbeltown, formerly U-S^ Buchanan. She was loaded with
delayed action explosives and successfully rammed the gate of the
Kormadie Dock during the St. Nazalro raid on March 29, 1942. About
nine hours after striking the gate at nearly 20 knots, the Campbeltown^
and the dock gate were demolished by a violent explosion. The dock,
largest of its kind in the world and the only one on the Atlantic Coast
which could handle the German battleship Tirpitz , was unusable for the
rest of the war. See The "Town" Class Destroyers and Goodhart, Fifty
Ships that Saved the World , pp. 209-2 lT.
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Chicf of Naval Operations directed the Joint Planning Committee to pre-
pare a report on prospective base sites in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica,
7
St. Lucia, Trinidad and British Guiana. Antigua and the Bahamas were
added to the list a few cays later. The report was to be a preliminary
study; final selection would require an on-the-sccne survey.
The Joint Planning Committee issued its report on August 28. An
o
appendix on Antigua v?as issued on September 3. Genei-ally, the study
recommended that facilities for naval patrol aircraft (seaplanes) be
established at all eight sites. Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Trinidad were
recommended for additional development as bases for heavy fleet units.
Each site was to have an Army garrison whose size would be adjusted ac-
cording to the size of the naval base and the difficulties of defending
it.
9
Shortly after the Committee had begun its study, the Navy Department
organized a board to make on-site inspections. A few days later, Army
members were added and the group was named the Board of Experts.*- This
7. lark Skinner Watson, Ch i. e_f_jo f St a f f : Pr ewar Plans and Problems, p. 478.
8. Joint Planning Committee reports to the Secretary of War and the Secre-
tary of the Navy, "Base Sites and facilities suitable for United States
Army and Navy Bases in certain British Possessions in the Western
Hemisphere,' 5 August 28, 1940, and supplementary report from the Joint
Planning Committee to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of
Staff of the Army bearing the same title and dated September 3, 19^0.
Navy Department Archives. Hereafter these reports will be cited as
JJrC report of August 28, 1940 and JPC report of September 3, 1940.
9. Watson, Chief of Staff
, p. 473.
10. Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, Guarding the United
States p-pd- } t s Outposts , a volume in the series Un ited Stat es Army^in
World War II: The Western Hemisphere (Washington: Office of the Chief
of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964), p. 358. Cited here-
after as Conn, et a
1
.« Guard ing the U.S. Acting independently of this
Board of Experts, the Army Air Corps expanded a previously scheduled
inspection of Pan-American Airways projects to include the new sites
in the West Indies. This inspection produced a separate report sub-
mitted to the Chief of Staff on October 14, 1940. It recommended
larger installations than those proposed by the Board of Experts but






conformod to the phraseology used in the British and United States notes*
On September 1, the President formally appointed Rear Admiral John J.
Greenslade, USN, senior member of a Board of Exports "to meet with ex-
perts designated by the British Government" to select sites for the bases
mentioned in the exchanged notes,** The other members of the board were,
from the Navy Department
:
Captain Russel 5. Crenshaw, USN, Director, Navy War Plans Division;
Captain Duette W. Rose, SC, USN, Supply Corps representative;
Commander Kendal B. Bragg, CEC, USN, Civil Engineer, representative
of Bureau of Yards and Docks;
Commander Calvin T. Durgin, USN, Bureau of Aeronautics representative;
Lieutenant Colonel Omar T. Pfeiffer, USKC, ferine Corps representative;
and from the V.7ar Department:
Brigadier General Jacob L. Devers, USA, Commander, Washington Pro-
visional Brigade, formerly Chief of Staff, Panama Canal Department;
Lieutenant Colonel Harry J. Malony, FA, USA, Field Artillery repre-
sentative, member of committee which drafted detailed plans for the
RAINBOW 4 war plan. 12
In addition, Commander Harold Biesemeier, USN, from the Judge Advocate
General's office was appointed Aide and Legal Adviser. Major Townsend
Griffiss, AC, USA, an Air Corps flight surgeon, was appointed Aide and
11, Letter from the President to Rear Admiral John W. Greenslade, dated
September 1, 1940, appointing him Senior Member of a board of experts.
Navy Department Archives, It is interesting to note that this letter
dated September 1 appoints the Admiral to a board established pursu-
ant to notes dated September 2, 1940.
12, .Ibid1 , , and Conn, et al ,« Guarding the U.S« « p. 359; Commander Walter
Karig, USNR (with Lt, Earl Burton, USNR, and Lt. Steven L. Freeland,
USNR) Battle Report: The Atlantic War , Vol. II of a series (New York:
Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1946), p. ~25.
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Technical Adviser to General Devers, Although not officially a member of
the board, Colonel Joseph D. Arthur, Jr., CE, USA, accompanied the board
13
on its surveys and participated in much of the early planning.
A second appointing letter to Admiral Greenslade, this one from the
Secretary of the Navy on September 3, assigned the naval personnel to him
for duty and designated Col. Pfeiffer to serve as recorder for the board. *^
The Secretary also detailed the purpose of the board:
. .
.
to meet with Experts to be designated by the British
Government for the purpose of determining upon, in common
agreement with the British Experts, the exact location and
bounds, the necessary seaward, coast and anti-aircraft de-
fenses, the location of sufficient military garrison,
stores, and other necessary facilities, etc., of naval and
air bases £in the listed British possessions!.
The board was directed to convene at 10:00 a.m. September 3, 1940, in the
Navy Department "or as soon thereafter as practicable, and thereafter at
such places and times as may be directed by the President of the Board."
It was instructed to give "full consideration" to the Joint Planning Com-
mittee* s base study of August 28. The board was to prepare separate re-
ports for each British possession in which base rights had been acquired.
The reports, including a summary of the survey and the board's recommenda-
tions, were to be submitted to the Secretary of the i.avy "as completed and
as soon as practicable."
Admiral Greenslade and several other members of the Board of Experts
were soon assigned an additional duty. On September 11, the President
13. Conn, et al. , Guarding the U.S.
, p. 359; He is mentioned in all reports
of the Greenslade Board. Colonel Arthur was later appointed Commander
of the Eastern Division, Corps of Engineers; as such he supervised
much of the base construction work.
14. Letter from Secretary of the Kavy to Rear Admiral J. W, Greenslade,
U. S. Navy, September 3, 194-0, appointing him President of a Board of
Experts. Navy Department Archives. Subsequent quotations in this
paragraph are from same source.
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appointed them to a board which was directed to survey the shore estab-
lishment and determine the changes needed to support a two-ocean Navy.
This board's report was submitted in January 1941, and its recommendations
on the Atlantic-Caribbean area were the foundation of all subsequent base
development in that region. The report of this "Shore Establishment"
board contained the framework of strategic thinking which prevailed as the
Greenslade Board of Experts conducted its surveys of the various base sites.
Within the Caribbean, the "Shore Establishment" board contemplated de-
velopment of three sectors, each composed of a central base and several
supporting bases. Antigua would contain one of the supporting air fields
for the sector centered in Puerto Rico. Another sector was to be centered
in Guantanamo, Cuba, with Jamaica and the Bahamas acting as supporting
bases. Finally, Trinidad was envisioned as a "subsidiary operating base"
and the center of the third sector. It was to be supported by outlying
facilities on St. Lucia and in British Guiana.
Outside the Caribbean, Bermuda was to be a major defense post in the
mid-Atlantic area. It would be capable of supporting carrier, destroyer,
cruiser and submarine operations as well as providing a base for patrol
aircraft. Newfoundland was expected to play a similar role in the North
Atlantic, wTith the added function of serving as "a major center for convoy
escort operations.
Admiral Greenslade' s Board of Experts (referred to hereafter as the
Greenslade Board) never met with a British Board of Experts in the process
15. U.S., Navy Department, jSuiJLdin:? the Kavy^ s,J3ases in Jforld, Uar II:
H,istory_of
tjthg_ Bureau of Yards and J)opks and the Civi 1 Engineer Corps,
1940-1946 (two volumes, Washington, 1947), Vol. II, p. 3. Cited here-
after as Building...the Navy's Bases,
16. Ibid., and Goodhart, Fifty Ships that Saved the World , pp. 216-217.
Goodhart seriously confuses the duties and efforts of the two boards to
which Admiral Greenslade was assigned.
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of selcctiiig the base sites. In spite of Lord Lothian's suggestions,
the assertions in the British note of September 2, and those in the Presi-
dent's appointing letter, no British Board was ever designated. Instead
of formal meetings with a counterpart British Board,, the Greenslade
Board had informal contact with British military officials. The Senior
Royal Kavy officer of the region (Commander-in-Chief , American and West
Indies Station) was represented by Captain J. S. Bethel, R.N. Ke accom-
panied the board on most of its travels and arranged for the board to
confer with the colonial and British naval and military representatives
present in each of the base-site colonies, 1
As directed in the appointing order, the Greenslade Board convened
1 P,
on September 3 at the Navy Department . The members discussed the board's
functions and laid out a tentative schedule for surveying the base sites.
Later the same day, the board flew to Norfolk, Virginia, embarked on the
cruiser USS St .Louis and sailed for Bermuda. En route, the board members
organised themselves into functional committees, planned their survey pro-
cedures and drafted an outline of the proposed Bermuda base.
The board arrived at Bermuda on September 5, spent four days survey-
ing the islands and conferring with local officials, and departed on the
evening of September 8. The report on Bermuda was prepared during the
return voyage. It had been completed by the time the ship arrived in
Norfolk on September 10, so the board flew to Washington and delivered the
report to the Acting Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, and the Chief
of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark,
17. Conn, et al .« Guarding the U.S., pp. 359-364,
18, Unless otherwise noted, the following account of the Greenslade
Board's survey procedures is based on information contained in the
board's reports filed in the Navy Department Archives,
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The board spent several days in Washington conferring with various
officials about the Bermuda survey and the plans for the Newfoundland
base. It met with the Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defense
to discuss joint planning for the defense of Newfoundland and it discussed
the Newf oundland situation with several experts on the region.
Leaving Washington on the evening of September 13, the board embarked
on U3S St. 1 ouis at Boston the following morning and sailed for Newfound"
land. Once again, the time en route was devoted to planning the survey
and drafting a proposed list of base requirements. The board arrived in
St. John's on September 16. Surveys of the St. John's area and other
prospective sites at Flaccntia Bay were made. Many conferences with local
officials, including British military representatives, were conducted be-
fore the board met to decide on the sites to be selected. The board left
Newfoundland on September 21 and returned to Washington. Its report was
submitted on September 24.
From September 25 until October 1, the board remained in VJashington
holding conferences and discussing the completed and planned surveys. It
discussed its work with the President on September 25. On. September 30
it met with the Permanent Joint Board on Defense for further discussions
of the best and quickest way to improve the defense posture at Newfoundland.
Much of the board's energies were also devoted to preparations and plans
for its next trip.
On October 1, the board left VJashington for a survey of the remaining
base sites in the Caribbean region. Flying to Miami for another conferencCj
the board decided to conduct its survey of the Bahamas in three separate
groups. On October 2, it left Miami in three airplanes. One, with the
Army members embanked, made an air survey of Eleuthcra for a landing field
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site end then vent to Rum Cay, conducting a quick aerial reconnaisance
of Cat Island on the way. The naval personnel boarded a second plane and
followed a similar course, looking for a seaplane base site en Eleuthera*
These two pianos rendezvoused at Fort Kelson on Rum Cay and proceeded to
Guantanamo together. On the way, they conducted aerial surveys of Rum
Cay, Crooked Island and Mayaguana. The third plane carried the senior
officers. It flew from Miami to Nassau and looked at Great Abaco en
route. In Nassau, there were conferences with the Governor of the Bahamas
and other Bahamian officials. After these meetings, this plane also vent
to Guantanamo by way of Cat Island, San Salvador, Mayaguana and Great
Inagua Island. When the entire board met at Guantanamo, it decided that
further surveys were necessary before a site or sites in the Bahamas could
be selected. After arranging for those surveys on October 3, the board
departed for Jamaica, via U.SJ^^^^cadjs.
Arriving at Kingston on October A, the board spent several days
holding conferences and conducting surveys in Kingston and in the area of
the Portland Bight, southwest of Kingston. It departed for Trinidad on
October 7. The Jamaica report was prepared and plans and preparations for
the Trinidad survey were completed.
The board arrived in Trinidad on October 10. At an early conference
with the Governor, local authorities presented the board with extensive
recommendations regarding the size of the bases and their sites. The
board conducted many air, water and surface surveys until October 14, when
it took a brief trip to British Guiana. After conferring with the Governor
there and conducting an aerial inspection of prospective sites, the board
returned to Trinidad.
In addition to drafting the report on British Guiana, the board made
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further surveys and studies in Trinidad in Che following days. At a
conference with the Governor on October 17, there was a long discussion of
local objections to the board's proposed recommendations. Several items
in the board's tentative report were changed to satisfy local opinion, but
there was a fundamental disagreement on the question of base sites. The
board held firm in its opinions and the Governor declined to either approve
or disapprove the board's proposals.
Several board members flew to St. Lucia on October 17 and the others
arrived there the following morning aboard JJSS_St.__Louis. After holding
conferences and surveying prospective sites by land and air, the board
sailed for Antigua on the evening of October 18. Conferences and surveys
of Antigua were conducted on October 19 and the board then departed aboard
USS St. louis for a second visit to Bermuda.
While en route to Bermuda, the board was busy preparing the remaining
reports on the Caribbean sites and studying the situation in Bermuda where
strong objection had been raised to the board's earlier recommendations.
Arriving at Bermuda on October 24, the board conducted lengthy conferences
with local authorities. Alternate base sites were surveyed the next day
and found acceptable, and after another long conference, the board left
for Norfolk. A supplementary report on Bermuda- was prepared en route.
All of the Greens lade Board's surveys were conducted in the same
manner. Typically, the work of a survey began while en route to the colony
to be surveyed. This advance work consisted of drawing up a list of base
sites considered necessary. Using the recommendations of the Joint Plan-
ning Committee and its own opinions, the board would decide, for example,
that a particular island ought to have a naval facility for operating patrol
seaplanes, an Army air field, and an Army defense garrison.
19. See pp. 139, 140- 141: below.
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to arriving at the island, the board met with the Governor and key
local officials including British military representatives. The tentative
plan for United States bases was presented and discussed with pertinent
local comments being encouraged. In several cases, such as Jamaica and
St. Lucia, the local authorities had prepared full studies and suggestions
which they presented to the board at this initial conference.
The second phase of the board's visit consisted of looking at the
prospective locations. As has been noted, this was frequently done by air
and water as well as by land. At the same time, designated board members
collected other data regarding the proposed locations and their environs:
health conditions, soil studies, water supply, transport and communications
facilities, social and economic conditions, existing defense arrangements,
and any other relevant selection factors.
When the second phase had been completed, the board met to review the
information it had collected and to select sites and draft any other im-
portant recommendations it planned to make. Site selection took many
factors into consideration, A site had to be suitable for the operational
needs of the forces to be based within it: ship facilities required navi-
gable access routes, seaplane bases required protected runway waters, and
air fields required relatively flat areas for runways. In so far as possible,
the sites selected were those which would produce the least interference
with local life, and every attempt was made to meet the preferences of the
local authorities.
After the sites had been chosen and significant proposals such as
joint use of existing facilities had been prepared, another conference was
held with the Governor and local officials. The board announced its tenta-
tive site selections and outlined the other points which it planned to
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include in its report. Any disagreements or new local proposals wore dis-
cussed and sometimes, as in Newfoundland, the board's recommendations were
changed. Strenuous efforts were made to achieve agreement, in principle
at least, on the board's proposals. The Board usually drafted its formal
report, complete with its findings, recommendations, and supplementary
stntensnts, soon after departing from the island.
The sites selected by the Greenslade Board, the strategic considera-
tions and planned installations on which they were based, and some details
of the various surveys are summarized in the following pages:
Bermuda - The Joint Planning Committee Report had conceived of Ber-
muda as a base to support naval and air forces protecting the mid-Atlantic
on
air and sea approaches to the United States. Both the Joint Planning
Committee and the Greenslade Board proposed the establishment of three
United States bases on Bermuda. One was to be a naval air station to sup-
port in-shore and off-shore patrol seaplanes; a second was to be an operat-
ing base for a light naval force of submarines, destroyers, and cruisers;
and the third was to be an Army base for defense forces which would include
an airfield, pursuit and bomber aircraft, and various supporting units.
The Army airfield was also expected to serve as a landing and support fa-
cility for carrier-based naval aircraft, enabling an aircraft carrier to
operate out of the Great Sound area.
As a result of its first visit to Bermuda, the Greenslade Board recom-
mended acquisition of two sites." One was a large strip extending across
the main island near the southwest end; the second was a group of islands
in the Great Sound. When the board announced the selections of these sites
20.. Ji'C report of August 28, 1940.
21. IMc[• > an^ Greenslade Board Report - Bermuda, p. 1.
22. See Map No. 1
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at the end of its first visit, vigorous local objections wore raised.
They must have made an impression on the board, because a second visit to
Bermuda was under consideration as early as September 13, before the board
left Washington for Newfound 1and." On October 16, while at Trinidad, the
board was directed to make another visit to Bermuda to reach an arrangement
more acceptable to the local people. 2 When the board arrived at Bermuda
on October 24, it received two extensive and detailed statements setting
forth the nature of the local residents' objections to the board's pro-
posals. An altei-native base site proposal was also presented to the board.
In their statements, the Bermudians stressed the impact which the
bases, as proposed, would have on the colony's economic and social life.
They indicated surprise at the size of the base sites recommended, since
they thought the "air bases" referred to by the Prime Minister and in the
exchange of notes were merely seaplane operating bases, not lend fields.
They were opposed to any large base such as that recommended, which occu-
pied about one-thirteenth of the colony's land area. The site chosen by
the board was particularly objectionable because it effectively divided
the colony into two separate parts and included some of the island's
choicest properties. The Bermudians anticipated that severe social dis-
ruption would occur as a result of the large number of residents who would
have to be relocated to other parts of the densly populated island. They
also feared destruction of the island's "peaccf ulncss" and "old-worldliness"
which were its chief assets in the tourist business. Since tourism pro-
vided the island with its income, any project with negative effects on
tourism would affect the very existence of the entire colony. The Ber-
mudians .reluctantly admitted that if a large base were really necessary,
23. Greenslade Board Report - Newfoundland, Appendix A.
24. Greenslade Board Report - Supplementary Report on Bermuda.
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it would be preferable to locate it at the eastern end of the island
25
where its economic, social and political impact would be greatly reduced.
The alternative proposal submitted to the board called for the air-
field to be established on several islands at the north and northeast end
of Castle Harbour, with the spaces between islands being filled as neces-
sary to provide three runways. The proposed location for the seaplane base
was an adjacent island, with the waters of Castle Harbour to bo used as
seaplane runways* The alternative proposal also suggested that personnel
could be quartered on an adjoining part of it. David's Island and that
magazines could be located on the islands at the eastern side of Castle
Harbour. 26
After a day of surveying these alternative sites, the board found
then acceptable with only a few modifications. The air base site would
be on Long Bird and adjacent islands; the main Army base would be adjacent
to the north on St. David's Island, and the seaplane base would be adjacent
to the northwest on St. David's and several smaller islands. Since Castle
Harbour would be too small for seaplane operations under certain wind and
loading conditions, the board also recommended acquisition of Morgan's and
Tucker's Islands in Great Sound. These would be used as an auxiliary base
for seaplane operations on the occasions when Castle Harbour was not ade-
quate. 2 ' These proposals received the assent of the Governor and appeared
to meet the popular objections.
In its supplementary report on Bermuda the board noted that the re-
vised base sites would affect base development in several ways. It would
25. Greenslade board Report - Supplementary Report on Bermuda, pp. A-3
through A-15.
26 » JilLr5.* > Enclosure A; also sec Map Ko. I.
27. Ibid"., pp. A- 21 through A-22; also Map No. 1.
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be necessary for cruisers to use the general anchorage areas in the Great
Sound because the waters of Castle Harbour were too shallow to permit a
deep-draft vessel to moor at the proposed naval base. It would also re-
quire extensive dredging to fill the spaces between islands and to clear
Castle Harbour of shoals and coral heads which prevented immediate use of
the area by either surface ships or seaplanes.
The revised recommendations on Bermuda soon underwent a significant
change. By November 1, when the board's supplementary report on Bermuda
was forwarded to the President, the Navy had decided to make the Great
29Sound area the "primary seaplane operating area.' 5 This decision was based
in part on the lengthy dredging and filling required before Castle Harbour
would become available, and also because even then its waters would be
"too limited for the safe operation of naval patrol planes ... in service
and {those! to be placed in service in the near future."-*- The modified
draft lease submitted to the President therefore contained no indication
that the use of Great Sound would be temporary or that the principal sea-
plane base would be elsewhere.
This decision did not portend well for future relations with Bermuda.
As reported by an American representative, the Benrtudians were reluctant
to accept the use of Great Sound, even on a temporary or war-emergency
basis, and there was definite opposition to inclusion of Tucker* s Island
31in the leased area.
28. Greenslade Board Report » Supplementary Report on Bermuda, p. 2.
29. Forwarding Letter, Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy to the
President, November 1, 1940, submitting the Supplementary Report on
Bermuda. Navy Department Archives.
30. Ibid
.
31. U.S., National Archives, Department of State, Document 811.34544/242
(Telegram, American Consul General at Bermuda to Department of State,
No. 115, October 31, 1940). The United States had acquired a leasehold
on h:organ f s Island under the 1939 arrangement with Britain (See pp. 7-8
above). Greenslade Board Report - Supplementary Report on Bermuda,
Appendix A- 2 2.
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Newfound land - The Joint Planning Committee and the Greenslade Board
both thought Newfoundland essential to the defense of the approaches to
Canada and the United States. The Joint Planning Committee had recom-
mended the establishment of extensive United States facilities on New-
foundland, It suggested several naval air stations to support inshore and
offshore patrols of the region, a naval light-force operating base near
32
St. John's, and multiple Army and Army Air Corps installations. The
Permanent Joint Board on Defense, which concurred in the significance of
Newfoundland and considered existing defenses there inadequate, had sub-
sequently allocated defense responsibility for the western and northeastern
coastal sectors to Canada. The United States was primarily responsible for
the southern coast. - In addition to these factors, the Greenslade Board
took into account the nature of the threat to Newfoundland. It did not
expect a large assault against the island, but the infiltration of small
forces attempting to seize key points in the island's primitive transport
3A
and communications system was considered possible. Strong emphasis was
therefore placed on air facilities to support patrol planes which could
keep Newfoundland's extensive coastline under surveillance.
Specifically, the Greenslade Board was looking for three base sites
in Newfoundland: a naval air base on the south coast or Avalon Penin-
sula for the support of amphibious patrol aircraft, a naval base for light
operating forces (destroyers and submarines), and an Army base for defense
35forces." After surveys were conducted, the board recommended the
32. JPC report of August 28, I960.
33. Greenslade Board Report - Newfoundland; Memorandum to Admiral Green-
slade from Opl23, dated September 3, 1940, forwarding a summary of the
discussions of Newfoundland defenses by the Canadian-American Permanent
Joint Board on Defense. Navy Department Archives*




acquisition of three sites and possibly a fourth, ° Due to congested
conditions in St. John's and its harbor, a site on the east side of
Placentia Bay was selected for thr. main naval base. The board recommended
that a 2610 acre site which included the Argentia Peninsula and the area
southeast of it be acquired for a naval air station (land and seaplanes),
a naval operating base, and an Army defense base. A site south of St.
John's was selected for the major Army base to defend the Avalon Peninsula,
but at the final conference with the Governor on September 21 this was
changed to a 160 acre site on Quidi Vidi Lake, north of the city. Within
St. John's harbor, the board recommended acquiring a 22 acre site with an
1150 fcot frontage on the southeast side of the harbor. This site was to
be a base for light forces, a stores handling center and a harbor defense
center. The board also noted that Canada was then planning to build a
landing field near St. John's which would be available to United States
forces. It recommended that if Canada changed its plans, the United States
acquire a site and develop such a facility. The board also recommended
•57
that the United States establish a security force at Newfoundland Airport.
Bahamas - The Joint Planning Committee recommended establishment of
bases in the Bahamas to patrol the Bahamas region and the approaches to
the Windward Passage, a major entrance into the Caribbean Sea. It suggested
that naval air facilities and defensive Army garrisons adequate for temporary
and intermittent use be established.™ In view of this proposal and the
fact that the United States already had facilities in Florida, Puerto Rico
and Cuba, the board looked for a site about 200 miles northeast of
36. See Kap iio, 2.
37. Greens lade Board Report - Newfoundland,
33. JPC report of August 28, 1940,
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Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This area was also desirable because the north-
western Bahamas alx-eady contained aviation facilities: Pan-American Air-
ways operated limited seaplane facilities at Nassau and Sir Harry Cakes
had offerer' the United States full access to his newly completed airfield
southwest of Nassau, * This was in contrast to the southeastern Bahamas,
where no air facility existed. Investigation therefore centered on
Kayaguana, Crooked Island, San Salvador, Long Island, Ruin Cay and Eleu-
thera in that order of preference.
After the board had conducted its aerial surveys, it tentatively
selected a site on Kayaguana, Before reaching a final decision, how-
ever, a detac!ime:it of the Fleet Marine Force stationed at Guantanamo was
requested to n!;e a more detailed survey. The survey was conducted by
ferine Corps engineers aboard the destroyer USS Hushes on October 13 and
14, The Marines found that Abraham Bay, on the south side of the island,
would be adequate as a seaplane operating area after removal of some soft
coral heads. The entrance to the bay was narrow and shoal, however, and
dredging was necessary before it could be safely navigated by a seaplane
tender. Ashore, they found solid coral and rock with rolling hills and
no soil, A naval station could be established on the shore, but building
an airfield would require blasting of the hills and crushing of the rock
debris for use as fill in the valleys. There was neither fresh water nor
a food supply en the island. The inhabitants had no wheeled vehicles,
so no i-oads had ev^r been built.
In addition to the difficulties noted by the Marines' survey, there
were no recreation facilities and the island had minimal value as a
39, Groonsla.de Soard F.eport ~ Bahamas.
40, See pp. 125-126 above.
41, Greanslade Board Report - Bahamas.
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training site. Cognisant of all those detracting points, the board never-
theless recommended Mayaguana as the Bahamas base site. It proposed the
shores of Abraham Bay as the site for a naval air facility for operating
tender-supported seaplanes. ' Due to Mayaguana's location with respect to
other aviation facilities, the board further rec emended acquiring a \\
square mile tract for an Array airfield. The precise location of this tract
was deferred uatil further detailed surveys were made, but the board noted
that since the island was undeveloped and relatively primitive, the impact
of an airfield on the local inhabitants would be the sane, no matter where
it was located. J
Jj^^i_ca, - The report of the Joint Planning COiirdttoe suggested that
Jacaica be developed as a supplementary fleet anchorage, for operations
based in Guantanamo, Cuba, and as a central supply base for Army forces in
the Caribbean. Admiral Greenslade disagreed with the idea of using
Jamaica as a supply center. He thought the Army's plan to establish
three sectors (Panama, Puerto Rico and Trinidad) within a Caribbean Theatre
commanded from ranama would be inefficient. It would cause duplication of
facilities between Jamaica and Trinidad and require an excessive amount of
shipping for supplies routed through a "pool" at Jamaica.
In its survey of Jamaica, the board looked for sites for four installa-
tions. The first was a secure fleet anchorage on the south coast, with
limited docking, fueling and repair capability, local defenses and a
42. See Map i-.o. 3.
A3. Greenslade Board Report - Bahamas.
44 J PC report of August 28, 1940.
45. "Memorandum for Admiral Stark," from Adrdral Greenslade, September 27,




recreation area, Kext was a naval air base, also on the southern coast,
with facilities for operating tender-supported patrol seaplanes. The
third site was for an Army base, including facilities for the defense of
the naval bases and an airfield suitable for bombers and for occasional
use by the planes of two aircraft carriers. Finally, the board looked for
a site for a central supply base and hospital for the Amy's Caribbean
Theatre/ 6
The board was greatly assisted in its work at Jamaica by the efforts
of local officials prior to the board's arrival. The board had outlined
its plans for Jamaica to a Royal Navy representative at Bermuda on
September 7. This information was passed to Jamaican authorities who
made intensive studies and surveys and presented the board with a very
thorough report, complete with site and facility recommendations, a month
later/' 7
On the basis of its survey and the local studies, the board selected
six sites. °
1, The waters of Portland Bight on Jamaica's south shore, including
several islands and Galleon Harbor at its northeast comer. This site was
recommended as the fleet anchorage area and the seaplane operating area.
2, A 34 square mile tract directly east of Galleon Harbor to be used
as the naval and air stations, the airfield, and the storage and housing
facilities for both the Davy and Army bases.
3, The eastern part of Portland Ridge, a tract of about 13 square
miles, for use as a training and target area and as the site of shore de-
fenses for the fleet anchorage.
£\ 6. Grecnslade Board Report - Jamaica.
U7. Ibid.
48. See Map No. 4.
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4. Pigeon Island in Portland Bight, for shore defenses of the
anchorage.
5. An area of about oae square raile near Kay Pen, for use as an emer-
gency landing field.
6. An area north of liandcvillc. for use as a recreation area and a
t
hospital center.
The beard also recommended that the United States redevelop the Royal
Isavy's dockyard at Port Royal (near Kingston), The yard had been vrecked
by an earthquake in 1907.
Trinidad - Both the Joint Planning Committee and the Greenslade Board
envislor.ee'. a triple function for the base complex on Trinidad: to provide
a base for fleet operations needed to control the southeastern approaches
to the Caribbean and the northern coast of South Arr.arica; to deny use of
Trinidad and Tobago to any enemy; and to support air operations in, and
movement of forces to, northern South America. ^ To fulfill these func-
tions, the Greenslade Board looked for sites for two bases. The first was
for a fleet bare which would include about 12 square miles of anchorage
area, facilities for seaplane operations, United docking and repair capa-
bilities, local defense installations, an advanced base for Fleet Marine
Force units (including aircraft), a hospital, a housing area, and fuel
storage and supply depots. The Army base was expected to be largely in-
corporated in the fleet base site, but a second site would be needed for an
airfield and a stores and supplies depot of United size but capable of rapid
50
expansion in an emergency.
£9. JPC report of August 23, 1940; Greenslade Board Report - Trinidad,
50. Greenslade Board Report - Trinidad.
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Whon tho board arrived in Trinidad, the Governor quickly expressed
a desire for the United States bases to be located in the Caroni region,
south of Port-of -Spain, Caroni was an immense swamp, the reclamation
of which had long been a projected public development scheme. Aside fro-,.i
the obvious advantage to Trinidad of having the United States do the
reclamation work, the Governor believed that using Caroni would, minimize the
impact the bases would have on the life of local residents. In making its
survey, "the Board reconnoitered the area concerned, studied the project,
52
and rejected it as unsuitable for a base," Reclamation would have been
a massive project necessarily accompanied by sanitary filling and drainage
of vast surrounding areas. The newly-filled sections would have to be
allowed to settle before construction began. As a result, it would have
been several years before any base facilities became operational.
In its report, the board made many observations regarding the sites
it recommended. It assumed that Trinidad would be primarily an operating
base with supply, training and hospital centers located in the Guantanamo-
Jamaica area. It pointed out that the best anchoj-ages were in an area
close to the south side of Trinidad's northwestern peninsula. Moreover,
the established anchorage area further south at San Fernando was used by
a large number of tankers and was expected to become the site of oil well
drilling in the near future. The board also pointed out that the suggested
naval anchorage would be able to serve as a seaplane operating area as well.
The .adjacent shores were unfit for developing land fields, however, so it
was necessary to build any airfields inland. Since use by naval aircraft,
primarily from aircraft carriers, v;ould be infrequent, naval land plane
51. See Map Ko. 5.
52. Greens lade Board Report - Trinidad,
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facilities could be incorporated into the Army base. For health and
sanitation reasons, it was necessary to locate the latter base in the
inland foothills.
In its report, the Greenslade Board recommended acquisition of five
sites in Trinidad, The first, to serve as the location of a major fleet
base, was to include the end of the northwestern peninsula, the adjacent
vaters to tho south, and several nearby islands. The second area was
to be used as the Army base, including its main airfield. It was to be
an 18 square mile tract extending north and south of (but excluding) the
main cross-island road in the Cumuto-Valencia-Guaico region. A third
site of about two square miles near Longdenvi lie was recommended for use
as an auxiliary airfield. The fourth site recommended was a 96 acre
section of beach front at Saline Bay. to be used as a recreation area.
Finally, the board recommended acquiring a 1200-foot section of waterfront
in Port-of -Spain harbor for use as a stores handling depot. This area
would bo made available to local authorities when not needed by the United
States, but the United States was to have the right to fill adjoining
mudflats and extend the wharves if needed.
When these and the board's other recommendations were submitted to
the Governor of Trinidad just before the board departed, the Governor
raised many objections. Re was principally opposed to the use of the
Chaguaramas peninsula in lieu of the Caroni region, but many lesser points
were also presented. The board modified its report to satisfy the Governor
on as many points as possible, but felt it could not accept the Caroni
proposal. The Governor was adamant in his opposition, refusing to approve
53. See Kip I.o. 5.
54, Greenslade Board Report - Trinidad,
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the proposals until they had been sent to London and he had received ap-
propriate instructions. The Governor's primary reason for objecting to
the acquisition of the Chaguaramas site was the fact that it included
the island's best beaches and its customery recreation area. The board
was annoyed by the Governor's position that the pleasure and relaxation
of the local residents were more important than the defenses of the
island and the hemisphere. It is remarkable that the record of the final
conversations does not reveal any lack of diplomacy or dignity by the
board. 55
British Guiana - Both the Joint Planning Committee and the Green-
slade Board believed a base in British Guiana would serve three purposes:
provide basing and support for patrol aircraft conducting coastal sur-
veillance of the Guianas and protecting the shipping lanes between North
and South America; serve as a base of operations to oppose any enemy
movement into the northeastern part of South America; and act as a way-
station for the southerly movement of troops and aircraft. ' To fulfill
these tasks, the board looked for sites for a naval air station and for
an Army base with an airfield.
The board's brief survey and the reports and recommendations of the
Governor of the colony revealed that the choice of sites was seriously
constricted by many factors: the primitive, tropical nature of most of
the colony, water and weather conditions, topography and sanitary condi-
tions.
The Greenslade Board finally recommended the sites proposed by the
55. Greenslade Board Report - Trinidad.




Governor of British Guiana. A site of about 2\ square miles on the
east bank of the Dewerara River, near Hyde Park, was selected for use as
an Army airfield, a defensive base, and an auxiliary seaplane facility.
For the principal seaplane base, the board recommended acquiring a 1500
foot strip facing on the western channel of the Essiquibo River between
Hibernia and the Supenaam River. The precise location of the air station
was deferred pending more detailed surveys. The board also recoirtwiended
that the Array base be developed as quickly as feasible, but retained in
a caretaker status with capacity for immediate expansion if and when
needed. The proposed naval air station was to have only the limited
facilities required to support six seaplanes with the assistance of a
CO
seaplane tender.
St^ Lucia - The Joint Planning Committee and the Greanslade Board
thought a base at St, Lucia would be of value for surveillance of the
eastern entrances to the Caribbean, supporting air operations if needed
to defend the Windward and Leeward Islands, and as an intermediate land-
ing field for short range planes travelling between Puerto Rico and Trini-
50dad. ' The board looked for sites for a seaplane base, a landing field
and an Army garrison.
Once again the beard was greatly assisted in its surveys by an exceed-
ingly thorough study prepared by the St, Lucia authorities. On the basis
of this study and its own surveys, the board selected two sites for
leasing. An area of 120 acres on the southeast side of Gros Islet Bay,
on St, Lucia's northwest coast, was chosen as the seaplane base. This site
57, See Map No. 6,
53, Greenslade Board Report - British Guiana.
59. JPC report of August 28, 1940; Greenslade Board Report - St. Lucia.
60. See Map No. 7.
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was selected after it was decided that the waters of Port Castries were
too rough and congested for use as a seaplane area. The land plane base
was to be located on a 1% square mile tract in the area northeast of the
toirn of Vieux Fort, at St. Lucia's southern tip. The precise location of
this site was deferred pending completion of more detailed surveys and
topographical studies.
The board further recommended that most of the housing and support
facilities be located at the seaplane base, where health and sanitary
conditions were much better than those at Vieux Fort. The airfield was
to contain only weather, radio, servicing and caretaking detachments.
The local authorities approved the board's proposals but noted that the
land near Vieux Fort was in an unusual status which might delay its ac-
quisition. The land was owned by the St. Lucia Company, but it had been
leased to the Barbados Settlement Company. As part of a project to reduce
the over-population problem at Barbados, inhabitants of Barbados were
being urged to move to the Vietc-; Fort region of St. Lucia. *
Antigua - When Antigua was added to the list of base sites, the
Joint Planning Committee proposed that the base complex there serve the
same purposes and be composed of the same facilities that had previously
been suggested for St„ Lucia. ^ The Greenslade Board agreed.
After rejecting several areas duo to size and/or weather and sea
conditions, the board recommended that Parham Sound be acquired as a
seaplane operating area. The Crabs Peninsula was recommended as the
site of supporting facilities. The board initially proposed to establish
61.. "Beane Field: U.S. Base in St. Lucia," Spotlight, October, 195S
(Vol. 10, No. 10), p. 15.
62. JPC report of September 3, 1940.
63, Greenslade Board Report - Antigua; also see Map No. 8.
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tho land piano base on a site just east of St. Jolins. On learning that
the area included the island's best farmlands and was therefore opposed
by local authorities, the board selected a site across Parham harbor
from the naval air station. This site was physically suitable for an
airfield, highly preferred as a housing site, and close enough to the
seaplcne base to permit direct communication and transport by small boats,
In addition to the recommendation of particular base sites, the re-
ports of the Grecnslade Board also contained other recommendations con-
cerning the development of the bases and additional rights required by
the United States. In most earns, the board recommended that planning and
construction of the naval and air bases be accomplished as a single project
in order to avoid duplication of facilities. In several reports, notably
Jamaica, Newfoundland, Trinidad and Bermuda, the board proposed some form
of joint usage of air and naval facilities by British and United States
forces, agc.in to avoid duplication of effort. Almost all the proposals
were based on an explicit assumption that existing defenses would bo main-
tained or further developed. Any reduction of existing defenses would
make it necessary for the United States to expand its bases and possibly
acquire additional sites. Another standard recommendation was for the
maximum employment of local labor and local materials in building the bases.
The board thought this would offset any negative effects the bases might
have on the local economy. In Bermuda, it was also suggested that base
architecture conform to the customary island style to avoid offending
the eyes of Bermuda's chief source of revenue, the tourists. In many
areas such as Trinidad, Jamaica, St. Lucia and British Guiana, the board
recommended acquiring extensive rights outside the leased areas for the
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purpose of improving health and sanitary conditions and assuring a supply
of fresh water. Many reports also recommended acquiring the right to
defend key areas in the base-site colonies, such as St. John's, Newfound-
land; Port-of-Spain and the entrances to the Gulf of Parla in Trinidad;
Castries, St. Lucia; and St. Johns, Antigua. The board also recommended
that wherever possible, local residents be permitted to continue cus-
tomary use of the waters and roadways of the leased areas so long as it
did not interfere with military operations.
The board's report for each colony also contained a draft lease for
the proposed bases. In addition to specifying the tracts of land to be
leased and listing the special rights and arrangements already noted,
the leases contained the clauses sumirariaed below:
Each lease granted to the United States, "exclusive rights, powers,
authority and control within the [prescribed leased"] areas and within the
territorial waters and air spaces adjacent to or in the vicinity of such
areas" unless such privileges were assigned elsewhere in the lease. * The
leases further listed some of the specific "rights, powers and authority"
thus granted:
(a) to control anchorages, moorings and movement of ships and water
craft in the areas "to the extent that may be determined as necessary or
65
convenient in the use, control and defense" of the areas,
(b) to exercise similar control with respect to aircraft.
(c) to control internal and external cor;-sun i cat ions of all types
within, into and out of the leased area.
(d) to use all public or commercial utilities end channels of trans-
portation on an equal basis with the British government.
64, Grecnslade Board Report - Antigua, p. B-2. Phrasing of this and other
clauses quoted below varied only slightly among the individual leases,
65, Greenslade Board Report - Bermuda,
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(g) to install and use armament or defenses needed for the leased
areas, including underwater defenses.
(f) to acquire additional sites, rights-of-way, easements, etc.,
under supplementary leases for the remaining period of the main lease,
and under similar conditions (i,e., without consideration other than com-
pensation of private owners).
(g) to use public lands, piers, arsenals, hospitals, and other such
facilities "to the extent which may become necessary or convenient for
the protection of the property, instrumentalities, and activities of the
United States, or otherwise to safeguard its national interests" without
charge other than reimbursement of additional costs directly attributable
66
to sucn use.
(h) to remove improvements made in the leased area.
The draft leases also granted full exemption from customs and other
related taxes on equipment and material imported in connection with the
development, construction or operation of the bases. This privilege was
extended not only to goods consigned to the United States government but
also to those destined for military and civilian personnel, including em-
ployees of contractors and their families. Thi s exemption was subject to
the proviso that any article so imported would not be "further sold or
fit
transferred to other interests" in the base-site colony.
The draft leases specified that the United States was under no obliga-
tion to develop or use the bases or to exercise the rights acquired. Should
it do so, however, the United States also had the right to abandon the bases
and cease to exercise its rights and powers at any tine. The United States
assumed no obligation for the defense or cJvil administration of the leased




areas or other parts of the base-site colonies.
The draft leases assigned criminal jurisdiction over offenses com-
mitted in the leased areas to the authorities which first acquired custody
of the offender. Either government, however, was authorized to deliver an
offender to the other government on request. In such cases, the draft
leases provided that the colonial government was required to try any of-
fenders turned over to it on request. It also said that "all offenders in
the service of the United States, civil or military, shall on demand be
apprehended and delivered to the government of the United States for trial
whether or not the offense with which charged was committed within or with-
6°
out the leased ares." v Civil authorities were not permitted to serve
process within the leased areas except with the permission of the command-
ing officer. Any colonial laws which interfered with the free use of the
leased area were to be considered inapplicable within such areas.
The original report on Bermuda and the report on Newfoundland were
personally delivered to the President by Admiral Greenslade, the Secretary
of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations on September 11 and 25, re-
spectively. The President approved the reports and the leases by memoran-
dum on October 1, but asked that the Attorney General approve the draft
69leases before they were transmitted to the British government. ' A week
later, when the Secretary of the Navy forwarded the draft leases to the
Secretary of State for delivery to the British Ambassador, he said the
70drafts had been reviewed and approved by the Attorney General.
63. Greenslade Board Beport - Bermuda.
69. "Historical Monograph: Bermuda," (Unpublished manuscript history
prepared for North Atlantic Division [Army Service Forces, Corps of
Engineers]
,
New York, 1945), p. I1 T -1. Office of the Chief of
Military History, Department of the Army.




Subsequcnt reports by the Greenslade Board were submitted by joint
Secretary of War-Secretary cf the Navy forwarding letters. In each
case, the draft lease underwent slight changes of content and format to
achieve greater standardization with the leases which bad been approved
by the Attorney General. All of the Greenslade Board's reports received
presidential approval.
The Greenslade Board of Experts performed an extremely difficult as-
signment in a quick yet thorough fashion. It has been criticized for
recommending some sites which later proved ill-suited to the intended use,
a failing which has been attributed to lack of air corps, engineer or
7?
medical members on the board. '^ As the contents of the Greenslade Board's
reports indicate, however, persons with those qualifications were present
and did assist the board in its work. In retrospect, the number of changes
which were made in the sites and arrangements recommended by the Green-
slade Board can be attributed largely to changes in the strategic situations,
the revised roles of the various bases, and the rapid growth of the tech-
nology of warfare. Far more impressive than the board's few errors is the
number of situations in which its recommendations proved correct. In less
than two months the Board surveyed eight British possessions (one twice),
selected sites for more than 20 bases, end laid the groundwork for initial
development at most of those sites. It was no mean feat.
71. Joint Secretary of War - Secretary of the havy forwarding letters,
submitting the Greenslade Board Reports to the President, as follows:
October 29, I960 - British Guiana; October 31, I960 - (letter # 25041)
Antigua; (letter # 25062) St. Lucia; (letter # 25066) Jamaica;
(letter # 25047) Bahamas; (unnumbered letter) Trinidad; November 1.,
1960 ~ Supplemental Report on Bermuda.
72. (Edward H, Ross), ''History of Antilles Department Real Estate: Part I <
99-year Lease Bases," (Unpublished manuscript history prepared for
Headquarters, Antilles Department, Historical Section, Caribbean
Defease Command, 1966). Office of the Chief of Military history, De-
partment of the Army, pp. 90-92.
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A recent writer has said the Greenslade Board 'Vas scarcely notable
for diplomatic finesse," making particular reference to Bermuda and Trini-
73
dad. Ko evidence to substantiate this accusation has been found. The
evidence indicates that the board displayed restraint when confronted
with short-sighted local opposition. It made genuine efforts to cater to
local interests such a; the retention of bathing beaches on Chaguaramas
Point, Trinidad, and the protection of yachting areas on the Great Sound
of Bermuda, when the; circumstances may have justified a less considerate
position.
The sites having been selected and draft leases prepared, the further
progress of the Destroyers-Bases exchange faded fro.;; the headlines. It
was replaced by the Tripartite Agreement, Lend -Lease, and growing United
States involvement in the vir, But behind the scenes, sorco very difficult
tasks lay ahead: negotiating and signing formal lease agreements and
building the bases.
73. Good hart, Fifty S That Saved the World , p. 217,

CHA TES VI
The Base Lease J <".-. h 27^ 1941
The notes exchanged on September- 2, 1940, have been described as
evidence oi the mutual good faith shared by the United States and Britain.
They contained no hedges or conditions, and there vtre no explicit limi-
tations on the sites to be leased by the United States or the rights and
privileges to be enjoyed therein. This broadness of phrasing, however,
also raised immediate questions of interpretation. There were no indica-
tions of how private land would bo taken for the leased areas, whether such
takings would be deferred until settlement had been reached with each owner,
or whether the United States .would be a direct party to each claim for
compensation. These questions cane quickly to the fore, especially in
Newfoundland, where the local government was unable or unwilling to pay
private owners for property at the time it was tak.cn.
In order to select precise sites and to determine the metes and bounds
to be included in the leases, surveyors had to visit the sites and make
detailed maps and measurements. There was uncertainty about the procedure
by which the United States would obtain permission for personnel to enter
the colonies and conduct these surveys. I'o one knew if it would be neces-
sary to obtain a separate clearance for each visit, if a single clearance
could be granted to cover all visits and surveys in a single colony, or if
the British government could grant blanket permission to conduct all surveys
at all colonies. When these difficulties had been resolved and survey
parties arrived in the colonies, questions of local jurisdiction and the
1. Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, Guard ing the
united States and Its Outpo sts




applicability of local lav:s arose to take their place.
Still another question left unanswered by the exchange of notes- was
that of the status and role of the colonial governments. They had been
excluded fro;?! all negotiations leading up to the Destroyers-Bases exchange,
and they thought it Imperative that they participate in some way in the
further negotiations concerning their respective territories. The colonial
governments wanted to assert what they considered their "rights" and to
protect their local interests. The presence of the United States bases
and the rights and powers acquired and exercised by the United States were
certain to affect local life and the constitutional role of the Governor.
By participating in negotiations, the colonics hoped to minimize this im-
pact. This sentiment was particuarly strong in the "gift" bases, New-
found 1 and and B ermud a
.
The colonial officials took full advantage of the vagueness of the
exchanged notes to exercise local controls over the development of the
bases. The United States requested permission to conduct surveys in New-
foundland but h::d to wait nearly two weeks for an answer. Survey parties
did not arrive in St. John's until October 13* In Bermuda the situation
was even more confused. A request similar to the one sent to Newfoundland
had been addressed to the government of Bermuda several days earlier, but
it required more than a month to get an answer because the Governor de-
cided to refer the issu? to the local assembly before making a reply. In
the meantime, five or six telegrams had been exchanged between the United
States and Britain, and in late October, Britain approved the entry of
American survey teams into Bermuda. On the basis of this approval, an
advance party arrived in Bermuda on Mo\ amber 3, only to learn that the
2. Conn, et a 1
.




Governor of Bermuda had not authorized the survey or been notified of
the British authorisation. Mindful of local dissatisfaction with the
base proposals which the Greenslr.de Board had submitted, the Governor
insisted that a definite agreement on the general location of the bases
be made before he would authorize any surveys. He reportedly made a
"forceful" suggestion to the advance party that the rest of the survey
3
tear 1, not travel to Bermuda until specifically invited. When the other
surveyors arrived unrequested, the Governor was adamant in his refusal
to permit surveys. The survey team was idle until November 19, when
agreement on the location of the bases was publicly announced. The start
of surveys thus was delayed for more than a month from the time the united
States was originally prepared to send its survey team.
In view of the difficulties which were being encountered at Bermuda,
in late October, 19^0, the Navy Department suggested that the United State:
obtain permission to make detailed surveys of all the sites recommended
by the Greeuslade Board by submitting a blanket request to the British
government. Such a request was made on November 1. In late November a
note from the British Embassy seemed to imply that the blanket request had
been approved. When Britain was asked to confirm this interpretation,
Britain said no such approval had been intended and indicated that when
3. Con",>, ejt _a_l
.
, Guarding the U.S ., p. 367.
^* Ibid
.
Apparently, the request was actually submitted to the British
government by the U.S. Embassy in London on November 1. The State
Department instructions to submit the request were dated October 31.
U.S., National Archives, State Department, Document 811. 34544/296
:
telegram, State Dcpt. to U.S. Embassy in London, No. 3329, October 31,
1940. Hereafter, documents from the State Department Archives will




thc United States request was ans\vered, it would be disapproved. Cn
December 4, the British government formally replied, saying it: could not
approve th.2 request because there Blight be occasions when the presence
of the surveyors could be "inconvenient to the British authorities in
the localities in question." The British Foreign Office suggested that
it would be better for the United States to request permission for sur-
vey visits directly from the local governors, but it cautioned that: this
procedure was to be used only for visits involving surveys of the base
sites.
By obtaining this arrangement the colonial governments had made
their point. Local governments had obtained some control over base develop-
ment and a right to participate in future base negotiations. Few further
delays were encountered and survey work had begun at all sites by January
1941.
During November and December, 1940, considerable progress was also
made in the selection of base sites. By mid-November British authorities
had approved a long list of sites 6 The Greenslade Board's site recommen-
dations for the Bahamas, Jamaica, Newfoundland and British Guiana had been
approved, as had all but the airfield sites on St. Lucia and Antigua. The
Bermuda sites recommended in the Greenslade Board's supplementary report
had also been approved, except for the "granting of facilities affecting
5. Doc. 296b: telegram, State Dept. to U.S. Embassy in London, No. 3618,
Nov. 28, 1940; Doc. 346: note, State Dept. to British Embassy in
Washington, Dec. 13, 1940, replying to British note of Nov, 22, 1940;
and Doc. 293: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London to State Dept., No. 3905,
Nov* 29, 1940.
6. Doc. 307: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London to State Dept., No. 3942,
Dec. 4, 1940.
7. Ibid ., and Doc. 321: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London to State Dept.,
No. 3997, Dec. 8, 1940 and State Dept. reply No. 3730 of Dec. 7, 1940.
The latter also extended the procedure to Newfoundland which had been
excluded from earlier arrangements.
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an island or islands in the Groat Sound for operation of seaplanes."
The latter, along with "[t^he question of facilities to be granted at
Trinidad" were said to be "still under consideration,," Shortly after
this agreement on sites had been announced, Britain confirmed its gen-
eral acceptance of the Greenslade recommendations and suggested that it
would be permissible to start work at all the approved sites except An-
tigua. On December 13, the Secretary of State advised Britain that its
list of agreeable base sites contained many minor errors and one sig-
nificant one: omission cf the landing field in the Bahamas.^ He also
told the British government that it would not be necessary to delay the
start of work at Antigua as requested by Britain. The installation
planned for Antigua was small and would not cause the drain on the local
labor force which had been anticipated by Britain,
Discussions of the Trinidad site were continued in December when the
Governor of Trinidad renewed his proposals for locating the base in the
Caroni region. On December 27, the Secretary of State politely but firmly
refused to accept the Governor's suggestions. Aside from the unaccept-
ably long time required to develop the Caroni site, the Secretary listed
other reasons for insisting upon the sites recommended by the Greenslade
Board: they provided better strategic locations with respect to the
northern entrance to the Gulf of Paria and the southern entrances to the
Caribbean; they contained better waters for ships and seaplanes; and they
gave better access to the high seas. Data tending to refute the opinions
8. U.S. Navy Press Release, November 18, 1940. Navy Department Archives.
9. Ibid
.
10. Doc. 345: note, State Dept. to British Embassy in Washington, Dec. 13,
1940, replying to a British note of Nov. 22, 1940.
11. Doc. 343: note, State Dept. to British Embassy in Washington, Dec. 27,
1940, replying to a British note of Dec. 13, 1940, in which the
Governor's proposals were' renewed.
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of several Trinidad engineers regarding the suitability of various base
sites was also mentioned. The Secretary said that the United States
viewed sympathetically the feelings of local inhabitants with respect to
bathing beaches near the proposed naval base, ond he assured the British
government that every effort would be made to permit local residents con-
tinued access to the beaches so long as it did not interfere with military
operations or construction.
The latter assurance had been added in response to a suggestion made
by British representatives curing a conversation on December 23„ It was
hoped that such a promise would permit the Governor of Trinidad to accept
1 9
the United States preferences without arousing too much local opposition.
In the same conversation, the United States mentioned its plan to acquis
e
both Morgan* s and Tucker's Islands in Bermuda as the main seaplane base.
The British representatives said they were unable to discuss this point
because they had not been aware that the Great Sound site was to be used
on a permanent basis as the only seaplane base. During this conversation
the United States military and naval representatives also asked the British
to expedite the reply to a letter of December 13 requesting permission to
enter Newfoundland and start construction. When the United States said
it wanted to settle the question of tax and customs exemptions for con-
tractors engaged in base development and to establish a procedure for com-
pensating the owners of private property which vould be taken for the bases,
the British representatives promised to request detailed instructions from
London on these points.




Another development which occurred during the last months of 1940
v/as the establishment of a team to conduct the remaining negotiations.
Cn November 1&, the Secretary of the Navy suggested to the Secretary of
State that all further negotiations and handling of arrangements for the
bases should be centralized in the State Department. He offered to
assign a liaison officer to enable the Navy Department to provide the
State Department with any assistance it desired in the course of those
negotiations. The Secretary of State approved this idea and on December 5
he appointed the following State Department personnel to handle the nego-
tiations: Green H« Kackworth, the Legal Advisor; Jair.es Clement Dunn,
Advisor on International Political Affairs; and John Hickerson, Assistant
Chief of the Division of European Affairs. The Secretary asked that the
Navy and War Departments each designate an officer to work with these offi-
cials. On December 9, on the rccoir-mendation of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, the Secretary of the Navy named Captain R„ E. Schuirmann, USN, to
assist the negotiating team. The Secretary of War appointed Lieutenant
Colonel Robert W. Crawford (CE), GSC (and as an alternate, Lieutenant
1
6
Colonel Stephen K. Sherrill (~C) 9 CSC) to a similar role on December 10.
These officers were well qualified for the additional duties to which they
were thus assigned. Capt. Schuirmann was Director of the Central Division,
Offjce of the Chief of Naval Operations; Col. Crawford was an engineer on
the General Staff; and Col, Sherrill was a supply officer, also on the
General Staff.
13. Doc, 327: letter, Secretary of the Navy to Secretary cf State, Nov. 16,
I960.
14. Doc. 327: letters, Secretary of State to Secretary of the Navy and
Secretary of War, Dec. 5, 1940.
15. Chief of Naval Operations letter, Dec. 9, 1940, Navy Department Ar-
chives; also Doc. 327: letter, Secretary of State to Secretary of the
Navy, Dec 18, 1940.
16. Doc. 327: letter, Secretary of State to Secretary of War, Dec. 18, 1940.
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V/hile the United States was organizing for negotiations, a dispute
developed over the place at which those negotiations would be held. In
the letter part of November, the British suggested that they ba con-
ducted in London. On December 13, the State Dep- Lt told the British
Embassy that the President wanted to complete the negotiations and the
base leases as soon as possible, The Depo I also informed the British
Charge that an interdepartmental committee had been established to pursue
the negotiations and suggested that appropriate members of the British
Embassy confer with the committee to get negotiations started. *' In sub-
sequent discussions, Mr, Dunn presented the United States position favor-
ing negotiations in Washington on the grounds it would be impractical to
1
S
send people with the requisite qualifications to London. 1
The British government replied to this suggestion early in January,
1941, The question had been reconsidered in light of the United States
proposal, but: Lord I.othian*s earlier suggestion for negotiations in Lon-
don was still considered the better proposal. To support its position,
Britain argued first that the negotiations would include many complex
issues which involve:! several administrations within the British govern-
ment. Experience with a London interdepartmental committee considering
the leases demonstrated that negotiators would need continuous advice from
civil, legal, military and colonial specialises. It would be impossible •
to send so many advisers to Washington because of the serious manpower
17. Doc. 346: note, Secretary of Strte to British Embassy in Washington,
Dec. 13, I960.
18. U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941
,
Vol. Ill, p. 5- ( >ire , British Embassy in Washington to State
Department, January 3, 1941.)
19. These exchanges apparently occurred in parallel channels between the
State De: ant and the British Embassy in Washington and between the
State Deportment and the British Foreign Office via the U.S. Embassy
in London, For Relations, 1941 , Vol, III, pp. 53-55 (Aj
British Embassy in Washington to State Dept., Jan, 3, 1941) and Dc
423*;;: (some aide-i >ire , but dated Jan. 7, 19H) am 1 Doc. 419; tele-
gram, U, S. Embassy in London to State Dept,, No. 60, Jan, 7, 1941.
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shortage which the war had caused. Almost all the offices involve! in
lease negotiations had already been reduced to the point of having only
one or two qualified staff members. Sending a large group of these
persons to Washington would have disrupted the day-to-day conduct of
British government and seriously impaired the war effort. The United
States Embassy in London confirmed this argument, observing that precisely
those people who would be required for lease negotiations were then bear-
no
ing a large share of the burden of current: government work,
Britain's second reason for preferring not to conduct negotiations
in Washington was the delay which would be caused by constant reference
of questions to the experts in departmental offices in London. Since it
was impossible to send all the advisers to Washington, Britain could only
send a small negotiating group which would then have to request informa-
tion and guidance from London on a great many of the points which were
expected to arise in the course of discussions. Finally, Britain pointed
out that the presence and participation of representatives of the colonies,
especially Bermuda and Newfoundland, would be difficult to arrange in
Washington but very simple in London.
These British arguments were presented to the President who recon-
sidered the matter and agreed that negotiations could be conducted most
21
expeditiously in London, To conduct those negotiations, the President
appointed the following members to a Base Lease Commission: Charles Fahy,
Assistant Solicitor General of the United States, Lieutenant Colonel
20. Doc. 419: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London to State Dcpt, No. 60,
Jan. 7, 1941.
21. Doc. 419: telegram, State Dcpt. to U.S. Embassy in London, No. 102,
Jan. 7, 1941 (Published in Foreign Relations, 1941, Vol. Ill, pp.
57-58 under date of January 11, 1941).
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Harry J. Maloxiy, TA V USA, formerly a member of the Greenslade Board of
Experts, and Commander Harold Bieseraeier, U3W, a Navy lawyer who also
served with the Greenslade Board.
The British government was advised of the r mbership of the Presi-
dent's Base Lease Commission early in January when the United States ac-
cept c' London as the site of negotiations. The Commission was scheduled
to leave New York on January 17, After several delays, flight cancella-
tions and schedule changes which were a hazard of transatlantic travel
23during the war, it arrived in London on January 25, 1941. A Foreign
Service Officer attached to the United Stater- Embassy staff, Theodore
Achilles, was assigned to assist the Commission and arrange for any ad-
mini strat ive and clerical support it might need. K He soon became an
or
unofficial State Department member of the Commission.
*
J The Commission
took with it to London the modified versions of the draft leases prepared
by the Greenslade Board and a draft of a general ]ease agreement prepared
by the State Department.
There had been some preliminary discussion of the draft leases and
their provisions during December, 1940. On December 2, the British A
bassador sent the Secretary of State a note expressing British preferences
and ideas with respect to several matters that would be covered by the
base leases. Specifically, the Ambassador indicated preference for a
clause which placed sharp limits on United States jurisdiction. As pro-
pose:! by Britain, the United States would exercise exclusive jurisdiction
22. Doc. 419: telegram, State Department to U.S. Embassy in London, Mo. 102,
Jan. 7, 1941.
23. Conn et a 1
.
, Guarding the U.S. , pp. 369-370.
24. John Gilbert Wi t, L< cer from Grosvenor Squ '^count ^of^ a
Stewardship (Doston: Houghton Mifflin Company, L947), p. 33.
25. Interviews, Theodore Achilles and Ch?.rles Fahy, April 6, 1966.




ovcr the following offenses by United States personnel: (a) disciplinary
offenses committed either inside or outside the leased areas; (b) criminal
offenses against other United States personnel or United States interests
if committed inside the leased area. The United States would also be al-
lowed to exercise criminal jurisdiction over British subjects for offenses
against prime United States interests such as sabotage or espionage,
whether committed inside or outside the leased areas, providing only that
th^ death penalty would not be imposed. Local authorities would exercise
jurisdiction in all other cases* They would thus have full jurisdiction
over United States personnel outside the leased areas for all but dis-
ciplinary of fen:.-.;, although this was subject to the understanding that
in minor cases the offenders would be turned oyer to base authorities for
punishment, local authorities would also exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over all offenses by or involving British subjects (except those affecting
prime United States interests) whether committed inside or outside the
leased areas.
With respect to customs duties, the Ambassador proposed that exemp-
tions apply only to goods which were to be used by the United States govern-
ment and which were not intended for any kind of resale. He also suggested
that any businesses established inside the leased areas (such as hotels,
taxi service and beach facilities) would require the consent cf the local
government and be subject to its regulations.
These proposals were offered only as suggestions of what the British
government would prefer to include in the lease agreement. They applied
only to the colonies, not to Newfoundland,
Although the available records do not include any response to these
proposals, it is quite certain that they were unacceptable. They offered

-161-
something far less than the exclusive United States control and authority
in the leased, areas which had been suggested by the Greensladc Board, and
07
they contradicted several of the board's specific recommendations.
On December 23, the Grecnslade Board's draft leases were discussed
by United States and British representatives. The draft lease for Jamaica
was used as an e Le, and the British representatives found most of it
acceptable* They took exception to the clauses extending exclusive united
States authority into areas "adjacent to" the leased areas, and suggested
that exclusive powers within the leased areas would be acceptable if the
rights outside the areas were limited to non-exclusive transit rights. °
Many points such as acquisition of additional areas, use of public facili-
ties and services, operation of navigational aids, and control of shipping
in the fleet anchorage area, were agreed to be subject to the mutual con-
sent of both parties to the lease, although it was indicated that British
consent would probably depend upon the consent of local authorities. Sur-
prisingly, the British representatives said the paragraph on import privi-
90leges - later a major point of debate - seemed "all right," The juris-
diction provisions of the draft leases were not discussed.
When the President's Base Lease Commission arrived in London on
January 25, the British government presented a draft agenda and a schedule
for the negotiations. The opening of formal discussions was planned for
January 28, and it was hoped that negotiations could be completed in two
30
weeks by meeting t\;ice daily.
27, Especially those regarding the extent of customs exemptions, the in-
applicability of local regulations within the leased areas, and the
draft jurisdiction clause. See pp. 145-147 above.
2S, Doc. 392'j : memo of conversation, prepared by J, D. Kickerson,
Dec. 23, 1940.
29. Ibid.
30. Foreign Relations. 1941 . Vol. Ill, p. 64 (telegram, U.S. Embassy in
London" to State Dept., No, 296, Jan. 25, 1941).
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Thc proposed British agenda included the following points:
1. Format for lease and /or agreement
2. Provision for "satisfactory use" of le?.sed area
3. Metes and bounds of sites
4. (a) Question of command and defense policy
(b) Reciprocity in use of facilities during war and pence
(c) Arrangements for radio stations
(d) Standardization of local flight rules
(e) Provisions covering weather stations
(f) Provisions for hydrographic studies
5. Criminal and Civil jurisdiction
6. Arrangements for apprehending and surrendering suspected offenders
7. Administrative regulations within leased areas, such as health
codes and gambling laws
8. Shipping and immigration
(a
)
Imm i grat i on 1aws
(b) Quarantine of plants, animals and persons
(c) Liability of United States ships to payment of light, harbor
and pilot fees
(d) Standards applicable to aids to navigation
(e) Applicability of United States cabotage lavs
(f) Use of leased area waterfront facilities by British and other
foreign vessels
9. Payment and applicability of customs fees and duties
10, Wartime control of imports and exports
11. Arrangements for monetary issue, currency and exchange controls
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12. Arrangements for commercial and professional establishments
within leased areas
13* Provisions for employment of local labor
16* Provisions for use of local and British materials
15, Provisions covering postal, telegraph and radio communications
and wartime censorship
If'. Applicability of traffic laws inside leased areas
17. Reservation of rights to minerals, oil, treasure trove, and
antiquities and preservation of fishing and other local indus-
tries inside leased areas
18. Provisions and procedure for expropriating and acquiring privately
o-.med property
19. Provision covering relations with colored population
20. Provision for defraying additional costs of local administration
incurred as a result of the presence of the bases
21. "Additional compensation to Newfoundland and colonies"
22. Regulation of civil aviation
23. Arrangements for applicability of local income taxes and profes-
sional fees to earnings of contractors engaged to construct
bases.
When this agenda was relayed to the State Department, it elicited sur-
prise. It contained many subjects which the United States had not anti-
cipated discussing or including in the lease. The State Department sus~
pected that some items, such as numbers 20 and 21, had only been included
to satisfy the demands of colonial officials and would not be pressed in




serious discussions. The Base Lease Commission interpreted the situa-
33
tion in the same vay.
The negotiators held their first meeting as scheduled on January 28,
1941. The- time was consumed mainly by optimistic introductory speeches,
although questions of organization and procedure were also settled. V
Chairman of the negotiating session, Lord Cranborne, noted that the ques~
tion of specific sites had largely been settled through previous consul-
tation in London and Vfeshingtcn and at the prospective sites. He antici-
pated that the negotiators would "have little more to do than to decide
upon the manner in which formal effect is to be given to agreement already
o/.
reached in substance. liJ " Their task, in Loi-d Cranborne* s opinion, would
be "mainly to discuss • . . the detailed arrangements for administration
and jurisdiction in the territories arising out of the grant of the
35leases." Even the representative from Bermuda expected a quick and
mutually satisfactory conclusion of the talks, having noted with great
pleasure (and relief) that there had been no mention of altering the
nationality or constitutional status of the colonies.
At the initial meeting it was agreed that the negotiations would be
given no publicity while they were in progress and that: no verbatim rec-
ord would be kept.-*6 xhe latter decision was due partly to the shortage
32* Foreign __R e latTons., .1941, Vol. Ill, p. 67 (telegram, State Depfc. to
U.S. Embassy in London for Ease Lease Commission, No. 303, Jan. 29,
1941); and Doc. 491: telegram, State Dept, to U. S. Embassy in
London for Ease Lease Commission, he. 319, Jan, 30, 1941. Hereafter,
telegrams to and from the Base Lease Co: mission will be identified
as (BI.C).
33. Doc. 509: telegram, U.S. Embassy Jn London (BLC) to State Dept.,
ho. 360, Jan. 30, 1941.




36 • Foreign Relat i ens V l_1?A1 , Vol. Ill, p. 65 (telegram, U.S. Embassy in
London (BLC) to State Dept., No, 330, Jan, ?S, 1941).
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of clerical personnel and partly to the desire to allow frank and unin-
37hiuited discussions.
The Base Lease Commission proposed that the following points be
added to the agenda;
(a) Discussion of contents of United States draft leases,
(b) Provisions for an official to employ legal assistance,
including lawyers not members of the local bar, to defend
against suits arising out of acts dene in performing the
duties of his office,
(c) Clarification of certain points of the draft agenda which were
not understood by the Commission,
(d) Provisions for conducting surveys outside the leased areas, and
(e) Provision for transfer of possession simultaneously with sig-
38
nature of the leases.
The i7iitial meeting ended after discussing these additions and the first-
nine points of the British agenda.
Following this meeting, the Base Lease Commission began what developed
into a highly effective and efficient operating procedure. Each evening
it would prepare and send to the State Department a summary report of the
day's discussions, including requests for additional information or in-
structions and proposed drafts submitted for comment. As long as this
report message was completed before 10:00 p.m. London time, it would be
received in Washington at about 5:00 p.m. on the same day - before the
working dry ended. The Washington team, primarily Mr. Hickerson, Capt.
Schuirmann and Col. Crawford, would locate the appropriate people, seek
37. Interviews with Charles Fahy, April 6, 1966, and General Harry Kalony,
April 7, 1966.
38 « Lc!2:cJ^rL-^^i5iisji..-i?_il.> Vol » In > P« 66 (telegram, U.S. Embassy in
London (BLC) to State De?t., No. 330, Jan. 23, 1941).
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out the requested information and discuss drafts and instructions during
the late afternoon and evening. Finally, a draft reply would be pre-
pared for i ' ission to the S cretary of State early the following morn-
ing. If it was approved and released by the Secretary or other responsible
official before 8:30 or 9:00 a.m., the reply was in the Commiss ion's hands
in tirr,e for its afternoon session. Thus, if a question az-ose on Monday,
it could be referred to the State Department Monday evening and in most
cases the reply would be received and the Commission would be ready to
39present its answer on Tuesday afternoon.
The negotiations which fo!lov;ed that first session lasted not two
weeks, as hoped, but eight weeks. The confidence and optimism expressed
at the opening meeting did not even last through the first wee!;. The
negotiations were complex and, on some issues, bitterly disputed. Com-
piling a comprehensible account of the discussions and debates is made
more difficult by the fragmentary and disorganized nature of the records
which have survived. The following account of the negotiations will
therefore consist of tvro parts: a si: : v.ry of sore of the dif f iculties 4
tactics, and major developments in the course of the conferences, and a
statement of how each item of the agenda was handled and ultimately
settled.
The first serious difficulties erupted on January 30. The negotiators
had first discussed each agenda item briefly, deferring many and assigning
the rest to various subcommittees. Then the first discussion of the United
States draft leases was begun. After comments on the introductory para-
graphs were completed, disagreement became so sharp that the meeting was





adjourned. The disagreement was caused by a difference between the
United States and British approaches to the leases, and by a misunder-
standing about- the status of the United States draft 1 . 3. Tl
British approach was to achieve a general agr int by first agreeing on
specific points, whereas the United States wanted to reach agreement on
general issues such as the extent of the United States jurisdiction and
to proceed from there to more specific points. These contradictory
approaches made it difficult, if not impossible, to find a mutually ac-
ceptable starting point from which to develop further agreement.
The British negotiators apparently expected the draft leases to be
withdrawn completely. This belief was based on reports received by the
Foreign Office from the British Embassy in Washingtc i. Lord Lothian had
objected to the drafts in October, 1940, on the grounds they were too
sweeping, Ke reported that Secretary of the Navy Knox had agreed to
withdraw then. In December, 1940 s following Lord Lothian's death, the
British Charge d Affairs, Nicholas Butler, reported that the State De-
partment was not aware of any such agreement between Lothian and Secre-
tary Knox, When Butler renewed Lothian*;; objections to the draft treaties,
he was told that the drafts were only offered as starting points, subject
to discussion and modification. They were not being presented as a *take
it or leave it* demand by the United States. The Base Lease Commission
viewed the drafts in the same way. "^ In spite of this seemingly clear
explanation, the British negotiators were surprised when discussion of
the draft leases was proposed by the Base Lease Co-r.mission, This
40. Doc. 512: telegram, U.S. . y in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 383, Jan. 31, 1941; also Doc. 1495: Report of the BLC.
41. Conn, et al .. I U.S.. p. 370.
42. Doc. 512: tel< , U.S. y in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 333, Jan. 31, 1941, and Doc. 1495: Report of the BLC.
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difficulty was finally avoided by deferring further consideration cf the
draft leaser, and resuming discussion of oth-r points en th agenda.
A particularly thorny problem was thai regarding participation by
representatives fr< th colonies and Newfoundland. The conference was
between the United States and Great Britain '» they were the powers who
had exchanged the notes and undo the basic Agreement. The colonial rep-
resentatives insisted on participating on the grounds that they had vital
interests at stake/ 3 The attitude of the colonial representatives pro-
duced many debates and delays. They were Interested primarily in mini-
mizing the rights and powers of the Unite' States and, if possible,
raking the presence of the bases a financial asset. The Commission re-
ported that they sought to "restrict the freedom of action" at the pro-
posed bases in ways "which would inure to their pecuniary benefit."
1
Bermuda and Newfoundland were singled out as particularly vexing. They
tended to look at the base garrisons as groups of individuals who should
be subject to the local laws - especially customs and other duties -
rather than as units of armed forces stationed in leased areas.
One of the colonies even attempted some extra negotiating on its
own. On February 3, the Commission reported that the Bermuda representa-
tives had suggested a plan to facilitate approval, of a suitable lease
agreement. They wanted to announce that a delegation of Bermudians would
be received in Washington to discuss "minor change" in the immigration
and faro produce import tariff laws and a possible decrease in the with-
4 6
holding tax on United States investments owned by Bermudians. The
63. Conn, et al .« Guarding the U. S.
,
p. 370.
44. Doc. 512: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 3S3, Jan.. 31, 1941; and Doc. 1495: Report of the BLC.
45. Doc. 512: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dent.,
Mo. 333, Jan. 31, 1941,
46. Doc. 517: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 417, Feb. 3, 1941.
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Commission favored the idea of permitting the Bermuda delegation to
visit Washington because it might, in fact, speed up i otiations in
London; however, the Commission had not given the Bermudians any reason
to expect that such a delegation could achieve any of its alms. In its
reply, the State Department said the United States would be willing to
consider Bermuda's suggestions if they were forwarded through existing
channels, but it pointed out that there was little chance that the changes
requested by Bermuda could be approved even if compensating concessions
were offered. In more general terms and referring to contemporary sug-
gestions in both the Bermuda and Newfoundland press, the State Department
said the United States could not reccgni&e any claims that local govern-
ments ought to receive more direct benefits from the Destroyers-Bases
exchange. The United States could recognize no obligations beyond those
expressed in the notes exchanged on September 2, 19^0.
The negotiators continued to meet in plenary sessions for the first
few days, but it soon became evident that those stormy sessions ware less
productive than the informal conferences and subcommittee meetings which
were also being held. 3y February 5, the plenary sessions had been aban-
doned and negotiations were conducted in smaller groups, ' On the sai
date, the Base Lease Commission stopped making a' full record of the con-
versations, messages and letters exchanged between delegations, attribute
ing the decision to the shortage of clerical personnel in the London Em-
bassy.
The progress of negotiations, even when conducted in subcommittees
47. Doc. 517: telegram., State Dept. to U.S. Embassy in London (BLC),
No. 394, Feb. 6, L941.
48. Doc. L495: Report of the BLC, "Memo for the Record" dated Feb. 7,
1941. Conn, et a 1
.
, C the U.S. , p. 370, says the tenth and
final plenary session was held on Bob. 19, 1941.




or on an informal basis, was very slew. The first draft: agreement was
not completed until February 18, and only 12 of its 28 articles were
50fully acceptable to both sides. By late February the situation 1 id
become so serious that both sid ted to speed up the negotiations.
On February 25, the Under Secretary of State told the new British Am-
bas! idor in Washington, Lord Halifax, that the delays were causing dc;:p
concern in the United States. The House and Senate Appropriations Com-
mittees were considering legislation to provide the funds for develop-
ment of the bases. The admission that the leases had not yet be< i
5i
settled produced "a great deal of u ' ble conjecture and debate."
When Under Secretary Welles said the State Dc, it was planning to
recommend that the President send a message about the situation to the
Prime Minister, the Ambassador asked that the message be delayed. He
wanted consideration given to the British position as recently communicated
to him. He promised to submit the British views the following day in a
52
memorandum end Welles agreed to defer the message.
The Ambassador's memorandum of February 26 discussed the lack of
progress in the negotiations and attributed it to an alleged inflexibility
53
of the instructions given to the President's Base Lease Commission,
According to this memorandum, Britain thought the purpose of the negotia-
tions was to arrange for United States authorities to have "adequate
powers to defend, control and operate their bases with the minimum dis-
turbance to the existing British administrative and jurisdictional ar-
rangements? The British government wanted "fullest consideration" to
50. Doc. 579: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
Ho. 616, Feb. 18, 1941; and Conn, et al. , Gj ling the U.S ,. p. 370.
51. Foreign ' s, 1941 a Vol. Ill, p. 69 (Memo of Conversation be-









be given to local interests and sentiments and opposed any disturbances
of the status quo unless they were "really essential for the proper de-
; ice of the American bases." In the British opinion, the Base Lease
Commission^ instructions r. ed its taking into account the broad
interests of leer. I residents and forced it to "put forward demands for
concessions or facilities which would not s< - to be essential for the
defence or control of the bases." The note then cited the United
States positions on ju: isdiction and on shipping as instances in which
the demands exceeded the realm of "essential" powers*
The United States replied to this British memorandum on March 1 in
a note announcing a modification of the ;- " d States position on juris-
diction and denying in detail the allegations regarding the position on
shipping. It was further contended that th.^ delays were €,uz not to the
views or instructions of the Commission, but to the efforts of "local
authorities to have provisions inserted which would circumscribe the
rights considered ... necessary and in accordance with the principles
laid down in the exchange of notes of September 2, 1940.
"
J/ The n<
concluded with a warning that certain British positions were antagoniz-
ing influential members of the Congress at the very time when the Ad-
58
ministration was trying to assist Britain to the maximum extent.
A fe;; days after this exchange, the British Foreign Office suggested
that certain base lease issues be discussed by the State Dap ..': end
the British Embassy ir. Washington, This request was rejected summarily
on the grounds that the United States had gone to considerable difficulty
55. Foreign Relations, 1941 , Vol. Ill, p. 70.
57, Ibid
., p. 74 (Mote, Secretary of State to British Ambassador, Mar. 1,
1041).
58. The House and Satiate Naval Affairs Committees were growing irritated
over the prolonged discussion of customs, harbor and light dues at
the same tii tl t . I id-] se Bill was before the Congress.
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to comply with Britain*s preferences and send qualified personnel to
5Q
London to act as tne United States negotiators. The United States
refused to confuse the issues by discussing the same matters in t.
places. In reporting this incident to the new United States A -or
in London, Jolrn G, Winant, the Secretary of State also said that a
United States proposal to rove all negotiations to Washington had been
quickly declined. In Secretary Hull's opinion, the British were attempt-
ing to by-pass the Base Lease Commission, hopeful that the British Am-
bassador in Washington could get the United States to yield in its posi-
60tion.
The proposal for a message from the President to the Prime Minister
was still pending. Such a message had been drafted, but on March 7 the
President decide:: not to send it until he had discussed the matter with
the British Ambassador. The President explained to Lord Halifax that the
intensity of Congressional interest and its concern over the slowness of
negotiations made settlement of the base leases an urgent matter. Halifax
agreed to relay this explanation to the British government himself, in-
stead of having the President send it directly to the Prime Minister.
It appears that these diplomatic maneuver ings did some good. On
Karoh 9 , the Base Lease Commission was able to report that pressure from
59, Fo Relations, 1941 . Vol. Ill, pp. 75-76 (telegram, State Dept.
to' U.S. Embassy in London (BLC), No. 712, Mar. 4, 1941).
60. Ibid.
, p. 76; also, interviews with Theodore Achilles, Apr. 6, I960,
and with J. D. Hickerson, Apr. 7, 19C6, Mr. Hickerson pointed out
that the complaint of inflexible instructions and proposals for
parallel discussions are standard diplomatic tactics employed when
the negotiations become difficult. Such an old trick was predictable
in a diplomatically experienced nation such as Britain. The course
was abandon::--' when the United States resisted it firmly.
61 • Foreign Relations « 1941 « Vol. Ill, pp. 76-77 (telegram, State Dept.
to U.S. Embassy in London (BLC), No. 777, Par. 8, 1941).
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tho Ambassador and the State Deportment had produced rapid progress in
the negotiations. While a few details remained to be worked out, the
preliminary version of the final draft r. as completed on March 11 and the
most difficult phase of the negotiations was completed.
Before relating the concluding portion of the negotiations, the
discussion and disposition of the various agenda points vill be noted
b. iefly. Detailed consideration will be reserved for the points about
which the greatest controversy developed.
The first agenda item, the form of the lease agreement, was disposed
of quite quickly. On January 25, the British Colonial Office proposed
that a general agreement on administration and jurisdiction be prepared.
It could then be incorporated by reference into eight specific leases con»
taining the notes and bounds and special conditions applicable to each
base. This proposal was accepted by the United States, On February 6,
the British announced that constitutional arrangements made it preferable
for the leases to be granted by the King acting through his appointed
66Governors, rather than directly by the government in London, This was
viewed as a minor technical problem and it was discussed again on the fol-
lowing day. At that time the negotiators CqciCc-'-. to prepare a general
agreement and attach, as an annex, sample leases for each of the base-site
territories. Since each lease required the Governor's signature, the
62 » Foreign Relations. 1941 . Vol. Ill, p. 79 (telegram, U.S. Embassy in
London (BLC) to State Dept., No. 915, Mar. 9, 1941).
63. Doc. 680: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (LLC) to State Dept, No.
939, Mar. 11, 1941; and Conn, et al. . G ' th« U.S.
. p, 374.
64. Foreij lations^ 1941 . Vol, III, p. 65 (telegram, U.S. Embassy in
London ( :) to State Dept., No. 294, Jan. 25, 19^1).
65. Ibid.
, p. 67 (telegram, State Dept. to U.S. Embassy (BLC) in London,
No. 303, Jan. 29, 1941).
66. Doc. 351: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept., No,
45S, Feb. 6, 1.941.
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actual leases would have- to be pre] and < ut ed in the colonies.
It was I " .Tore provided in th ; 'al agreement that "these leases
she- Id 1 :uted und r seal with all coi i sp ' after the conclu-
sion cf the [general"] a\ i ; it," '
Ag3 > reached on the second ag : . m at the first negotiat-
ing meeting, Britain wanted unused areas to revert to Bi - itrol,
while the United States said that reversion could only occur by a fori '
act of ab ant. The United States positi-. \ . accepted with the
proviso that "reasonable notice of intention to abandon" would be given*
This point was Incorporat ad into the non-user and al ndonment articles cf
6°
the final agreement.
The site be ies und< i i lerous c' during the negotia-
tions. As a result, they were excluded from the basic agreement and
placed in the sample leases, Most of then underwent further changes as
detailed surveys were completed and as plans for the size and missions of
the various bases changed.
The elements of the fourth agenda item were deferred at the negotia-«
tor's first meeting. There is no record of their specific consideration
at a later date, but most of them were lumped into a broad provision covei
Ing the general rights of the United States,, Radio stations and hydro-
graphic surveys, however, \>cre treated in separate articles in the final
*. 70agreement.
The fifth, sixth and seventh iter::-; on the agenda, all pertaining to
criminal and civil juridiction, re re referred to a s] ' 1 jurisdiction
67. Dec, 1495; *t of the BLC, The wording was modified slightly and
inserted in the p ' Le of the 1 : t. See p, 207 bole.?.
63. Foreign Re] ' ' ., Vol. HI, p. 66 (telegram, U.S. Embassy in
lx '.on ( :., No, 330, Jan. 2b, 1941,
69. See p, 203 below, Article III; p, 212 , Article ;.. [; and p. 211, Article
XV.
70. Sec p. 207 below, Article I; p. 209 ' tide X; and p. 211, Article XV.
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subcoiTimittee at the first negotiating session. Although no record of
that subcommittee's deliberations has been located, the British and
United States positions can be inferred fro-; other sources. The
United States desired exclusive jurisdiction over: (a) all civil i
criminal offenses coi nitted within the leased areas; (b) disciplinary
offenses committed by I. L.ted States personnel outside the leased areas;
and (c) all offenses against the security of the bases or against other
United States interests, even if committed outside the leased areas.
Britain was not prepared to grant such sweeping jurisdiction, Britain
claimed that the United States was d tding a broader range of juris-
73diction than was "essential to the proper defence of the bases." In
response, the United States instructed its negotiators to claim juris-
diction over British subjects only when they had committed, within a
leased area, an offense affecting the safety or security of the leased
74
area. As a further concession, the United States agreed that whenever
it exercised jurisdiction over a British subject, the trial would be hold
by a United States court sitting in the leased area. This vras intended to
eliminate colonial fears that local citizens might be tried in the con-
tinental United States, a point which was sufficiently delicate to pre-
vent the passage of the colonial legislation necessary to complete the
base leases* Had that occurred, the British government would have been
forced to obtain an Act of Parliament overriding the colonial legislature.
If it had been necessary to resort to such extreme measures, the bases
TT. plrtTciTlaTl'y the draft leases, the British note of Dec. 2, 19': 0,
(Doc. 433 cited above, p. 159, note 26) and the British memorandi
of Feb. 26, 1941 (published in Fj> ' Relati is, 19JU, Vol. Ill,
PP. 70-71).
72. See pp. 159-160 above for British propose!,,
73, For e i gn Re la t ions , 19^, l_s Vol. Ill, p. 71 (British memorandum of
Feb. 26, 1941).
74 « Ibid ., pp. 72-73 (Note, State Dept. to British Em1 . , Mar. 1, 1941),
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would certainly have been a source of irritation, ill-will and con-
stant: difficulty.
The last aspect of the cri jurisdiction question was resolv
later, when the United States agreed to let the loe-il authorities exer-
cise jurisdiction over United States personnel for all but certain
75
security offenses committed outside the leased area,
The question cf civil administration within the leased areas also
posed a difficult problem. This category embraced many of the agenda
points presented by the British, including among other items, immigra-
tion; financial, import and export controls; and quarantine rules. The
United States wanted to exercise exclusive control over those affairs in
the leased areas, but it did not want to assume any responsibility for
the ,;civil administration or defense" of the leased areas or their adja-
cent territories. '^ On February 5, the Base Lease Commission reported
tentative agreement on a draft clause covering civil administration, It
said
:
The government and authorities of the United States shall
not be required to assume any responsibility for the ad~
ministration within the leased areas of the lavs of the
territory or otherwise for the civil administration of
such areas; but except in those cases where it does assu: n -
such responsibility, it agrees to permit freely this re-
sponsibility to be administered by local authorities.''
On the very next day, however, the Commission reported that this clause
faced opposition within the British delegation. The opponents thought
the United States position was very nearly a derogation
75. Doc. 1495: Report of the BLC; also see p. 203 below, Article IV.
76 » Jore' elations, 1941 , Vol, III, p. 68 (telegram, State Dept, to
U.S. I ,y in London (3LC), No. 303, Jen. 29, L941, quoting a
clause common to all draft leases),
77. Doc. 529; telegr*
,
U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 443, Feb. 5, 1941.
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of British sovereignty and they therefore found it unacceptable. They
wanted to rake local lavs applicable unless otherwise specified or un-
less they conflicted with other rights granted by the lease.' 8 This
problem was referred to State, Justice and Navy Department legal experts
who suggested that a new clause on civil administration be offered. This
clause would say that the United States was not responsible for adminis-
tration of the leased areas, but in any case where the United States did
not occupy or use all or part of a leased area, the local authorities
79
could administer it while it was unused. This would allow the United
States to maintain its claim to complete control of the leased areas, and
by permitting local authorities to administer unused areas, it avoided
accepting responsibility for administration. This compromise arrangement
was accepted and serve:! as additional basis for the Non-User clause and
the untitled Article XXIX of the final agreement.
Certain specific points within the area of civil administration re-
ceived closer attention and r.ore detailed discussion. Agenda item number
eight (immigration and shipping) and its sub-paragraphs received such
scrutiny. At the initial meeting of the negotiators, Newfoundland asked
that local Immigration lavs be applicable to the leased areas, a position
completely opposite to the United States contention that local laws were
inoperative in the leased area during the life of the lease. Newfound-
land suggested, alternatively, that immigration control be established
between the leased area and the local territory. Bermuda wanted to decide
78. Doc. 351: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 458, Feb. 6, 1941.
79. Doc. 529: memo, Division of European Affairs to Kr. Hackworth, Judge
Townsend and Admiral Woodson [Navy Judge Advocate General!, of Feb, 6,
1941; and reply of Feb. 7, 1941,
80. Doc. 538: telegrams, U.S. ssy in London (BLC) to State Dept., No,
478, Feb. 7, 1941; and State Dept. to U.S. Embassy in London (BLC),
No. 421, Feb. 1, 1941. Also see p. 203 below, Article III, and
pp. 213-214, Article XXIX.
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who would be responsible for laborers brought into the colony by private
contractors engaged in base construction. The United States wanted per-
sonnel attached to the bases or engaged in their construction to be ex-
cluded from ell immigration laws and agreed to accept responsibility for
maintaining control over all such p . „ official and private, This
position was accepted. 81
The United States agreed to accept or establish quarantine regula-
tions as strict as those prevailing in the local territory and the matter
was not subjected to further discussion nor was it specifically included
CO
in the lease agreement.
Rapid agreement was also reached on the question of navigational
aids which night be established by the United States in the leased areas,
They would conform to the local standards and marking system; they would
be located at positions acceptable to local authorities; and their presence,
location and characteristics would be promulgated to all interested local
residents. 3
Two points concerning shipping in the leased area were the subject
of prolonged discussion: the status of United States public vessels, in-
cluding their liability for payment of harbor, light and pilotage dues;
and the status of the leased areas under United" States laws governing
coastwise navigation. The status of public vessels was a very serious
question for n;ost of the colonies because it was a pocket~book issue:
its disposition v;ould have a significant effect on local revenues, having
81. Fore i ~ r\ Re^laMons^lQ^l , Vol, III, p. 66 (telegram, U.S. Embassy in
Londc.. C ".- ' Dept.,No. 330, Jan. 2S, 1941), Also seep. 210
below, Article XIII,
82* Foreign Relations. 1941
.
Vol. Ill, p. 66 (same telegram cited above)
and Boc. 1495: Report- of the LLC.
83. Forei Relations, 1941
.
Vol, III, p. 66 (same telegram cited above)
and Doc. 331: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 458, Feb. 6, 1941. Also sea pp. 209-210 below, Article XI.
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been deferred at the first negotiating session, the question v?as dis-
cussed in a subcommittee which on Fel y 7 presented a draft putting
United St ;s public vessels in the same category as ships of the Royal
Navy, They would be Lred to accept and pay for pilotage when local
regulations made it' compulsory, and except for "public vessels owned and
operated by the United States for the Navy and War Depart] its," they
would be required to pay light and harbor duas. " The United States
opposed this draft provision in an extensive rebuttal forwarded to the
Ease Lease Commission on Febru ry li. The United States did not want
public vessels subjected to compulsory pilotage requirements! it wanted
to leave the option of taking a pilot to the commanding officer or master
of each individual vessel* Whenever a pilot was used, his services would
be paid for at the normal rates*
The United States also opposed p t of light dues by its public
vessels. Observing that it was not customary for any United State.? public-
vessels to pay dues for passage of certain lights in the Bahamas, the
United States argued that full exemption of public vessels would neither
decree ;e existing revenues from light dues nor increase the cost of operat-
ing the lights* In addition, the United States expected to establish
navigational aids and lights in the leased areas and such aids would be
available for uso by British vessels at no cost. The argument against
payment of harbor dues by ships "o;;ned and operated by the United States
P 5
bound to and from the leased areas" was much the same. The presence of
the ships involved no loss of current revenues nor increase in costs, so
it was argued that public vessels should bo exempted, . It was also noted
84. Doc. 539: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BJC) to State Dept*,
No. 479, Feb. ?, 1941.
85. Doc. 479: telegram, State Dept. to U.S. Embassy in London (BLC),
No. 447, Neb. 11, 1941.
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that British vessels were not reqt : " to pay du >.s for the use of im-
provements in United States harbors.
In its- Febri y andum concerninj t delay of negotiations,
Britain reasserted its position that the public vessels ought to be in
the same status as ships of the Royal Navy. The United States demand for
complete e: ption was cited as an pie of the alleged inflexibility
of the Base Lease Commission* s instri ;tions. ° In the same memorandum,
Britain renewed its question about whether or not the leased areas would
be considered American ports under United States navigation laws. This
issue h?.d been deferred pending further instruction and the Briti:
87
claimed the question had never been resolved. The question of whether
or not harbor facilities within the leased areas would be available to
British and other shipping also remained unanswered.
The United States reply on March 1 addressed all of these issues.
With respect to the status of public vessels, the United States pointed
out that whereas British vessels used the ports in question infrequently,
the United States vessels would be using then constantly, both entering
and leaving on suppl> arid construction voy^^ci, and on operations and
silvers. If the United States vessels were required to pay dues on
the same basis as ships of the Royal Navy, they "might be paying large
sums of money into the local treasury for the use cf a leased base which
under the agreement fof September 2, 194CF] they would have a perfect
8G
-
Foreign Rel \ )._, Vol. Ill, p. 71 (British Memo of Feb. 26,
1 OA 1
)
Also sec p. 171 above.
87 » Foreign Relations. 1941 . Vol, III, p. 71 (Memorandum of Feb. 26,
1941); also see Ibid
., p, CO (telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC)
to State Dept., No. 320, Jan. 28, 196!) and p. 63 (telegram, State
Dept. to U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) No. 303, Jan. 29, 1941) where
the State f ant replied with a tentative decision that the
bases and leased areas would not be considered U.S. ports for the
purpose of the navigi tion 1< s.
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right to use without charge,"00 The United States also pointed to
another essential difference between payment of fees by Royal navy ships
' by United S payment by British ves: " - i rely a ; ti
of intra-Empire accounting, while pays ; at by United States ships would in-
volve ir.ore complicated intei*national procedures* Finally, after remind-
ing the British that their ships would benefit without charge from harbo
improvements paid fcr by the United States, the united States note:1 that
it was only requesting total exemption for vessels of the Army, Navy,
Coast Guard, and Coast and Geodetic Survey, The large number of non-
public vessels which would be employed in the process of constructing and
supplying the bases would be required to pay all dues normally assessed
against commercial vessels. This would produce a considerable increase
in local revenues.
With respect to the navigation laws, the United States said the
leased areas would not be considered United States ports; therefore,
cabotage provisions would not prevent British vessels from carrying cargo
to them from other United States ports. The United States pointed out,
however, the continuing effectiveness of the laws which requires material
to be used by the Army and Navy to be shipped in vessels cf United States
registry whenever possible* The United States also agreed that harbor
facilities within the leased areas would be available to British and
other shipping on an equal basis with United States commercial shipping.
88 « l2lSia^L^lB^lSIii^-12hl.9 Vol « IH » P» 73 ;oce 5 State Dept, to British
Embassy in Washington, Mar. 1, 1941).
89. The President would have excluded British vessels from the leased areas
and adjacent waters on the grounds they were military reservations.
Ke was willing to permit them access under a system of licenses,
jevocable at will or for cause by the United States. Fc ' Relal j
1941 . Vol. Ill, p. 77 (telegram, State Dept. to U.S Embassy i
London (BLC), ho. 777, Mar. 8 S 1941).
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In tho final agreement, the United States position or these issues was
accepted.
In the discussion of harbor, light and pilot dues and the next sub-
sequent agenda item, custon di 'cs, the Unit* 1 States negotiators re-
ceived surreptitious supi . and assistance from an unexpected source -
tho Royal Navy, During neg( fciations on these subjects, tho Royal Kavy
representatives made little effort to substantiate or su] I the British
position, a position which had actually been established by the colonial
governments for the benefit of their local treasuries. Outside the con-
ference room the Royal Navy encouraged the Base Lease Commission to per-
sist in it; demands for total exemptions. The Royal Navy's motives were
simple: it had been trying to get similar exemptions from the colonial
governments for many years; if the United States obtained the desired
privileges, the Royal Navy was confident it could get similar benefits soon
91
afterward.
Customs duties, as the largest source of revenues in most of the base-
site territories, were the subject of long and arduous debate* The United
States wanted the greatest possible exemptions, relying heavily on the
"free from all rent and charges" phrase in the original agreement, ^ The
colonies sought to limit the exemptions as much' as possible, mainly to
protect their financial situation.
At the first negotiating session, the question of customs duties was
deferred, but the Base Lease Commission reported that it expected the
90. See pp. 210-211 below, Article XJ.
91. Interview vith Theodore Achilles, April 6, 1966.
92. U, S'„, Congress, House of Re] Natives, Acquiring Certain Naval •
Air Bases ii o ange f> r-age ] >yers , 76th Cong.,




subject to be troublesome. Bermuda, Newfoundland and Jamaica had ex-
pressed opposition to the duty-frc :ry of articles intended for general
because control of their use and o 3 would be difficult
because it would establish a privileged class within the c iity.
chainna i of tl 3 n« '• ting session had suggested that duty-fr< entry be
granted only to material int ' i'c:_ official use, not to personal good
Bermuda had also objected to duty-free entry for the household good:; of
personnel stationed at the bases.
The subject was discussed in subcommittees and informally, with the
United States adamant in its support of the proposal contained in the
draft leases. Under those provisions, the United States weald have re-
ceived "The privilege of importing free from all dues, ... or assess-
ments of any nature" all kinds of material "consigned to or destined for
any activity of the United States
. . .
its military, naval or civil per-
sonnel and their families, [orJ contractors and their families" provided
such material would not be transferred to other local interests. Britain
was reluctant to yield. On January 31, the Base Lease Commission for-
warded to the State Department a British proposal that only building ma-
terials for original construction and government stores that: vcre not for
95
resale be admitted duty-free. The British negotiators pointed out that
personal baggage was admitted free at all colonies, although several
colonies placed a limit on the value of household goods which could enter
96duly-free. It was suggested that these regulations should apply to
^» Foreign Re 1; ; L?ALj v° 1 * ***> P* &1 (telegram, U.S. Embassy in
London (BLC) to . Ee Dept., Mo. 330, Jan. 28, 1941).
94, Paragraph "1", modified draft lease for Bermuda; Navy Department
Archives,
95, Doc. 510: telegr< i, U..S. ! v in London (BLC) to State Dept,,
No. 384, Jan. 31, 1941.
96, Specifically, Antigua, British Guiana, Jamaica, St. Lucia, and Trinidad,
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United States personnel, British objection to the exemption of other
goods, especially tobacco and liquor, was based en an assertion that duty-
frc . lid give United States persoi 2.1 privileges th ' \ o not
even extended to British officials. On this point, the Base lease Cc
mission noted that although British officials posted to the colonics did
not receive such 15 1 custoi ' ions, they were paid a special
ry allowance instead. The British objection would be valid
only if United Slates personnel received a similar allowance.
On February C
v
the Commission reported that the United States
position on customs was one of several matters that had been referred to
higher British authority. u Nevertheless, discussion of minor details
and specific exemptions continued throughout February f The major points
of controversy were the classes of personnel to whom exemptions vould be
granted (contractors, military and consular personnel, dependents) and
the typos of property to be exempted (household goods 5 consumables, liquor
and tobacco). Exemption from various taxes, such, as those on: stamps,
checks and tickets, was also discussed. By late February, the Base Lease
Commission had obtained exemption for nearly all the desired goods exec.
99
retail merchandise for ships' stores, post exchanges and commissaries.
When the customs issue was finally passed to the Cabinet level for de-
cision, Britain yielded t.o the United States, but on one condition? the
United States had to promise to maintain strict control over duty-free
retail merchandise. The British concession was so complete that the
97. Doc, 510; telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 336, Jan. 31, 1941.
98. Doc. 351: telegram, U.S. Embassy In London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 653, Feb. 6, 1941.
99. Doc, 1695: Report of the BLC; Conn, et al ., Guarding the U.S. .
pp. 372-373.
100 « Foreign Relations. 1941 , Vol. Ill, p. 81 (telegram, U.S. Embassy in
Londoi '. ') to State Dept., No. 962, liar. 12, 1941). In his dis-
cussions with Loj 1 Halifax on March 7, President Roosevelt had
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Base Lease Commission decided it would not be vise to risk upsetting
the situation by requesting an exemption for the personal automobiles
of persons stationed at the bases.
Even after a final draft of the lease agr< had been pr<
on March II, the cu : s article was discussed and revised. On March 12,
the United States ask ' that it ba liberalized with respect to duty-
free entry for the persoi 1 and household goods of military personn ]
102
assigned to the leasee' areas. Additional exemptions were requested
on March 13; on March 14, the Base Lease Conmission reported that the
customs article was being rewritten, " A new draft was offered on
March 17 and approved on March 18, but there was another small revision
104
on March 19, As finally written, the customs clause fulfilled the
original United States demands for broad., general exemptions.
The next Items on the agenda, wartime import and export controls,
exchange controls, and currency, were settled expeditiously after Icing
100, (continu ) said with respect to customs exemptions that the United
States should make "a soleian undertaking" that violations of the
privilege "would be severely punished and put and end to," Foreign
Re lat \s« 1941 . Vol. Ill, p. 77 (telegram, State Dept. to U.S.
Embassy in London (BLC), No, 777, Mar, 8, 1941),
101, Fc Re] 1941 . Vol, III, p. 81 (telegram, U.S. Embassy in
London (BLC) to State Dept., No. 942, Mar. 12, 1941)* Perhaps the
Base Lease Commission was invoking Prime Minister Churchill's ad-
vice: "When you have got a thing where you want it it is a good
thing to leave it where it is, ,! (Speech to House of Commons,
Sept, 5, 1941, describing the Destroyers-Bases exchange. Their
Finest Hour , p. 368.)
102, Doc, 680: telegram, state Dept, to U.S. Embassy in London (BLC),
ho, 829, Mar. 12, 1941.
103. Doc. 680: telegram, State Dept, to U.S. Embassy in London (BLC),
No. 854, Mar. 13, 1941; and Doc, 695: telegram, U.S. Embassy in
London (BLC) to State Dept,, No, 1002, Mar. 14, 1941.
104. Doc, 709: telegrams, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
ho. 1042, Mar. 17, 1941, and State Dept. to U.S. Embassy in London
(BLC), ho. 911, Mar. 18, 1941; also Doc. 726: t ' i, U.S.
Eml ssy in London (BLC) to State I i
., No. 1077, Mar. 19, 1941,
and State Dap;:, to U.S. Embassy in London (BLC), No. 922, Mar. 19,
1941.
105. See pp. 210-211 below, Article XIV.
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referred to a technical subcommittee. Tine colonial representatives s<
suggested that I' subjects be omitted, but the Base Leas- Co mission
be] ' 1 ling was necessary. The Cos a toco. •
mended a provision to exempt official personnel from the financial,
i
.
. and export regulc ' i and to require base commanders to prevent
abuses. The State De] .•'.: advised the Commissic t the United
States considered the grant of exclusive rights 9 power and authority to
provide sufficient . ption. The relevant rej ions could have no
effect within the lc tsed area unless they were specifically mentioned as
an exception to the exclusive grant of pi rs. J The subject was there-
fore dropped end it was not mentioned in the lease agreement.
The next three items on the agenda were also disposed of quickly.
On January 29 there was tentative agreement that private businesses would
be prohibited within the leased areas and that navel and military medical
officers would not engage in local practice, with exceptions to both pro-
107hibitions allowable if the local government consented,, The United
States approved this agreement on the condition that post; exchanges,
ships' stores and service clubs were not considered businesses, an inter-
pi fcation justified by the fact I' '. e clientele of these institutions
1 0°
was restricted to service personnel. * ° This condition was accepted arc!
109the final agreement was drafted accordingly.
The questions of employing loc. 1 labor and using British and local
goods in the construction of the bases were settled before the conference
100. Doc, 500: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 350, Jan. 29, 1941; and Doc. 509: telegram, U.S. Embassy in
London (BLC) to State Dept., Do. 360, Jan. 30, 1941, and State
Dept. reply, Do. 330, Jan. 31, 1941.
107. Doce 500: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
Mo. 350, Jan. 29, 1941.
103. Doc. 491: telegram, State Dept. to U.S. Embassy in London (BLC),.
Do. 319, Jan. 30, 1941.
109. See p. 211 bolo -.-, Article XVIII.

-187-
began. The Grcensladc Board had expressed support for such er.iployir.ent
and use. When these items appeared on the agenda, the State Depart-
ment said there was no need to include them in the lease. **•* The Base
Lease Commission replied that Bermuda and Newfoundland wanted to include
them to so.tisfy local political pressures, but on February 6 they agreed
to delete them. 112
Postal and telegraph matters and the related sub-topics (postal
facilities, radio, cable and telephone facilities, and censorship during
wartime) proved difficult. The second sub-topic was settled first. The
negotiators agreed that there should be no commercial radio or cable
stations established within the leased areas, but the coordination of
11 3
military radio systems was deferred for discussion with defense problems.
The censorship question was complicated by the inherent difference
of viewpoints between a nation which is at war and one which is not.
There was never any suggestion that official mail ought to be censored;
only the censorship of personal mail was discussed. At first, and largely
at the instigation of the Bernvjda representatives, the British Chairman
suggested that when one nation was at war and the other was not, the in«
terests of the warring nation (i.e., favoring censorship) should prevail.
The issue was supposedly deferred for discussion with defense problems,
but the Commission soon reported tentative agreement on a draft authorizing
the belligerent's authorities to censor the non-belligerent's unofficial
110, See p. 144 above,
m» Foreign Relat i ons , 1941, Vol, III, p. 63 (telegram, State Dept, to
U.S. Embassy in Lond'on (3LC), Mo, 303, Jan, 29, 1941).
112. Doc. 500: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No, 350, Jan. 29, 1941; and Doc. 351: telegram, U.S. Embassy in
London (BLC) to State Dept., No. 458, Feb. 6, 1941.
113. Doc. 500: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept,,
No. 350, Jan, 29, 1941; also sol- p. 211 below, Article XV.
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m-il* The State- Department clarified the United States position on
February 5. Censorship of official mail by either Britain or the United
States was rejected. It was suggested that outgoing mail from the 1< red
area should only be censored by United States personnel, and that censor-
ship should occur before the mail entered trie postal system. Incoming
mail which ) •' origin ted in the United States would not be censored, but
the United States was willing to make available for examination by British
authorities any incoming mail which originated in a foreign state. This
proposal was made with the understanding that Britain would reciprocate
with a similar system in the event the roles of belligerent and no
115
belligerent were ever reversed. The matter was referred to high'.
British authorities v;ho decided, v/ith the concurrence of the United States
and the Base Lease C . Jon, that censorship would be excluded from the
lease agreement and made the subject of a separate exchange of notes, 1
The text of such an exchange, based on the United States proposal above,
,.
, ,/ 117was approved on fcarch 24,
The question of postal systems, which would appear to be a minor
issue, generated vigorous debate because some of the British negotiators
considered the postal system a symbol of sovereignty. At the second
plenary session, the chairman of the British delegation objected to the
establishment of United States Post Offices because, he said, it implied
114. Doc, 500: telegram, U, S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No, 350, Jan, 2.9, 1941; and Doc. 510; telegram, U„S. Embassy in
London (BLC) to State Dept., No. 384, Jan, 31, 1941,
115, Doc. 510: telegram, State Dept. to U.S. Embassy in London (BLC),
No, 373, Feb. 5, 1941,
116. Doc, 351: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept,,
No. 458, Feb. 6, 1941,
117, Doc. 777: telegrams, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 1154, and State Dept. to U.S. ] y in London (BLC), No, 996,
both of Mar. 24, 1941, Also see p. 215 below.
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United States sovereignty. 11 >. State De nt replied on January 30
) 19
"We see no ii of sov ' ' ; in trus, 1 '" On the next day t]
Base Commission re. • that colonial officials : < deeply con
C< al >ut fch . issue, They thought the presence of \
States post offices and the use of United State: p. stai ps in th
lc. eas would cause a loss of prestige for Britain. They also an-
ticipated a-comj ti Ave effect from differing postal rates between the
United States and British systems. The Base I S€ Commission persisted
in demanding United States postage and post offices, at least foi ; 11
going directly to the United States on United States ships. When the
Commission reported these facts, the State D: rtt replied with one
of the most direct and forceful statements of policy in the entire course
of the negotiations:
The United States postal authorities will establish
and operate United States post offices in all of the
leased areas, such operation to be under their complete
control, with United Stai es postage to be used on all
t\?Al posted therein. We regard the control of postal
facilities in the leased areas as a mattej of funda-
mental importance and essential to sirjple and efficient
administration. Ko distinction (repeat no distinction)
should be i bet sen mail going direct to a United
States post office in the United States, its pos«
or the leased areas on American vessels or vessels of .
foi eign regi stry. l2
The post office issue was another of the points referred to higher
British authorities on February 6. The United States position was
118, Doc. 500: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 350, Jan. 29, 19a}..
119, Dee, 491: tel m, State Dept. to U.S. Embassy in London (BLC),
No. 319, Jan. 30, 1941.
120, Doc. 510: telegram, State Dept. to U.S. Embassy in London (BLC),
To, 373, Feb. 5, 1941, in reply to Embassy tele lo. 384 of
Jan. 31, 1941 (also filed in Doc. 510).
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eventually accepted as the basis for the article placed in the final
agreement; tho only added condit '• . i -. s that use of the postal facili-
ties would be limit id to Urn I St personn >.l (military, civilian and
contractor) and to service within th ' State: • I system.
At an early meeting of the negotiators il was decide:' that 1< - 3
traffic 1" would not apply witl in tl s. The only remain-
ing problems pertained to the payment of license fees for official r
personal vehicles used outside the loat.l r» as and the conflict with
local laws in Bermuda and Trinidad which required vehicles to have right-
hand drive. Thes i :e dispoj ' Df bj ex< ' ing govern owned ve-
hicles from licensing fees and by providing that standard United States
vehicles would not be kept off local reads solely because the:*;- construe-
12?
tion varied from that prescribed by local laws.
When the reservation of certain rights was discussed on January 29,
the British negotiators said Britain desired to reserve the rights to
minerals and oil, treasure trove, and antiqi ' I ated inside tl
leased area. This reservation w s subject to the understanding that the
rights would not be exercised or transferred to third parties without the
consent of the United States. Britain also suggest''' that local fishing
and other industries be allowed to continue within the leased areas so
long as they did not interfere with military operations, Tho State
Department approved these agreements, but pointed out that it could mal
124
no guarantees wj th respect to continuation of fishing and industries.
121, Uoc. 351~: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept,,
No. 458, Feb. 6, 1941; also nee p. 211 below, Article XVI,
122. Sea p. 210 below, Article XII.
123. hoc. 500: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to Ztr.to Dept,,
No, 350, Jan. 29, 1941.
124, Doc. 491: tel , State Dept. to U.S. ay in London (BLC),
No. 319, Jan. 30, 1941.
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On February 6, the Co ' orted that a draft agreement includl
these points had been prepared, but the rights were reserved to the local
I? j
i id inli ibit , rather t t o th I .. 11 i '< gc .. n
set of <
.
Ltion of private prop \ d i • the
negotiation session on January 29, When the State Department fc -
its co o i the ag ' to the Lease Commission, h , it said that
a tentative t .' ! ' already been worked out in discussions in Washing-
ton. " The Co] lission was advised that this formula was being submitted
to the Foreign Office \yj the British Embassy in Washington, and if it was
accepted, the matter could be excluded from the le* se agreement.
The compensation procedure called for the colonial gov< tits to
settle with the private owner on the amount of coi % snsation due. This
figure would be reported to the United Slates. If it was approved,
British authorities would pay the prival ' and the United States
would reimburse Britain. In the event the colonial government could
not read"! r; - rent with the owners, or if the United States did not ac-
cept the sum on which they r I case would go before a special
tribunal, establish ' i der colonial laws, to determine t" ai >unt of
compensation due. The decreed it would then be paid to the owner by
the British government with the United States reimbursing Britain, In
the event the United States refused to accept the decreed sura as pro;"
.
c
. isation, the case would be "setlL:" under arrangements to be determined
123. Doc. 351: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No, 458, Feb. 6, 1941; also see p. 213 below, Article XXV.
126. Doc. 500: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 350, Jen. 29, 1941; and 1< I U, Vol, III, p. 68




and agreed to by both Goverr its." This point was omitted from the
lease agre .. but the discussion of compensation continued throughout
the negotiating ... Toward the end of the meetings, the difficul-
ties which had been encountered in impl< : ng the agreed-upon procedures
were disci .-' frequ ntly in en effort to • te the acquisition of
title to the base sites.
At the second plenary Lng on Jc ,> 29, it was decided to crop
agenda item number 19 and exlude from the lease a\ eement any reference
to treatment of colored population. No reasons for this move were re-
corded. Consideration of the next agend items, additional costs of
administration due to the establishment of the bases and additional com-
pensaticn to the base-site territories, never went beyond the initio 1
negotiating sessions either. The latter subject was deferred on January 29,
but it was never reconsidered. At the same session, the Be uda repre-
sentatives clarified the former point by e: Lning that it referred to
costs such as those of additional sanitary facilities necessitated by the
presence of the United States forces, the damages caused by gun-blast,
and the added wear and tear on roads. The Base Lease Commission immedi-
ately pointed out that the local inhabitants and govt lent would also
benefit from the presence of the United States forces. There would be
large quantities of money spent in the local economy and additional
127, Doc, 495%: Memo of conversation between First Secretary of British
Embassy in Washington and J e Hickerson, Assistant Chief of Division
of European Affairs, Stare Dept», dated Jan. 32, 1941, This pro-
cedure was fi . Lzed by an exchange of notes between '.' British
assy in Washington and the St ..i:, on Feb. 10 and Feb, 14,
1941, (Edward 11. . ), '. ry of Antilles Department Real te:
Fart I - 99-year Lease Bases," pp. 74-76,
123. Doc. 500: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept,,
No. 330, Jan, 29, 1941.
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development of the territories* natural resources would occur. The
Conunissio th "ore refused to consider any such additional pa; its.
Both of these compensate c] w< also -y to the provision
of th inal exchange of notes. They provided that the bases would
be Ci e of rents and c except those required "to compensate the
cmers of priva property for loss by ' yp 01 d / arising
1 30
out of the establis] at of the bases anc facilities
. .
." The com-
pensation requested in these two items was not due to the owners of
private property nor was it the result of expropriation or damage incident
to the establish! snt (as contrasted to the operation) of the bases.
Neither issue was mentioned in the lease agreement.
Discussion of civil aviation was deferred at the January 29 negotiat-
ing session, but two days later the Ease Lease Commission reported tenta-
tive agreement on a clause barring civil aviation from facilities in the
leased areas except as authorized by mutual agree: »nt with British and
131local authorities. In the same report, however, the Commission re-
quested additional instructions on the subject because Bermuda (which had
no airfield) and Newfoundland were interested in the possibility of using
the leased-area airfields for civilian aircraft in the future. After re-
considering the issue, the Commission decided it would be better to omit
any mention of civil aviation than to exclude it from facilities within
the leased areas. The State Department replied that the United States
policy on r - cial aviation at the leased bases had been adequately
129, Doc. 500: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No, 350, Jan, 29, 1941.
130, Acquiring Certaii ses, House Document 943, p. 2;
1 ! 181. : asis added.
131, Doc. 510: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept,,
No. 384, Jan. 31, 1941.
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expressed to tho British government in a note on December 30, 1940,
13?
so there was no need to include it in the lease agreement, ~ On
February 6, the same cay this issue was referred to higher British
authorities, the British Air Ministry asked for an assurance that cor
cial aircraft would not c e from the leased areas except in an emer-
gency or when engaged in operatic i , i "or direct government control.
The ministry was especially desirous of receiving this assurance if the
133
matter was excluded from the lease agreement. The State Department
repeated its preference for omitting the matter from the lease agreement
anc relying on the note of December 30, 1940, but eventually it yielded
to Britain, A clause excluding commercial aviation except on the mutual
consent of the United States and the United Kingdom was added to the
1 34
shipping article of the lease agreement:.
The final item of the British agenda referred to the liability of
contractors engaged in base development for payment of colonial income
and professional taxes. At first, Newfoundland argued that exemption
from income taxes would give the United States contractors an unfair ad-
vantage over local contractors in the competition for construction work.
The Commission quickly pointed out that United States contractors would
still be subject to United States income taxes at rates as high as or
higher than those assessed in Newfoundland, The general question of
132. Doc, 510: telegram, State Dept. to U.S. Embassy in London (BLC),
No, 373, Feb, 5, 1941; also see p. 113 above regarding the note of
December 30, 1940,
133. Doc. 351: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BI.C) to State Dept.,
No. 453, Feb. 6, 1941; and Doc. 352: telegram, U.S. Embassy in
London (BLC) to State Dept., No, 459, Feb. 6, 1941.
134. Doc. 470: telegram, State Dept. to U.S. Embassy in London (BLC),
No, 446, Fob. 11, 1941; also sec pp. 210-211 below, Article XI.
135. Doc. 500: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 350, Jan. 29, 1941.
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taxation was deferred frora official consideration but it was the subject
of continuing informal discussions, The British admitted that the profits
or a contract should be taxed at the place where the contract was made,
but they declined to make such an agreement in writing. Supported by
the State Department, the Base Lease Commission held out for a general
tax exemption, and th? question was among those referred to the British
I 37Cabinet, The record does not reveal much regarding further conversa-
tions about taxation except that on March 13, the State Department ob-
jected to taxation of contractors' materials. Such taxes would have been
shifted to the United States government under cost-plus-fixed-fee con-
struction contracts, and therefore would have violated the basic exchange
of notes. Being a pocket-book issue, the matter must have received
intensive discussion before the broad exclusions contained in the lease
agreement were accepted. Unfortunately, those discussions are not de-
139
tailed in available sources.
Of the five additional subjects placed on the agenda by the Base
Lease Commission, only the first and last proved difficult to settle.
The second item, assuring an official the right to legal assistance in
suits based on acts done in the course of his duties, was discussed and
deferred at the meeting of January 29. Later the same day, the State De-
partment told the Commission it did not understand the purpose of the
item. Asserting the international law doctrine of Act of State, the
136. Doc. 510: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept,,
No. 334, Jan. 31, 1941.
137. Doc. 510: telegram, State Dept. to U.S. Embassy in London (BLC),
No, 373, Feb. 5, 1941; and Doc, 351: telegram, U.S. Embassy in
London (BLC) to State Dept., No, 453, Feb. 6, 1941,
138. Doc. 680: telegram, State Dept. to b\S. Embassy in London (BLC),
No. 854, Mar. 13, 1941.
139. See p. 211 below, Article XVII,
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State Dep- . : said "any natter involving action by an American
official in his official capacity vould be a patter between the two
Governments and not one for the local tribunals," v Wh< i the Commis-
sion replied that it wanted a clause to cover situations such as a tres-
pass suit against a surveyor working outside the leased area, the Depart-
ment advia ' that the matter was non-essential and should be dropped.
Although no record of further discussion of this point is available, an
article providing for a right of audience was included in the final
agreement.
The Commissionfs request for amplification of certain items on the
British agenda was answered as each agenda item was considered in the
course of the early negotiating sessions* The next additional item, per-
taining to the right to conduct surveys outside the leased areas, was
also approved at an early meeting,, The approval was subject to the
proviso that the results of such surveys vould be made available to all
interested persons.
The final addenda item, which suggested that the United States should
obtain possession of the leased areas as soon cs the lease agreement was
signed, vas initially deferred due to the vide range of opinions on the
point. Bermuda wanted to set a time limit within which possession vould
be granted, with the interim period used to resettle residents; Newfound-
land thought possession should be arranged through consultation with local
1~A0. Foreign Relations, 1941 , Vol. Ill, p. 68 (telegram, State Dept, to
U.S. Embassy in London (BLC), No. 303, Jan. 29, 1941).
141. Doc. 509: telegrams, U.S. Embassy in London (3LC) to State Dept.,
Mo. 360, Jan. 30, 1941; and State Dept. to U.S. Embassy in Ixmdon
(BLC), No. 330, Jan. 31, 1941.
142. Sea p. 209 below, Article VII.
143. Doc. 500: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 35C, Jan. 29, 1941; also see p. 209 below, Article X.
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ofiicials and that possession ought not be transferred until the United
States actually needed the property. In its initial reaction to the
subject, the State Department; thought it irrelevant since Britain had
already agreed to grai immediate possession, even without signing
leases. ^ The Co;::nission replied that it intended to include a clause
which would secure possession which had been promised but not yet ful-
filled, so the State Departme it suggested that this clause be rephrased
so that all rights granted in the lease, including possession if not al-
ready acquired, would become effective when the lease was signed.
Those questions were raised again when the negotiators decided on
the format of the lease agreement.' :'' There ware tvro convenient procedures t
The rights and powers and possession could be transferred to the United
States when the lease agreement was signed, or the transfer could occur
later, when the actual leases, modeled after those appended to the lease
agreement, vere signed. When this situation was reported, the State De-
partment altered its position. The Base Lease Commission was advised to
retain a possession clause which would make it clear that the United States
acquired possession of the sites when the lease agreement was signed. The




144. Doc. 5C0: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept,,
No. 35C, Jan. 29, 1941.
145. Foreign Relations. 1941 . Vol. Ill, p. 63 (telegram, State Dept. to
U. S. Embassy in London (BLC), No. 303, Jan. 29, 1961, referring to
an unpublished British note of November 22, 1940).
146. Doc. 509: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 360, Jan. 30, 1941; and Doc. 509: telegram, State Dept, to U.S.
Embassy in London (BLC), No. 330, Jan. 31, 1941.
147. Doc. 533: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 473, Feb. 7, 1941.
143. Doc. 533: telegram, State Dept. to U.S. Embassy in London (BLC),
No. 421, Feb. 8, 1941.
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The effective date of possession continued under discussion during
tl rest of the negotiating sessions. The result was a compromise
clause: the transfer of possession and other rights acquired by the
United States would not occur until the actual leases were signed, but
"pending execution of such leases" the United States ras authorized to
exercise its rights ftad interim" and to receive immediate possession of
149the areas whose location had been ascertained.
The remaining supplementary agenda item called for discussion of the
provisions in the United States draft leases. This covered several
separate topics of discussion. Simplest of these were the treatment of
United States forces located outside the leased areas, the right to aban-
don the leased areas and to remove improvements, and the right to make
supplementary leases. The most difficult points in the entire series of
negotiations, however, were also in this group: the questions of defense
and special rights during wartime.
The status of United States forces outside the leased areas was
raised on February 1 by one of the Ease Lease Commissioners, Colonel Harry
Kalcny. After consultation with the War Department, an additional article
was proposed for the lease agreement. Under this article United States
forces operating under special arrangements with Britain, in or from any
of the base-site territories, would have the same status and the same
rights as forces actually stationed in the leased areas.
149. "Leased Naval and Air Bases," [Base Lease Agreement"}, Executive
Agreement Series No. 235, p. 11; see pp. 212-213 belo^.*, Article XXIV,
150. boc. 522: telegram, State Dept. to U.S. Embassy in London (BLC),
No. 3A3, Feb. 1, 1941. According to Col. Stanley W. Dziuban, Xi_ii-




p. 96, the President wanted such an.article included to enable
Unite:'. States forcer, to be based outside the Newf oundland leased
areas at Newfoundland Airport.
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The proposal received tentative approval on February 5 and was later in-
corporated in the final agreement.
The draft lease articles pertaining to the use of public facilities,
the absence of any United States obligation to develop the bases, and the
right to enter local property for survey and sanitation work, to abandon
the leased areas and to remove improvements to the leased area were also
discussed early in February. In ir;ost cases the United States positions
were accepted. The use of public facilities "under conditions no less
152favorable than those afforded to Kis Majesty's Government" was granted.
A clause relieving the United States of any obligation to develop the
leased areas was approved when combined with the provision for civil ad-
153
ministration of the unoccupied areas. The right to enter local property
was granted provided it was exercised in collaboration with local authori-
ties; nc consideration other than just compensation of private property
owners would be required. It was also agreed that the United States
could abandon the leased areas if it gave Britain at least one year ad-
vance notice. Emphasis was placed on the fact that no abandonment could
occur without such notice. The negotiators further agreed that the
151. Doc. 529: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.
N'o. 443, Feb. 5, 1941; and Doc. 53S: telegram, U.S. Embassy in Lon-
don (BLC) to State Dept., No. 478, Feb. 7, 1941. Also see pp. 211.-212
below, Article XIX.
152. Doc. 529: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 443, Feb. 5, 1941. This draft was approved by the State Dept.,
in Doc. 529: telegram, State Dept, to U.S. Embassy in London (BLC),
No. 462, Feb. 12, 1941. Also see p. 209 below, Article IX.
153. Doc. 538: telegrams, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 478, Feb. 7, 1941; and State Dept. to U.S. Embassy in London (BLC)
No. 421, Feb. 8, 1941. Also see pp. 176-177 above and 208 below',
Article III.
154. Doc. 529: telegrams, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
,
No. 443, Feb. 5, 1941; and State Dept. to U.S. Eirbassy in London
(BLC), No. 462, Feb. 12, 1941. See p. 212 below, Article XX.
155. Doc. 538: telegrams, U.S. Embassy in London (3LC) to State Dept.,
No. 473, Feb. 7, 1941; and State Dept. to U.S. Kmbassy in London (BLC),
No. 421, Feb. 8, 1941. Also see p. 212 below, Article XXI.
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United States bad the right to remove from the leased areas any improve-
ments it had erected, provided the removal was done during the period of
the lease or within a "reasonable" time thereafter.
The right to obtain additional areas by supplementary lease was also
raised early in February. Tentative agreement was soon reached on a
clause giving the United States the right to acquire additional areas
"found necessary for the protection and use" of the bases with acquisition
to occur by supplementary leases arrived at by "common agreement."*^' The
British were hesitant on this point, however, chiefly due to colonial
fears that the United States would be constantly demanding more territory.
Eventually, a compromise proposal was accepted. Supplementary leases were
authorized by common agreement, provided they were consistent with both
tec
the original exchange of notes and the base lease agreement.
The subject which caused the most difficulty was the extent of United
States rights, powers and authority inside and outside the leased areas,
especially with respect to military operations and defenses. The United
States draft leases contained clauses which would have assigned the United
States, "exclusive rights, power, authority and control" within the bases
and the "territorial waters and air spaces adjacent to or in the vicinity
of" them and "the right, power and authority to assume military control
and conduct military operations within" the colonies and their "surrounding
156. Doc. 533: telegrams cited above, note 155; also see p. 212 below,
Article XXII.
157. Doc, 529: telegrams, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept,,
No. 443, Feb. 5, 1941; and State Dept. to U.S. Embassy in London
(BLC) No. 462, Feb. 12, 1941, approving the tentative draft.
158. Foreign Relations, 1941, Vol. Ill, p. 82 (telegram, U.S. Embassy in
London (BLC) to State Dept., No. 942, Mar. 12, 1941); also see




waters and air space 11 as determined necessary by the United States.
Britain objected, claiming that these clauses were too sweeping and ap-
plicable to too indefinite an area, especially when the long-term nature
of the lease was considered. While Britain admitted that the powers
granted by such clauses might be proper for wartime, they were considered
too extensive for peacetime. The British negotiators also showed a
marked dislike for the implications of the word "control" as used in the
drafts. At an early negotiating session, the British representatives
offered a compromise proposal in which the word "control" was omitted
and the "rights, powers and authority" sections were replaced by a general
provision resembling part of the notes exchanged on September 2, I960.
This draft, which was much more palatable to the colonies, contained two
clauses; one assigned the normal rights and powers to the United States,
the other provided for extraordinary powers which could only be exercised
during wartime. The first clause said "the United States Government shall




the territorial waters and air spaces adjacent to or in the vicinity
of such bases which are necessary or appropriate for the access to and for
161the defense and control of such bases." The United States, on its part,
agreed not to exercise its powers "unreasonably or so as to interfere with
the necessary rights of sea or air navigation to or from the ports or
159. Modified Bermuda lease, items "e" and "f". Navy Department Archives.
There is an unexplained lack of material bearing on these defense
and military discussions in the State Department Archives.
160. Doc. 149 5: Report of the BLC; Conn, et al .« Guarding the U.S., p. 371.
161. Doc. 519: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 419, Feb. 3, 1941; Doc. 1495: Report of the BLC, indicates that
this proposal was for a separate exchange of notes, not a part of
the Base Lease Agreement. Aside from additional introductory word-
ing in Doc. 1495, the phrasing is identical.
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aerodromes in the colony." The British draft then said the rights and
powers granted to the United States would "include, inter alia ," the
following: the right to construct, maintain, operate and control the
bases; improve harbors; regulate communications; install defenses; and
establish aids to navigation. The second clause of the British draft
said that since defense of the leased areas and of the surrounding terri-
tory was a matter of mutual concern, common defense would be arranged
by agreement between the parties. The colonial Governor, in his consti-
tutional role as Commander-in-Chief of the local defense forces, was
designated to act as the representative of the King in making such de-
fense arrangements. Whan the United States was at war or in other times
of emergency, however, the United States would have all the rights neces-
sary to conduct military operations in the base-site territories and
their adjacent waters and air space.
The United States refused to accept the portion of this draft which
assigned a controlling position in local defense to the colonial Governor.
In its place the Commission proposed that mutual defense be arranged by
"consultation between the governments concerned" whenever the occasion
required. 1 After the United States rejected a British proposal for a
staff consultation arrangement resembling the Canadian-American Permanent
Joint Board on Defense, a tentative compromise agreement was reached. It
was based on the British drafts, modified by the Base Lease Commission's
consultation proposal and augmented by a statement that in the consulta-
tion provision the "governments concerned" were the United States and the
162. Doc. 529: telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (3LC) to State Dept.,
No. 443, Feb. 5, 1941; but Doc. 1495: Report of the BLC, does not
mention this clause.
163. Conn, et a 1
.
, Guarding the U.S., p. 371.
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United Kingdom, The negotiators were not able to reach final agree-
ment on these points, however, so they were referred to higher authority
early in March.
In late February and early March, as the talks were dragging into
their fifth week, there was a strong injection of political influence
into the negotiations, The new United States Ambassador to Britain was
a personal friend of the President. When he was informed that a few
issues, notably customs, jurisdiction, and defense, had not yet been
resolved, he took the matter directly to the Prime Minister. At the same
time, in Washington, the President told Lord Halifax that the base-lease
delays could jeopardize the Lend-Lease bill then before Congress, As a
result of these influences, the Prime Minister took an active role in
fettling the points still at issue.
On March 8, the Prime Minister proposed a revision of the defense
articles, which he considered the most important part of the agreement.
He was willing to yield to the United States on all the other points.
The Prime Minister first proposed to add to the preamble of the lease
agreement a clause containing a pledge of cooperation. After discussing
the wording with the Base Lease Commission, the Prime Minister inserted a
sentence saying the agreement would "be fulfilled in a spirit of good
neighborliness" between Britain and the United States, "and that details
of its practical application" would "be arranged by friendly cooperation."
164. Conn, et al., Guarding the U.S.., p. 371-372. The colonial Governor
was not explicitly ruled out as a representative, but the Commission
intended to prevent colonial officials from holding any controlling
position.
165. Ibid., p. 373; also Foreign Relations, 1 941, Vol. Ill, pp. 79-30
(telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept., No. 915,
Mar. 9, 1941).
166. Conn, et al
.




The Prime Minister considered this section to be extremely important.
Reportedly, to him, "it represented the spirit of the entire transaction,"
without which the agreement would have been a "capitulation."*
The second part of the Prime Minister's proposal was a revision of
the article on special military powers. He agreed that in times of war
or emergency the United States should have whatever rights it required
to conduct military operations, but he thought those rights should only
be exercised with "full regard" to the pledge which he had inserted in the
preamble. The Prime Minister also wanted to assure complete coordina-
tion of defense programs between the bases and the colonies. He there-
fore said that the modified clause on military powers ought to recognize
the need to cooperate in defense planning and to require "consultation in
169
accordance with the spirit of the preamble" on questions of local defense.
The Base Lease Commission rejected the Prima Minister's proposal be-
cause it thought the sentence requiring consultation was a limitation on the
powers granted to the United States. Ambassador Winant, with the con-
currence of the 3ase Lease Commission, then suggested a two-paragraph
compromise article to the State Department. The first paragraph said that
any difficulties regarding defense would be settled in accordance with the
spirit of the preamble; the second assigned almost unlimited rights to
the United States during wartime. If there was a direct response to
167. Conn, et al .. Guarding the U.S ., p. 374; also Foreign Relations, 1.941,
Vol. Ill, pp. 80-31 (telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State
De?t., No. 942, tor. 12, 1941).
168. Conn, et al., Guarding the U.S., p. 374; also Foreign Relations, 1941,"
_ i |i * i i " % | m in . ' , i, * * ! I i .ill. i_ i i i -~ i, p i l l>. i
Vol. Ill, p. 78 (telegram, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State
Dept., No. 903, Mar. 8, 1941).
169. Corn, et al,, Guardin g the U.S., p. 374; Foreign Relations, 1941,
Vol. Ill, p. 78 (telegram cited above).
170. Foreign Relations, 1941 , Vol. Ill, p. 78 (telegram cited above) and
Conn, et al , t Guarding the U .S., p. 374.
171. For ei
g
n Re 1 a t i ons ,_1 94 1 , Vol. Ill, p. 79 (telegram cited above and




this proposal, it is not available; however, the suggestion bears a
strong resemblance to the final division and disposition of the issue.
Soon after yinant*s proposal was submitted, the Lend-Lease bill was
passed; on the day the President signed it, agreement was reached on the
outstanding issues of the base lease negotiations. There is no direct
evidence establishing a causal relationship between these two events, but
it Is probable that signing of the Lend-Lease Act induced Britain to make
1 7?further concessions on the base lease agreement. '*
When the negotiators and the Prime Minister met again on March 11,
there seemed to be only one point bothering Mr. Churchill: the question
of reciprocity with respect to the right to conduct military operations
in wartime. The United States argued that the leased areas could not be
defended properly from within; it was essential to have the right to con-
duct military operations in the surrounding tex-ritory during wartime.
The United Stains denied that the opposite was true, and said it would be
possible for Britain to defend the entire colony or territory without con-
ducting operations in the small area leased to the United States. The
United States thus opposed reciprocity and Britain favored it. The Prime
Minister spent some time "ruminating aloud," analyzing the list of nations
which could conceivably attack the base-site territories during the life
1 TO
of the lease. In every case he could imagine, such an attack would
constitute such a serious threat to the United States and its leased bases
that the United States would be forced to enter the war. Because he could
conceive of no case in which Britain would be obliged to defend the colonies
without the active support of the United States, the Prime Minister
172. Conn, et al. , Guarding the U. S., p. 376 clearly implies such a
connection.
173. Interview with Charles Fahy, April 6, 1966.
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directed his negotiators to yield to the United States position. 17
The result was the drafting of a simple clause giving the United States
all rights necessary to conduct military operations during a war or
emergency, but promising that any exercise of those rights would be in
accordance with the preamble's pledge of cooperation. 1 All mention of
joint defense or consultation was omitted and the desired reference to
the preamble was included without sacrificing or limiting the United
States freedom of action.
The following two weeks (March 12 - 26) were spent in completing the
final draft of the base lease agreement. There were minor corrections
to various articles and to the site descriptions in the model leases, and
detailed comments from the State Department, Foreign Office and Colonial
Office were incorporated into the agreement. On March IS, the Base Lease
Commission was authorized to sign the agreement for the United States. 1
The text was submitted to the State Department on March 19 and the Depart
-
177
ment forwarded its final corrections on March 21, The agreement was
signed on March 27, 1941. At the same time, the United States and Britain
exchanged notes regarding mail censorship and the status of Newfoundland,
and they were joined by Canada in signing a protocol on Newfoundland de-
fenses. The contents of these documents are included in the summary be-
low.
In its final form, the Base Lease Agreement of March 27, 1941, was
composed of a preamble, 30 articles, and 3 annexes, summarized as follows:
174. Interview with Charles Fahy, April 6, 1966.
175. See pp. 207-208 below, Article II.
176. Foreign Relati ons , 1941, Vol. Ill, p. 83 (telegram, State Dept. to
U.S. Embassy in London (BLC), No. 910, Mar. 18, 1941).
177. Doc. 732: telegrams, U.S. Embassy in London (BLC) to State Dept.,
No. 1035, Mar. 19, 1941; and State Dept. to U.S. Embassy in London
(BLC), No. 961, Mar. 21, 1941.
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Preamble - This agreement is made pursuant to and in effectuation of
the notes exchanged on September 2, 1940. It is agreed that leases, sub-
stantially like those in Annex II, will be completed for each base as soon
as possible. Finally, "it is desired that this agreement; shall be ful-
filled in a spirit of good neighborliness" between the United States and
Brtiain; "details of its practical application shall be arranged by
1 7Sfriendly cooperation,"
Article I - General Description of Right s, The United States will
have, within the leased areas, all the rights, power and authority needed
to establish, operate and defend the areas; "within the limits of terri-
torial waters and air spaces adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the
leased areas" the United States will have all the rights needed "to pro-
179
vide access to and defense of the leased areas," Those rights include,
among others, the rights to construct, maintain, operate and control the
bases; improve harbors; control movement of ships and aircraft; regulate
and control communications; and install and use underwater and other de-
fense systems. The United States agrees not to exercise its rights outside
the leased area "unreasonably" or so as to unnecessarily impede the ship-
ping, aricraft or communications of the territory; all rights will be
IPO
exercised "in the spirit" of the final section of the preamble. When
the rights are exercised outside the leased areas, the United States will
consult with the British government as necessary.
Article II - Special Emergency Powers. In time of emergency or when
the United States is at war, it may exercise in the colonies and their
178. Executive Agreement Series, No, 235 (Base Lease Agreement), p, I,
This is the section referred to in Articles I and II, considered
the heart of the agreement by Prime Minister Churchill,
179 « Ibid,, p. 1.
180. Ibid., p, 2.
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adjacent waters and air space such rights as it considers necessary to
military operations, but they will be exercised "with all possible re-
181
gard to the spirit of
. . .
the preamble."
Article III - Kon -user. The United States has no obligation to de-
velop, use or defend the leased areas, but in any unused area, the British
government may, with the approval of the United States, act to maintain
health, order and defense.
Article IV - Jurisdiction, The United States has the right to exer-
cise jurisdiction over military and security offenses committed inside or
outside the leased areas by persons other than British subjects, over such
offenses by a British subject if committed within the area and he is appre-
hended therein, and over all other offenses committed inside the leased
areas by persons other than British subjects. The United States may
waive its right to exercise jurisdiction and transfer an offender to local
authorities for trial. If a British subject who committed, within the
leased area, a military or security offense, is apprehended outside the
leased area, he will be tried by local courts if his act violated local
laws; otherwise he will be surrendered to the United States which may
then exercise its jurisdiction. In any case where the United States exer-
cises jurisdiction over a British subject, the case shall be heard by a
court sitting in the leased area. This article does not affect the
jurisdiction of the United States over members of its armed forces with
respect to matters of discipline and internal administration.
Article V - S ecur i ty Leg i si at i on . The local government will enact
laws- required to protect the security of the leased areas.
Article VI - Arrest and S ervice of Process . No process will be served
181, Executive Agreement Series, No. 235 (3ase Lease Agreement), p, 2.
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in the leased area except with the permission of the officer commanding
the area. If a request for permission to serve process is denied, how-
cver, the commanding officer must either exercise United States juris-
diction if authorized by Article IV, have the process served by a member
of his command, or arrest and surrender the person involved to local
authorities. The local authorities will reciprocate in cases whore the
United States desires to serve process in a case under its jurisdiction.
Article VII - Right of Audi ence for United States Counsel , In any
civil or criminal case in local courts against a United States official
which is based on that official's conduct in the course of his duties,
govern;;. :>nt -appointed counsel who are members of the United States federal
bar will have the right of audience.
Article VIII - Su rrender of Offend ers , Surrender of offenders to
enable either the United States or local courts to exercise jurisdiction
shall be arranged by special agreements between United States and local
authorities at each base.
Article IX - Public Services. The United States will have the right
to use public utilities and facilities owned or regulated by the local
government "under conditions comparable to and no less favorable than"
those applying to similar use by the British government, 182
Article X - Surveys . The United States may conduct hydrographic and
topographic surveys outside the leased areas but will report the results
to the local government. The United States will be supplied copies of any
surveys conducted by the British or local government.
Article XI - Shi pp i ng _an6 Av i at i on , Aids to navigation installed by
the United States will comply with the local navigation system and the
182, Execu ti ve Agree ment Seri e s, ho. 23 5 (Base Lease Agreement), p. 5.
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characteristics and location of the aids will be published locally.
Public vessels are exempted from harbor and light dues and compulsory
pilotage, but may request pilotage and pay for it at the standard rate.
British commercial shipping will bo permitted to use facilities of the
leased areas on the same terms available to United States commercial
shipping. The leased areas are not considered United States ports under
the coastwise navigation laws and British ships are not therefore excluded
from carrying cargo between the leased areas and United States ports.
Commercial aviation will not be permitted to use tne facilities estab-
lished in the leased areas except for emergencies, or by mutual consent.
Article XII - Kotor_ Traf fj c, Standard United States vehicles may
operate on local roads even if they do not conform to local construction
requirements. No license or other tax shall be charged for the use of
United States government vehicles outside the leased areas.
Article XIII - Immigration, The local immigration laws shall not
apply to persons posted to or employed in the leased areas, except that
nationals of states at war with Britain shall be excluded. If the status
of anyone in the leased area is changed so as to require his exclusion
under the foregoing provision, the United States must notify the local
government of that fact and remove the person from the leased area if re-
quested to do so by local authorities.
Article XIV - Customs. No import or export duties or taxes will be
charged on: (a) material for base construction, maintenance or operation,
whether consigned to the United States government or to a contractor;
(b) goods to be used or consumed aboard public vessels of the United States;
(c) goods for resale in exchanges and other such institutions whose
clientele is limited to United States civil and military personnel;
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(d) personal r.nd household effects of those stationed in the leased areas
as military or civil personnel or contractor employees. This article
applies to goods which enter the leased area directly or pass through
local territory en route to or from the leased areas. The United States
will take administrative action to prevent abuse of the privileges estab-
lished by this article, cooperating with local authorities as necessary.
Article XV - V.T i re 1 e s s and Cable . No radio or cable stations for
non-military use will be established in the leased area unless consented
to by the local government. Questions regarding power, frequency and
control of electronic radiations "shall be settled by mutual arrangement."
Article XVI - Po st a 1 Fa
c
i lit i e s . United States post offices may be
established in the leased areas for use by authorized persons stationed
therein, but only for domestic mail within the United States postal system.
Article XVII - Taxation, Persons stationed in the leased areas shall
be liable for local income tax only on income derived from the local terri-
tory. They shall not be required to pay poll or other taxes for owning
or using property located within the leased area or outside the local terri-
tory. Profits of construction or maintenance contracts for the bases shall
not be subject to local taxes, nor will local licenses be required for
the performance of such contract work.
Article XVIII - Bus i n es se s ^and_^Profess ions. Consent of the local
authorities is required before any businesses other than exchanges and
such limited clientele institutions may be established in the leased area.
Professional services performed in the leased area shall be available only
to the United States government and its personnel assigned to those areas.
Article XIX - Forces Outside Teased Areas, If United States forces
183, Executive Agjrecmonj^Sejries , No . 235 (Base Lease Agreement), p. 8.
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are stationed outside the leased areas under separate arrangements with
Britain or the local government, their status, rights and privileges
shall be the same as those of forces stationed in the leased areas, but
no such agreement will obligate the United States to maintain forces out-
side the leased areas.





vith the local authorities, the United States shall have the right to
exercise the same powers as the local and British governments with regard
to entering private property near the leased areas for inspection and
for acting to protect health and improve sanitary conditions, subject only
to an obligation to provide just compensation to private owners.
Article XXI - Abandonment, The United States nay abandon without
obligation and at any time, all or part of the leased areas, but shall give
Britain at least one yecr f s notice of its intent to do so. No abandonment
can occur except through the issue and expiration of notice.
Article XXII - Remo;yal of I mprovemen t^s , During the life of the lease
and for a reasonable period thereafter, the United States may remove any
improvements it caused to be placed in the leased areas.
Article XXIII - Rights Kot to be Assigned. The United States agrees
not to pass any part of the leased property or its powers therein to a
third party.
Article XXIV - Possession, Leases similar to the samples in Annex II
will be executed as soon as possible after this agreement is signed. All
rights under this agreement and those leases (including possession of areas
not already transferred) will be effective from the date of signing of
those leases. Pending signature of the leases, however, the United States
may exercise its powers a_d interim and take immediate possession of the
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arcas whose location has been fully determined. Occupants of leased
areas shall be given due notice to vacate and allowed time to relocate
before eviction. These provisions shall not apply to the Bahamas until
agreement has been reached on the location of the area to be leased.
Article XXV - Reservations, All rights to minerals, antiquities,
and treasure trove in the leased areas are reserved to the local people
and their government, but these rights shall not be assigned to third
parties or exercised inside the leased areas except as agreed to by the
United States, The United States will permit the local fishing industry
to use the waters of the leased areas so long as such use does not inter-
fere with military operations. The United States will strive to avoid in-
jury to the local fisheries.
Article XXVI - Special Provisions for Individual Terri tories , The
provisions listed in Annex III shall apply to the respective territories.
Article XXVII - Supplementary Leases , The United States has the
right to acquire, by supplementary lease for the remaining life of the
basic lease, additional areas needed for the use and protection of the
bases. Such supplementary leases shall be entered into by mutual agree-
ment, on terms similar to those in this agreement and acceptable to both
parties.
Article XXVI II - Modificat i on of This_Agreement. The United States
and Britain "agree to give sympathetic consideration" to any proposals made
after "a reasonable time," looking to a review of this agreement "to deter-
mine whether modifications in the light of experience are necessary or
desirable," with any modification being made by mutual consent.
Article XXIX - (Untitled), The United States and the local governments
184. Executive Agreement Series, No. 235 (Base Lease Agreement), p. 12.
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vill cooperate to give full effect to the provisions of this agreement.
During the life of the lease, local laws which would impair or prejudice
any rights or power assigned to the United States by this lease, are in-
applicable within the leased area unless agreed to by the United States.
Article X>C< - Interpretat ion
.
(This article fixes the meaning of
the terms Lease, Leased Areas, Base, Territory, United States Authorities
and Forces, and British Subject.)
Annex I consisted of a copy of the notes exchanged on September 2,
1940. Annex II was composed of sample leases for each of the territories.
Each lease was drafted to conform with the legal requirements of the
territory, and each contained a schedule of metes and bounds of the areas
to be leased as they were known on Karch 27, 19A1.
Annex III was a list of the special provisions applicable to each
base-site territory. The number of provisions for each territory and
examples of such provisions are as follows:
Bermuda (5): in the application of Article I of the agreement, the
United States may defend but not close the channel through Castle Roads
to the high seas.
Jamaica (1): the United States may restore the old Royal Navy station
at Port Royal, making its facilities available for joint use by the United
States and British forces.
St. Lucia (1): the United States will maintain and keep open to
traffic existing highways through the leased areas or construct substi-
tute roads outside the leased areas.
Antigua (1): the owner of the High Point estate may continue lifetime




Trinidad (8): The United States has the right to develop a vater
supply system in the watershed of the Aripo River. Also, it "will
afford access" by road to the 1-Iacqueripe Bay bathing beach area for local
officials and residents, "subject only to such restrictions as are de-
rcanded by military necessity and proper police control. ,!l-OJ
British Guiana (2): the United States will not obstruct navigation
by its use of the Demerara and Esseouibo Rivers.
There were no special provisions for Newfoundland or for the Bahamas.
The first pair of notes which accompanied the Base lease Agreement
established an understanding on the subject of censorship. By this
exchange, it was agreed that only the United States could censor mail
within the United States postal system. Within the leased areas, when
Britain was p.t war the United States would arrange for examination of
non-official mail dispatched to and from leased areas. Use of United
States post offices would be limited to specified United States personnel,
and the United States agreed to deliver to local authorities on request
any mail which examination disclosed to have been placed in the system by
unauthorized persons. Britain agreed to establish a similar arrangement
to protect the security of the leased areas at any tine when the United
States was at war and Britain was neutral. Each country agreed to cooperate
to prevent its mail system from being used to the detriment of the security
of the other, and both agreed th?.t official mail would never be examined.*"'
The second set of notes clarified the position of Newfoundland, whose
185. Executive Agreemen t Scries , No . 235 (Base Lease Agreement), p. 39.
186. There is some doubt that the United States government had legal
authority to examine the mails. The War Department justified it
as "an administrative matter." Conn, ct al., Guarding the U.S. ,
p. 372.
187. Executive Agreement Series, No. 235 (Base Lease Agreement), pp. 41-43.
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status as a self-governing dominion had been suspended in 1934. It
was agreed that when Newfoundland returned to its earlier status, the
phrase "Government of the United Kingdom" would be construed to mean the
Government of Newfoundland whenever it was used in a provision of the
Base Lease Agreement applicable to Newfoundland. 1 °
The protocol on the defense of Newfoundland recognized that Newfound-
land's defenses were an integral part of Canadian defenses, and that
Canada had already accepted certain defense responsibilities in Newfound-
land. It was therefore agreed that : (a) when the United States used its
powers under the Base Lease Agreement in Newfoundland, Canadian interests
would be respected; (b) nothing in the Base Lease Agreement would affect
defense arrangements already established under the guidance of the Per-
manent Joint Board on Defense; and (c) the governments of Canada and New-
foundland would have the right to participate in all consultations con-
cerning the defense of Newfoundland held under provisions of the Base Lease
Agreement.
Several points about the contents of the Base Lease Agreement are
worthy of note. The provisions for supplementary leases and for modifica-
tion of the agreement were included to give the document sufficient flexi-
bility to last through its 99-year life; there was little anticipation that
supplementary leases would be required in the near future or that particu-
lar provisions would require changes. L Had these provisions been omitted,
the multitude of unexpected changes in and supplements to the leased areas
which were arranged during the course of the war would have been impossible
and development of the bases would have been severely constricted.
T5F^ Executive .A-reeiient Series
,
No. 235 (Base Lease Agreement), pp. 40-41.
189. Interviews with Charles Fahy, April 6, 1966, and General Harry Nalony,
April 7, 1966. Theodore Achilles differed, saying that the agreement
was tailored primarily to last through the war, Interview, April 6, 1966.
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The jurisdiction article of the Base Lease Agreement was a notable
innovation; it was the first step in the development of contemporary
status~of-forces agreements. Contrary to historic precedents, the Base
Lease Agreement of Karch 27, 1941, was "a lease of specific privileges as
distinguished from a cession of territory in the disguise of a nominal
lease. "190 It broke with tradition in allowing local authorities to
exercise certain types of jurisdiction within the leased areas (especially
if the areas were not actually occupied) and by not exempting United
States personnel from all local laws and jurisdiction. The concept of
concurrent jurisdiction by United States courts-martial and local courts
was a distinct departure from the traditional pattern of total immunity
191based on the Schooner Exchange Case,
In reporting that the Base Lease Agreement had been signed, Ambas-
sador Winant summarized the significance of the agreement and the exhaus-
tiveness of the negotiations as follows:
The Base Lease Agreement has boon signed, I think it
contains everything we need to use these bases effectively.
190. George Stambuk, American Military Forces Abroad; Their Impact on the
Western Stpte^Sy_stem (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963),
p. 29*. .
191. Ibid ,, p, 28, and Archibald Kind, "Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign
Armed Forces," American Journal of_ International Lav; , October 1942,
(Vol, 36), pp, 554-555, See also Schooncr^FiXclvtnrre v. KcF
a
dd en and
Others, 7 Cranch 116-147 (1812). Mr. Charles Fahy, a member of the
Base Lease Commission and now a Circuit Court Justice, agrees with
this interpretation of the jurisdiction clause. Ke was quick to
point out, however, that the United States would not have accepted
a similar arrangement with any other nation in 1941, The innova-
tional aspects of the jurisdiction clause were possible only b2cause
of the fundamental similarity of the United States and British
judicial systems and concepts. If the agreement had been with any
other state, Mr. Fahy is quite certain that full exemption from juris-
diction, as in the traditional "Schooner /Exchange" situation, would
have been demanded. Interview, April 6, 1966,
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The rights and powers it convoys are far-reaching,
probably more far-reaching than any the British Government
has ever given anyone over British territory before. They
are not used to giving such concessions and on certain
points they have fought every inch of the way. While they
have intended all along to give us everything we really
needed - they could do no less and had no desire to do
less - it was a real struggle for them to break habits of
300 years. 192
Looking to the future, the Ambassador continued with some words of
advice. Referring to the spirit of mutual assistance which was embodied
in the original exchange of notes, he said:
It is important that the agreement be carried out in
that spirit. The Colonies have been lightly touched by the
war, their point of view is local and their way of life will
be greatly changed by the bases. In the main the changes
will benefit them but it may take them some time to find it
out
. . .
The character of the men in command of the bases is
of tremendous importance, especially in the beginning. If
they are the right kind and ready to carry out our part of
the agreement in a friendly and understanding spirit they
.^^
can do much to inaugurate 99 years of good neighborliness.
The success with which the Ambassador's injunction was carried out
will be reflected in the following chapter where the history of the
various bases is recounted.
192. Foreign Relations, 1941 , Vol. Ill, p. 84 (telegram, U.S. Embassy in





History of the leased Bases, 1940-1964
The mission of the bases acquired from Britain changed during the
war in response to changes in the nature or magnitude of the threat con-
fronting the United Scates. From the exchange of notes in September,
1940 until January, 1941, the bases were viewed as a defensive chain:
they were a barrier against any westward spread of the European war.
The base garrisons were planned to support the forces operating from the
bases, to defend the bases themselves, and to deny any use of the base-
sites to hostile powers. Their use as an embarkation point for offensive
forces or as a base for offensive actions was strictly a secondary func-
tion.
By January, 1941, however, there was a growing belief that Britain
would survive and that German forces would be contained on the continent
of Europe. The bases were still envisioned as a defensive chain, but
against a less imminent threat. In the early months of 1941 there were
no plans to man the bases until the following July when a large part of
the construction work, including most of the housing, would have been com-
pleted. The Army was reluctant to send forces to the bases because it
was short of trained men and ammunition. Dispersal of available forces
also would have hampered the ti*aining of the much larger forces which were
expected to become necessary in the future.
In late torch, however, the Chief of Naval Operations thought it
1. Stetson Conn, Rose Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, Guarding the United





might be necessary to wage an undeclared war to keep the Atlantic sea
lanes open, since German surface raiders and submarines bad begun to
take a significant toll in the battle of the North Atlantic. There was
still a possibility that Britain would be defeated and that Germany
would occupy Morocco and Dakar and use them as a base for operations in
South America, * Admiral Stark discussed these potential developments with
the President and the result was a decision to conduct convoy operations
in the western Atlantic and to transfer several heavy ships from the
Pacific fleet to the Atlantic fleet. The conditions which produced these
decisions also led the President to fear for the safety of the newly-
acquired Atlantic bases. He was particularly concerned for those most
exposed and most valuable to the United States: Bermuda, Trinidad and
Newfoundland. 3
On April 7, 1941, the President directed the Secretary of War to
reinforce the small garrison which had been sent to Newfoundland in Janu-
ary and to establish forces at Bermuda and Trinidad at once. The bases
were not ready to receive operational forces, but Britain quickly agreed
to the temporary stationing of forces outside the leased areas and the
reinforcement and garrisoning was completed by mid-Jay.
Development of the remaining bases generally followed the plans laid
out by the Joint Planning Committee, m\M\\ occupation occurring in the
late summer of 1941, The role of the Newfoundland base was expanded in
2
.
The War Reports of General of the_ Army Goor<?e_C
i
. Karshnn. ,„,Chief_of
Staff , General of the Arm^H.^H. Arnold , Commanain g Genera 1 , Army Air
Forces y Fl eet Adm i ra l Ern est J . Kirr-'.._ Corji^nder-Jii-Cpief , Uni'^ec^ Sta t es
F leet and Chi ef
^
jof Naval _0oera t ions (Ihiladelphia ; J. B. Lippincott
Company, 1947), p. 71. Cited hereafter as \ Jar _Rcports.
3, Conn, et al
.
, Guard i ng_Jt he_ U . S
. , pp. 337-388.
U * Ibid., pp. 388, 389.
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late 1961 when it was decided to establish a naval operating base at
5
Argentia, rather than just an air statio.i In addition, the Air Corps
Ferrying Command was established in June, 1941, and its North Atlantic
ferry route crossed Newfoundland. The formal mission of the Newfoundland
base complex was not changed thereby, but its actual tasks were expanded
to include the protection of transport operations and the security of
the feiry route. The only other base to experience significant changes
in its mission or role early in the war was the one at Jamaica. Plans
for that base were scaled down considerably in late 1940 and early 1941
when it was concluded that the focus of warfate in the Caribbean would
be along its eastern edge, making Jamaica too remote for its previously
contemplated role of supply and troop-reserve center.
Although plans for some of the bases had been revised, their primary
roles as defensive establishments had not been changed. The Army garrisons
were only large enough to defend the United States naval and air facilities,
and the naval and air forces were only sufficient to conduct defensive
operations intended to keep hostile forces out of the Caribbean and away
from the east coast of the United States. The only orders authorizing
combat or offensive operations (other than self-defense) had been issued
on Kay 12, 1961. They authorized the forces to resist any attack or
threat of attack against any of the base-site territories, using all the
p
means available. Even this was actually a defensive order because it
required a determination that specific forces were hostile and were a
5. U.S., Navy Department, Building-: the Navy's Eases _ in_World War II,
Vol. II, p. 47.
6. Conn, et a 1
.
, Guardin- t_he__U,_S. , p. 392.
7. Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewa r Plans^and j^j^pjvrat_i ons
,
p. 483.
8. Ibid., p. 333; Conn, et alM Guarding the U .S.. p. 108.
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threat to the area. The only new feature was that the authorization
applied to hostile acts aimed at any part of the base-site colony, rather
than just the leased areas. The United States thus assumed voluntarily
a responsibility for local and colonial defense which it had steadfastly
refused to accept as an obligation during the London negotiations. The
situation with respect to defensive operations was resolved on September 11,
1941, by the Presidents "shoot on sight" order: in areas considered es-
sential to United States defense, German or other Axis ships, submarines,
or aircraft would be presumed to have hostile intentions and would be met
with force.
Shortly after the United States entered the war, the Army General
Headquarters drew up basic strategic plans for the defense of the United
States and the preparations for subsequent offensive operations. *^ In the
Atlantic, the first phase of the strategic plan was to secure the conti-
nent's outward defenses on a line from Newfoundland to Bermuda to 3razil.
In this phase, first priority was assigned to the reinforcement of Carib-
bean defenses and the establishment of troops at the southern extremity in
Brazil. Second priority went to the reinforcement of Newfoundland and
Bermuda (followed by Greenland and Iceland). While phase one of this
strategy thus had a significant impact on plans for the bases in British
possessions, phase two did not. The second phase was to consist of the
formation, within the Continental United States, of a mobile reserve force
which could be deployed to any point on the defense perimeter. Plans for
9. U.S., State Department Bulletin, September 13, 1941 (Vol. 5, No. 116),
pp. 195-197; also see Richard W # Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign
Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), pp. 577-579 for a discussion
of this order in the context of other war developments.




the third phase had only slight bearing on the bases. They envisaged
the preparation of major combat forces for deployment in offensive war-
fare, hopefully outside the defense perimeter. In this phase of the var
the bases in British possessions would function as way- stations for the
movement and support of the overseas forces.
Plans for the bases were changed significantly early in 1942. The
planned size of most of the bases was increased and the type of construc-
tion was changed. By this time most of the bases already had operational
airfields, housing, hospitals and storage facilities which used temporary
buildings, frame and sheet -metal structures which were adequate for exist-
ing garrisons, but which were not expected to have a very long period of
usable life. Replacing these temporary facilities with permanent ones
would have increased the strength of the bases very little, if at all, but
it would have had several adverse effects. It would have used shipping for
which there were other urgent demands, required the continued presence
overseas of many civilians employed by contractors, and diverted human re-
sources, material and equipment from other essential development projects.
It was decided therefore in April, 1942, to defer all permanent construc-
tion unless the replacement of temporary facilities would materially en-
hance the immediate strength of the base. *
The impact of this decision differed at the various bases. St. Lucia,
Antigua, British Guiana and the Bahamas had few permanent facilities planned.
In Newfoundland, service facilities such as dependents* housing, theaters
and clubs were cancelled or shifted to temporary structures, while additional











there was little temporary construction because the- local stone supply
made the construction of semi -permanent and permanent structures as easy
and cheap as temporary facilities. Belligerency and the decision to
defer pennanent construction affected Bermuda primarily by changing the
order in i.-hich facilities were developed. Runways, hangars, and essential
housing were built before recreation buildings were started, *•*-
During 1943 the reversal of the tides of war beegme clear. The war
in the Atlantic and in the European theater was not over, but it was being
won by the Allies. The United States no longer faced such a serious
threat on its eastward front. There was little chance that Britain would
be defeated, and Germany had been thwarted in its African-South American
ambitions. In such circumstances, the maintenance of large air and ground
forces in the North Atlantic and the Caribbean was no longer justified.
The United States began to cancel the further development of many bases
1 ^
and to withdraw garrisons for deployment to areas of greater threat.
In Newfoundland this took the form of a 50 per cent reduction in. the size
of the garrison. From a mid-June high of over 10,000 men, the United
States garrison had been cut to about 5,000 by December 31, 1943.
Throughout the Caribbean, military strength was reduced as base functions
were consolidated and outlying activities were closed or merged with ad-
jacent facilities. A tentative ceiling of a 110,000 man Army garrison in
the Caribbean had been set in October 1942, but the actual force exceeded
that level by some 9,000 men at the end of that year. Thereafter, how-
ever, the size of the garrison declined. In April 1943, the Caribbean
12. Conn, et_a 1_. , Guarding the U.S., p. 538.
13. War Reports, p. 71,
14. Col. Stanley W. Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States
and Canada, 1939-1945, p. 17~5.
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was shifted from Category D defensive status (exposed to major attack)
to Category 3 (only minor attacks likely, defenses relaxed considerably)
and by the end of June the garrison had been reduced to 110,000 men.
This reduction of strength in the Caribbean was delayed by two
factors. The first was the resurgence of the Martinique problem in
March 1943. Admiral Robert was suspected of preparing to violate his
agreement to immobilize his French naval forces. The United States be-
gan to assemble a force to invade I-kirtinique. This problem ended in
June 1943 when Admiral Robert's forces were surrendered to the Free
French, enabling the partially assembled invasion force to be broken up
and redeployed. 1 The second factor slowing the reduction of the Carib-
bean garrison was the general replacement of "continental" troops by
Puerto Ricans after January 1943, causing temporary double-manning in
many areas, Nevertheless, by the end of 1943 the Caribbean garrison had
been cut to 91,000 men. 17
As the Allies came closer to victory in the Atlantic-European war,
the decline cf the bases continued. Smaller ones, such as the one in the
Bahamas, were inactivated; larger bases, such as those at Trinidad and
Newfoundland, assumed larger roles by absorbing the functions of near-by
bases and by becoming supporting bases for operations in Europe, Following
the end of hostilities in Europe, Newfoundland and Trinidad also served as
major terminals and stopping points in the air transport of forces from
the European theater to the United States.
Against this background of changing threats and changing missions,
15. Conn, et a l.» Guarding the U.S., p. 433.
16 « Ibid., pp. 439-440.
17. Ibid., pp. 440-441.
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the development of the bases and their wartime functions can be con-
sidered in slightly more specific terms. As has been noted, the United
States experienced difficulty gaining access to some of the bases to
1
8
eonduct surveys and- start construction. *~ Whereas construction had ac-
tually been started in Newfoundland in the last week of 1940, it was
January 1941 before the Navy received permission to enter and start work
at the other sites. 1 The situation in Bermuda was especially difficult.
In addition to the local government's demonstration of its power to ob-
struct base development by refusing access, the local residents vere
still dissatisfied with the size and nature cf the projected bases at the
northeast end of the island. Although the British government approved
the United States proposal to establish a permanent naval air station on
Morgan's and Tucker's Islands on January 4, the adamant opposition of the
Bermudians caused Britain to retreat a bit. On January 21, Britain ad-
vised the United States that its approval of the Bermuda sites was only
an agreement "in principle" and that it was urging the Governor and
20
Assembly in Bermuda to accept the proposals. Bermuda yielded only after
having won its case for a greater local participation in the further base
negotiations.
Aside from the Bahamas, where the site selection was not completed
until June, 1941, work began at all the base sites in January 1941. In
most cases, however, this work was started under informal or temporary
agreements because the disputes ever customs, taxes, wage rates, and
18. Soe pp. 150-153 above.
19. U.S. Navy, Building the Navy's Bases . Vol. II, pp. 22-23.
20 * Foreign Relation s. 1941, Vol. Ill, p. 60 (telegram, State Dept. to
U.S. Embassy in I one on, No. 175, Jan. 17, 1941) and p. 6? (telegram,




other leasing details had yet to be resolved.
The size and location of the base sites underwent many changes during
the course of base development. The nature and extent of the changes
varied, but there were three general reasons for changing the sites. The
first was the discovery by the teams conducting detailed surveys that sev-
eral of the sites selected by the Greenslade Board were unsuited for their
intended use. It was found that the proposed seaplane base in British
Guiana was on a malaria-infested tract subjected to semi-annual flooding of
serious proportions. At Trinidad, the survey revealed that the site se-
lected for an auxiliary airfield near Longdenville was in the middle of the
23take-off zone for the Royal Air Force training field at Edinburgh. The
irost drastic changes were made at Jamaica. Aside fro;., the uncertainty re-
garding the strategic role which would or could be assignee1 to the Jamaican
base, the surveys revealed serious problems at the sites selected by the
Greenslade Board. The proposed main base site east of Galleon Harbor was
found to be infested by mosquitos and malaria, subject to frequent flood-
ing (up to seven feet deep at the main airfield site), and impaired by a
serious sanitation hazard: it was bisected by the Salt River, into which
was dumped the sewage from Spanish Town and its adjoining leper colony. '
As a result of these conditions, it was decided to interchange the pro-
posed main and auxiliary base sites. This required changes in the size
of both sites. With the main base moved out of an area which the
21. U.S. Navy, Building the Isavy ? s Basos, Vol. II, p. 22.
22. Memorandum in "British Guiana, General letters, Correspondence, etc."
file, Navy Department Archives.
23. (Edward H. Ross) "History of Antilles Department Real Estate: Part I-
99-Year Lease Bases," p. 55. Cited hereafter as "Antilles Dept, Real
Estate - Part I,"
26. Ibid., pp. 23-26.
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Greenslade Board apparently suspected of being malarial, there was no
longer any need to carry out the board's recommendation that rost of the
base's garrison be quartered in a healthier area outside the main base.
The site proposed for a hospital and recreation area was found to be in-
accessible, so it was changed from its original area north of Mandeville
to a better and cheaper site in Glassonby, ten miles south of Mandeville. ^
About all that remained of the areas recommended by the Greenslade Board
vere the naval air station, the fleet anchorage and Portland Ridge.
The second main reason for changing the proposed base sites was the
need for additional areas to hold added facilities. It was necessary to
acquire such additional areas after it was decided to establish Air Warn-
ing Stations and a radio range near almost every base. In Newfoundland,
an additional airfield site in the southwest part of the island near
Stephenville was acquired to service short-range aircraft moving across
the Atlantic. 26
The third reason for site changes was an inability to decide which
site was bsst. In the case of St, Lucia, there was some doubt that
weather and water conditions at Gros Islet Bay were suitable for seaplane
use. A seaplane tender and six planes were assigned to the area on a
trial basis, and the final decision to establish the St, Lucia Air Station
at Gros Islet Bay was not made until their experience had confirmed the
suitability of the site. The most serious case of uncertainty regarding
25. "Antilles Dept. Real Estate - Part I," p. 33.
26. M U,S, Army Bases, Newfoundland: Ft. Repperrell, Ft. McAndrew, Harmon
Field, Auxiliary Installations," (an unpublished historical monograph
prepared by North Atlantic Division, [Army Service Forces, Corps of
Engineers") : New York, January, 1946), p. IX-2; filed at the Office of
the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Cited here-
after as "Army Bases, Newfoundland."
27. "Report of Operating Conditions at Gros Islet Bay, St, Lucia," from
Commander, Destroyer Squadron Two to Chief of Naval Operations,
November 18, 1940. Navy Department Archives.
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the best location occurred in the selection of the Bahamas site.
Abraham Bay in Mayaguana had been tentatively selected as the site for
an air station, with an army airfield proposed for an undetermined loca-
tion en t'i3 same island. In December, 1940, however, the President per-
sonally directed that any plans for Mayaguana be suspended. ^8 xhe Presi-
dent had inspected the site during a cruise and found that Abraham Bay
offfered inadequate protection from the weather. A survey by the Coast
and Geodetic Survey Ship Hydrographer confirmed the President's opinion
and the existence of all the other disadvantageous features which had
been reported by the Marine Corps engineers in October 1940.™ in
February 1941, the Navy Hydrographic Office recommended that a tender and
some seaplanes be sent to Mayaguana on a trial basis before a final de-
cision was made; but in June 1941, the plans for Mayaguana were abandoned
and Great Exuma was recommended as the Bahamas site. This was approved
by the President in August and lease negotiations and construction began
30
soon afterward.
In addition to the sites obtained under the 99-year leases, the
United States also acquired rights to many other areas under short-term
leases. These leases were, in most cases, either for a fixed period of
years (four, five and seven year leases were common) or for the duration
of the war plus six months. In British Guiana a short term lease was
executed for a stone quarry 75 miles up the Demarara River from the Army
28. Doc. 331 4/6: message, President to State Dept., Dec. 12, 1940.
29. Memorandum from Navy Hydrographic Office to Rear Admiral Greenslade,
Feb. 28, 1941, forward i rig excerpts of ivnyaguana survey report. Navy
Department Archives. Also see pp. 135-136 above.
30. "The Guantanimo Sector, Caribbean Sea Frontier and the U.S. Naval
Operating B'se, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba," volume II of "U.S. Navy,
Caribbean Sea Frontier Caribbean Cor..:. and s," (an unpublished series
in the Navy Department Administrative History collection, Navy De-
partment Library), pp. 317, 321. Cited hereafter as "Navy Admin.
History, C.S.F. vol. II."

-230-
ba.se at Hyde Part'.. The United States obtained ir.ost of its construction
material (gravel, crushed stone and cut blocks) for the British Guiana
31bases under this lease. Short term leases were also vised to acquire
sites needed for tactical reasons. At Bermuda, existing seaplane facili-
ties on Darrell Island were leased to permit operations to begin while
the Bermuda Naval Air Station was being constructed. ^2 j n Trinidad,
short term leases were used to acquire sites for the base headquarters in
Fort of Spain, a motor pool, the United States Engineers office, and a
section of waterfront which was later filled and developed into additional
33
wharfage space. Short term leases were also used to acquire service
facilities. In Newfoundland such leases covered Military Police head-
quarters, the first troop cantonment and construct iox'i areas ashore, and
the berthing space for the steamer Edmund
_3JU_A 1exand er while it served as
a floating barracks.
The actual leases for the areas acquired for 99-years were executed,
for the most part, in April, May and June 1941. The leases were drawn
up following the patterns contained in Annex II to the Base Lease Agree-
ment of March 27, 1941. In some cases the final metes and bounds were
included, but in others they were left for insertion at a later date. In
several cases, signing of the leases was delayed due to site changes, dis-
putes over compensation, and a reluctance to grant easements. In other
cases, such as British Guiana, Newfoundland and Trinidad, supplementary
leases were also executed and the entire lease was later redrawn to in-
corporate the modifications.-"
31. "Antilles Dept. Real Estate - Part I," p. 63.
32. U.S. Navy, Build ing; the Navy's Bases, Vol. II, p. 31.
33. "Antilles Dept. Real Estate - Part I," p. 58.
34. "Army Bases, Newfoundland," p. IX-4, See p. 263 below.
35. Ibid., pp. IX-2 and IX-3; "Antilles Dept. Real Estate - Part I," pp. 71-
72; U.S. Navy, Building t he Navy's Ba ses, Vol. II, pp. 23, 29.
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In at least one case - Jamaica - no lease was signed until after
the war. Failure to sign a lease was due to the constant changing of
United States plans for the Jamaican bases, Jamaican objections to cer-
tain United States proposals and the confused status of landholdings in
several areas. Fortunately, difficulties with respect to formal leases
were not allowed to interfere with the practical application of the Base
Lease Agreement in Jamaica or elsewhere. Construction and use of the
bases proceeded just as if a formal lease had been signed.
The organization and management of the construction effort differed
slightly between the naval bases and the army bases and airfields. Pur-
suant to a request by the Army War Plans Division, the Chief of Staff
assigned overall supervision of the Army construction program to that
37division in order to prevent duplication of effort and to expedite work.
Under the War Plans Division, construction was managed by the Corps of
Engineers. Initially, construction of the Army bases was accomplished
by local labor under the direct supervision of local Engineer offices at
the base sites. Kost of the work accomplished in this fashion was ground
clearance and the erection of temporary quarters for contractor personnel.
Later, contracts were placed with civilian construction companies which
36. "Antilles Dept. Real Estate - Part I," pp. 66-68 indicates that no
lease had been signed by July 1946 but that agreement had been
reached and signing was anticipated before the end of 1946. This
situation is confirmed by "Construction of Individual Bases," volume
II of "Construction and Real Estate Activities in the Caribbean De-
fense Command" (an unpublished manuscript history series prepared by
the Historical Section, Caribbean Defense Command, 1946), p. 237;
filed at the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army. (Cited hereafter as "Construction and Real Estate,
Caribbean,") I have found no evidence to indicate whether or not the
lease was ever signed. The bases were closed soon after the war and
the areas subsequently fell under the provisions of the Defense Areas
agreement with The West Indies. See pp. 305 and 308 below.
37. Conn, et al
.
, Guarding the U.S., p. 359.
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then assured responsibility for all construction work.
The Navy assigned responsibility for supervising construction to the
Bureau of Yards and Docks. This bureau did not supervise any preliminary
construction. Civilian contractors did all the work. The other major
difference in the Navy's construction program occurred in the final
phases of construction. By then the Seabees (Construction 3attalions)
had been organized and they performed much of the later work at the naval
bases.40
When the results of the surveys which had been conducted in late 1940
and early 1941 were compiled, they were used to produce firm plans for
the bases. Both the Army and the Navy negotiated construction contracts
as soon as these plans were completed. Because the sites were extremely
remote and building conditions were uncertain, construction was accom-
plished under "cost-plus-fixed-fee" contracts. The government thus ab-
sorbed most of the contractor's risk, making the contracts more attractive
to prospective builders. The contracts were placed by negotiation, not
by competitive bidding. Contracts for the construction of all but the
Jamaica base had been placed by the end of February 1941. l The contract
for Jamaica was signed in Kay 1941, but relations between the government
and the contractor, poor from the start, grew intolerable. The contract
was terminated on grounds of waste and inefficiency in May 1942 and con-
struction was completed by another contractor.
38. Conn, et al. , Guarding the U.S. , p. 378 ; "Army Bases, Newfoundland,"
pp. IV-1, IV-2; "Construction and Real Estate, Caribbean," pp. 262-
267, 280.
39. U.S. Navy, Building the Navy's Bases , Vol. II, pp. 32, 47, 53.
40. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 33, 49, 55.
41. "Construction and Real Estate, Caribbean," pp. 178, 263, 280; U.S.
Navy, Build ing the Navy's Bases , 7ol. II, p. 34, Navy construction
at Argentia had begun in December 1940 as a supplementary item on the
contract for the construction of the Naval Air Station, Quonset Point,
Rhode Island. Bui Id ing^the Navy's Bases , Vol. II, p. 47.
42. "Construction and Real Estate, Caribbean," pp. 233-239.
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Construction continued on a contract basis until most of the work had
been completed. In some cases, the contractors actually completed all
the work and left the area before the contracts ended. J In other cases,
the deferral of permanent construction had reduced the remaining work.
Between March (Newfoundland Army Bases) and October 1943 (Trinidad) the
construction contracts were terminated for the convenience of the govern-
ment. ^ All remaining work was accomplished by the base public works or
engineer departments at the Army bases and by Seabees at the Navy bases.
In the initial stages of construction, two projects had a definite
priority, housing and airfields. At almost every base, the first order
of work was the erection of temporary housing for construction workers.
Once the contractor and his employees arrived, their first tasks included
the building of quarters so that troop garrisons could move in. On an
equal priority with housing was the construction of airfields so that
flight operations could start as soon as possible. Early commencement
of flight operations was desired because long and. short range surveillance
was a function assigned to every base and an essential component of the
defense system. Opening of the airfields also made rapid communications
and reinforcement possible. Two techniques were used to make airfields
operational at an early date. The first, employed at the outlying or
supporting airfields in St. Lucia, Antigua and British Guiana, consisted
63. The Army work at St. Lucia was completed on November 15, 1942.
"Construction and Real Estate, Caribbean, " p. 280. At Antigua, the
Army work was completed and the contractor departed on November I,
1942. Ibid.
, p. 274. The Naval Air Station, Antigua, was completed
in June 1942. U.S. Navy, Bui lding the Navy's Bases, Vol. II, p. 35.
44. "Construction and Real Estate, Caribbean," pp. 179, 239, 262;
Dziuban, Mi litary
.
Relations Between the U.S. and Canada
, p. 168.
45.' Conn, et al .. Guarding the U.S. , pp. 379 ff.
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of a temporary runway made with easily laid asphalt materials. The
permanent runways were built adjacent to this temporary strip, which
then became an apron, taxi-way or parking area. The second technique
was used at Bermuda where space was scarce. Short permanent runways
were built first, and as the shallow waters of Castle Harbour were filled
by dredging, the runways were gradually extended to their full length.
Newfoundland did not have such a pressing airfield problem. Newfound-
land Airport at Gander, one of the world* s largest airports, was avail-
able for use if needed. Pursuant to a recommendation of the Permanent
Joint Board on Defense, the United States also arranged to use Canadian
46
aircraft facilities at Gander.
The size of the base which the Army developed at each site was de-
termined mainly by the magnitude of the threat to the base area and the
extent to which the peacetime garrison could be expanded in an emergency. '
The principal threat to the bases was thought to be a raid by submarines,
small groups of aircraft, or fast surface ships. At each base, the
United States, British and local air and ground garrison had to be strong
enough to defend the base, the naval anchorage and the adjacent area
against such attacks. The inadequacy of local defense forces in most
colonies meant that United States forces had to supplement them to ensure
adquate general defense and the maintenance of internal communications.
Since performance of these tasks was required in addition to the essential
on-base or inside-the-leased-area defense activities, there was a pressure
to increase the planned United States garrisons. This was offset by taking
advantage of the other determinant of base size, the capacity to expand.
46. Dziuban, t-'ili tary Re lations Between the U .S . and Canad a, pp. 171-172.
67. Conn, et a 1
.




All the bases were planned for manning by a peacetime cadre force
using permanent facilities. Temporary facilities to handle an emergency
garrison several times the size of the peacetime force were planned.
Each base would therefore be manned by a minimum staff which could be
greatly enlarged on very short notice whenever the situation required it.
The naval bases were planned on the assumption that Newfoundland,
Bermuda, Trinidad, and, to a lesser extent, Jamaica, would be bases for
fleet operations. The others would serve as auxiliary stations from
which general scouting and surveillance operations could be conducted.
Developing the bases was a costly process. In September 1940, the
War Flans Division estimated that the Army's bases would cost $200
million, a figure which included a contingency fund for unexpected costs.
Although plans for Jamaica were drastically reduced and Trinidad's
planned ground garrison was cut back, the total estimated cost had risen
to over $260 million by December 27, 1941, and that included no contin-
gency fund. The final cost of the Army's bases has been set at $242,5
million, but this figure is not easily compared to the earlier estimates
because much of the non-essential or permanent construction included in
the estimated figure was deferred or cancelled after the United States
entered the war.^ The final cost is that of temporary construction,
whereas the estimates had contemplated permanent facilities. Unfor-
tunately, there are no equivalent data available on the estimated and
final costs of the naval bases.
The costliness of the bases can be attributed to three principal
factors. A considerable quantity of construction materials and supplies




was lost to submarine activities in the Caribbean. The contractors were
forced to pay very high wages, frequently 125 per cent of the United
States wage rate plus board and certain other expenses, to induce per-
sonnel to work at the bases under less-than-ideal conditions. Finally,
the contractors had to use overtime work at higher pay rates in order to
finish the projects on schedule after materials had arrived late and
weather had disrupted work schedules.
The bases and garrisons and their anticipated and actual costs are
summarized as follows:
Newfoundland . The Army's initial plan called for a 3,500 man gar-
rison at Fort Fepperrell, outside St. John's; 2,000 men at Fort McAndrew,
adjacent to the Navy base at Argentia; and a 250 man detachment at Harmon
Field, an emergency installation near Stephenville. The cost was estimated
at $28 million. The Air Corps planned to station a composite air group
of about 3,000 men at Gander Lake (Newfoundland Airport), a pursuit
squadron at the Argentia Naval Air Station, and airways (support) detach-
ments at St. John's Airport and Harmon Field.
In early 1942 these plans were expanded. Fort Fepperrell was to be
increased to handle 5,500 troops, Fort KcAndrew was expanded to a capacity
of 7,500, and Harmon Field was raised to the status of a permanent landing
field with a garrison of 2,800 men. 51 Harmon Field underwent further ex-
pansion in 1944 when it was being used by the Air Transport Command, The
49. Dziuban, Ki litary_ Relations Between the U.S. and Canada
, p. 168;
"Army Bases, Newfoundland," p. II-l.
50. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in
World War. II, Volume I: Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to
August 1942 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 156.
51. Dziuban, Military
_
Relation s Between the U.S. and Canada
, p. 168.
"Army Bases, Newfoundland," p. II-l lists the revised capacity of
Ft. Pepperrell as 8,500 men.
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final cost of the Army's Newfoundland bases (as of 1966) was
$62, 670, 513. 52
The Navy's initial plans included a site on the Argentia peninsula
for operating one squadron of patrol aircraft with both seaplane and land-
ing field facilities. This plan was soon expanded to include an air
station for one squadron of amphibious aircraft, space for one large or
two small seaplane tenders, and additional equipment and facilities to
handle two more amphibious squadrons and a carrier air group. 5^ The
President suggested that still greater capacity be developed at once.
In early 1942 it was decided to expand Argentia into a naval operating
base with capacity to support major surface and submarine forces. Ulti-
mately, Argentia became a major base for convoy and convoy escort vessels.
The final cost of the naval complex at Argentia has been calculated as
$44, 912, 927. 56
52. "Army Bases, Newfoundland,' 1 p. V-4 ; Conn, et_al . , Guard ing t he_ U.S.,
p. 378. Dziuban, Military delations Between t he U.S. and Canada ,
p. 168, places the"costs at $60,313,200.
53. Letter, Under Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Secretary of
State, Dec. 7, 1940, listing the Navy's requirements for initial de-
velopment of bases. Navy Department Archives. Cited hereafter as
Letter to Secretary of State, Dec. 7, 1940.
54. Memorandum, Chief of Naval Operations to Chief, Bureau of Yards and
Docks and others, Jan. 5, 1941, outlining tentative program for the
development of bases acquired from Britain. Navy Department Archives.
Cited hereafter as CNO memo, Jan. 5, 1941.
55. Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval
Operations, from the President. Undated, but filed with CNO memo-
randum cited above. A comparison of the contents of these two
memoranda reveals that some of the President's comments are the
same as those made in the CNO memorandum which was addressed only
to CNO's subordinates, not to the President or the Secretary of the
Navy. There is thus a possibility that this Presidential memorandum
was prepared before Jan. 5, 1941, and refers to some earlier Secretary
of the Navy - Chief of Naval Operations lists of tentative base plans.
This does not alter the fact that the President wanted more rapid
development than the Navy proposed on Jan. 5, 1941.
56. U.S. Navy, Build ing the Navy's Bases . Vol. II, p. iii.
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Bermuda_ . The initial studies of the Joint Planning Committee pro-
duced a recommendation that Bermuda be manned by a reinforced infantry
division and a composite air wing.-*' Because the Air Corps did not have
enough tactical units to assign such a wing to Bermuda, the authorized
peacetime air garrison was soon reduced to a group headquarters and one
to
heavy bombardment squadron. In the April 1941 rush to develop the
Bermuda site more quickly, the planned installation of heavy coast
artillery, bombers and infantry troops was expanded. Implementation of
this plan was thwarted by the unreadiness of the Bermuda airfield and
the lack of housing at the leased sites, although the latter problem was
soon eased by leasing the vacant Castle Harbour Hotel, two miles across
the harbor from the base site. y The forces at Bermuda were thus ex-
panded, but more slowly than planned. The initial estimated cost of
the Army installation at Bermuda was $20.3 million. ^ With several ex-
pansions of the airfield and the consequent increase in dredging opera-
tions, the final costs approximated $40.6 million.
In August 1940 the Joint Planning Committee had proposed a naval
facility for six squadrons of patrol planes and one carrier air group at
57. Watson, Chi ef of Staff , pp. 478, 492.
58. Ibid ., p. 482; Craven and Cate, Army A.F. in W.W. II , Vol. I, p. 162.
59. Conn, et al ., Guarding the U.S ., p. 388.
60. "Historical Ponograph: Bermuda," (an unpublished manuscript prepared
by i\orth Atlantic Division ("Army Service Forces, Corps of Engineers^]:
New York, December 1945), p. II 1-2. (Cited hereafter as "Army Bases,
Bermuda.") This estimate, prepared by the Assistant Chief of Staff
on September 18, 1940 was increased to $23,689,100 plus the cost of
acquiring private property by the Chief of Engineers on September 25.
Ibid
., and Watson, Chi ef of Staff , p. 479.
61. Conn, et a l.. Guard ing the U.S. , p. 378. A more recent estimate which
probably includes the cost of postwar construction places the cost of
Kindley Field at $42 million, of which $9 million is attributed to the
cost of dredging. J. Wreford Watson, John Oliver, and Kiss C.H. Foggo,
A Geography of Bermuda (London: Collins, 1965), p. 123.
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Bermuda. The Navy 1 s own plans were for a somewhat smaller installa-
tion. In deciding to move the air station site from, Castle ilarbor to
the Great Sound and Morgan* s and Tucker's Islands, the Navy scaled its
63plans down to an air station to support one squadron of patrol seaplanes.
In January 1941, the Navy planned to build an air station for one operat-
ing squadron of patrol seaplanes and full facilities for two additional
squadrons and two small seaplane tenders. The Army was to be asked to
provide temporary quarters and intermittent support for a carrier air
group at its landing field. Future plans for 3erzr.uda included the assign-
ment of an additional squadron of seaplanes and improvement of the ap-
proaches and anchorages to permit support of aircraft carriers and light
naval forces.
The Bermuda Naval Air Station was eventually expanded and designated
a Naval Operating Base. This was due in large part to the insistent pres-
sure exerted by its first commander, Capt. Jules James, USN. He thought
Bermuda could and should be a major operating base for surface ships and
submarines as well as aircraft. -* When established, the Naval Operating
Base was augmented by a fuel depot, a supply depot, a submarine base and an
62. Joint Planning Committee report to the Secretary of War and the Secre-
tary of the Navy, "Base Sites and Facilities suitable for United
States Army and Navy Bases in certain British Possessions in the
Western Hemsiphere," August 2S, 1940; Watson, Chief of Staff, p. 482.
63. Letter to Secretary of State, Dec. 7, 1940; messages from Chief of
Naval Operations to Commander Biesemeier (member of the Base Lease
Commission) at London, Feb. I and 16, 1941; filed in "Bermuda: Corre-
spondence, Memoranda" file, Navy Department Archives.
64. CNO memo, Jan. 5, 1941.
65. "Commandant, N. 0. B. Bermuda," volume V of "Administrative History
of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet in world War II" (an unpublished series in
the Navy Department Administrative History collection, Navy Depart-
ment Library), p. 18. (Cited hereafter as "Navy Admin. History,
Atlantic Fleet, Vol. V.") Also see Ernest J. King and Walter Kuir




anti-air training center. Estimates of cost for the Bermuda naval com-
plex are not available, but the actual cost (as of 1946) has been set at
$36.9 million. 67
Bahamas. The Army's plans for the Bahamas were never very clear.
The Joint Planning Committee and the Gre_nslade Board had recommended the
establishment of an airfield and base with the capacity to support a rein-
forced infantry battalion and a composite air group which could be deployed
to the area if and when needed.
"
The rejection of Mayaguana as the Bahamas site was due in part to the
fact that the island had no area which could be easily developed into an
airfield. By the time Great Exuma was selected as the site for the Bananas
Naval Air Station, the Army had abandoned its plans for a base in the
69Bahamas. The Army planned to establish Air Warning Stations in the
Bahamas in late 19^1, but this too was abandoned when the Navy erected a
series of such stations in the same region. ° In 1944 the Army Air Trans-
port Command established a radio station and an air-sea rescue center at
Great Exuma as tenant activities at the Naval Air Station. Although the




68. JrC report of August 28, 1940; Greenslade Board Report - Bahamas;
Watson, Chief of Staff, pp. 478, 4S4.
69. The rejection of Mayaguana and subsequent selection of Great Exuma is
detailed in the following documents: letter from the Joint Planning
Committee to the Joint Board, April 27, 1941 ; letter from the Chief
of iJaval Operations to Commandant, Tenth Naval District, May 27, 1941;
memorandum from the President to the Secretaries of the War and Navy
Departments, May 23, 1941; and letter from Commander, Destroyer
Squadron 27 to Chief of Naval Operations, March 10, 1941, with en-
closed survey reports and endorsements; all of which are filed in
Navy Department Archives. Also see "The Relation of the Bahama
Islands to the Caribbean Theater in World War II, " (an unpublished
manuscript history prepared by the Historical Section, Caribbean De-
fense Command, undated), p. 14, filed at the Office of the Chief of
Military History, Department of the Army. Cited hereafter as
"Bahamas Manuscript ,
"
70. "Bahamas Manuscript," pp. 27-29.
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originally proposed base was expected to cost $2.4 million, the cost of
the final installation has been placed at $15,332.
The Navy's plans for a Bahamas facility included only a tender-
supported air station from which patrol seaplanes could be operated on
72
an intermittent basis. After the rejection of Kayaguana, a site near
George Town, Great Exuma, was selected and a small air station was estab-
lished. No cost data is available. ^
Jamaica , As noted in the discussion of the Greenslade Board's
survey, the Jamaica Army base was initially expected to be a major, multi-
purpose base for the central Caribbean composed of a garrison, an airfield
with bombardment and reconaissance squadrons, a hospital and a supply
center. As a result of changes in strategic planning and in the anticipated
role of Jamaica, these plans were cut back sharply. The main Army and Air
Corps installations were limited to Fort Simonds and Vernam Field. These
activities supported a heavy bombardment squadron and had facilities fcr
rapid expansion: permanent housing existed for only 500 men, but there
were utilities to handle 21,000 men on an emergency basio. Construction
of the Jamaica base was consistently behind schedule, partly because of
contractor difficulties and partly because the concurrent reduction of the
significance and mission of the base impaired the efficiency of the
71. "Construction and Real Estate, Caribbean," pp. 297-298, 301; Watson,
Chief of Staff, p. £79. Conn, et al. t Guarding t he U.S., p. 378,
places the cost of the Army and Air Force installations in the Bahamas
et $273,583. This figure probably includes an emergency landing field
on South Caicos Island, a radio station and quarters later erected on
Mayaguana, and miscellaneous facilities near Nassau Airport.
72. Letter to the Secretary of State, Dec. 7, 1940.
73. U.S. Navy, 3ui ldj.ng t he N avy' s Bases , Vol, II, p. iii does not include
the Great Exuma facility in its list of bases which cost more than
$10 million.
74. "Construction and Real Estate, Caribbean," pp. 172, 237-233.
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construction program. The initial estimated cost of the Jamaica Array
complex was $41.5 million, but the cost of the final installation was
only $17.9 million. 75
The naval facility proposed for Jamaica in December 1940 was the
same as that planned for the Bahamas, facilities for operating seaplanes
from a seaplane tender. Portland Bight was also proposed as a fleet
anchorage to augment the facilities and space available at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. In January 1941, the Navy simply planned to do preparatory
work for an air station, but not erect the buildings or establish a station
77
until some later date when its services became necessary. Aside from
the protected fleet anchorage, the Navy planned to have facilities to sup-
port two squadrons of tender-based seaplanes. The Jamaica Naval Air
Station was actually built as a subsidiary activity of the Naval Air Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In early 1942 it began to provide support for con-
voy escort aircraft as well as defensive patrol planes, but in 1943 its
mission and operations were cut back to a very low level. There are no
fully detailed costs or estimates on the Jamaica naval complex but the
construction work performed by the contractor has been valued at $1.8
.... 78
million.
Antigua and St. Luc ia, The Army and Air Force bases planned for these
two islands were essentially identical: a small defensive garrison with
en airfield to support one composite air group. " There was some scaling down
of the plans as the threat to the area waned but the base facilities,
originally estimated at $2.4 million each, finally cost $13.1 million at
75. Watson, Chief .of Staff, p. 479; Conn, et_al_., Guarding the U.S., p. 378.
76. Letter to the Secretary of State, Dec. 7, 1940.
77. CNO memo, Jan. 5, 1941.
78. "Navy Admin. History, C.S.F., Vol. II," pp. 310-311.
79. JPC report of August 28, 1940; Greenslade Board Report - Antigua.
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80Antigua and $11.2 million at St. Lucia.
As in the case of Jamaica and the Bahamas, the Navy first planned
only to make preparations for establishing a seaplane tender supported
air station at each of these islands. Dredging was to be done, areas
cleared, and surveys completed. Buildings were to prefabricated and
stored in San Juan (for Antigua) and Trinidad (for St. Lucia) for rapid
81deployment and erection if and when needed. Each station was to have
the capacity to support one patrol squadron. The only significant change
Fade in these plans was to establish and operate the bases in support of
aviation patrols, rather than "storing" them for an emergency. Reliable
82
cost data on these bases is not available.
Tr inidad. The Joint Planning Committee's first plans proposed a
Trinidad garrison of two Army divisions, harbor defense and local defense
83
units, and a composite air wing. When the Greenslade Board submitted
its report, the proposed peacetime garrison was reduced to a reinforced
infantry regiment. This force was intended to serve as a nucleus for
expansion to the two divisions which the base would be capable of support"
ing.^4 The Greenslade Board retained the recommendation for a composite
air wing (one heavy bombardment squadron, one long range reconnaissance
squadron and one interceptor-pursuit group) but- the Air Corps was still
80. Watson, Chief of Staff, p. 479; "Construction and Real Estate, Carib-
bean," pp. 276 (Antigua) and 288 (St. Lucia); Conn, et al . , Guarding
the U.S
., p. 378.
81. CNO memo, Jan. 5, 1941.
82. Commander Walter Karig, USNR, Battle Report: The Atlantic War, Vol. II,
p. 27 places the cost at $2.92 million for Antigua and $1,625 million
for St. Lucia, but his figures have been quite wide of the mark in
other cases where more reliable figures were available for comparison.
83. JPC report of August 28, 1940; Watson, Chief of Staff , p. 473.
84. Watson, Chief of Staff, p. 482; Greenslade Board Report - Trinidad.
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too short of forces to provide such a peacetime garrison. The aviation
establishment at Trinidad was therefore reduced to bombardment and pur-
ge
suit groups and a regular reconnaissance squadron. As the direct
threat to Trinidad and the likelihood of German movement into Brazil or
other parts of South America declined, the planned garrison of Trinidad
was decreased proportionately.
The estimated cost of the facilities originally planned for Trinidad
Of.
was $95.6 million. After the garrison had been reduced and most of the
permanent construction had been cancelled or deferred, the actual cost was
placed at $52.3 million.
Initially, the Mavy intended to establish a base for one squadron
of seaplanes and a fleet anchorage with appropriate air and anti-submarine
defenses at Trinidad as soon as possible. Longer range plans anticipated
an expansion of these facilities to double the size of the air station,
provide a "subsidiary" operating base, and include temporary support facili
CO
ties for two carrier air groups. By January 1941, the plans had only
been changed to add an advance base depot at which the materials and
89
equipment for the St. Lucia and British Guiana bases would be stored.
By the following June, however, it had been decided to develop Trinidad
into a complete operating base with depots for fuel and supplies, ship re-
90
pair facilities, and a hospital. This expansion proved excessive to the
actual demands placed on the base, and much of the development was never
85. Craven and Cate, Army A.F. in W. W. II
.
Vol. 1, p. 162.
86. Watson, Chief o f Staff , p. 479.
87. "Construction and Real Estate, Caribbean," p. 182.
88. Letter to the Secretary of State, Dec. 7, 1940; U.S. Mavy, Building
the Navyts Bases , Vol. II, p. 24.
89. CNO memo, Jan. 5, 1941.




completed. The final cost of the Trinidad Naval Operating Base was
$65.7 r.illion. 92
British Gui ana . In alr.ost every respect, the intended and actual
plans for the Army, Air Corps and Navy installations in British Guiana
were the same as those for St. Lucia and Antigua. The only additional data
available is an estimate of the actual cost of the Army and Air Corps in-
stallations in 3ritish Guiana: $16.8 million. 3
Before turning to the operational aspects of the bases, it is neces-
sary to make a final comment on one of the difficulties which had obstructed
the start of construction, compensation of private property owners. Just
as the Governor of Bermuda demonstrated his powers by refusing permission
to start surveys, the government of Newfoundland used its control over the
acquisition of private property to its own advantage. The precise problem
which arose in Newfoundland was that of squatters on Crown lands. Until
a settlement had been reached on compensation, including the costs of mov-
ing squatters, the Newfoundland Commission refused to remove the squatters
so the United States could take possession and start construction. This
problem was raised and discussed in a series of notes and messages between
oA
the United States and Britain in December 1940 and January 1941, Since
the basic problem involved was relevant to all the base-site colonies, the
91. Rear Admirals *,<orrall Reed Carter and Elmer Ellsworth Duvall, USN
(Retired), Shi ps,
_
Sa lvage, and Sinews of 1'ar (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1954), p. 55.
92. U.S. Navy, Building the Navy f s Bases, Vol. II, p. iii.
93. "Construction and Real Estate, Caribbean," p. 267; Conn, et al ..
Guarding the U.S., p, 378, cites the foregoing manuscript as its source
but quotes a figure of $14,969,448, which is $143,000 greater than
that in the manuscript.
94. Foreign Relations,, 1941 , Vol. Ill, pp. 58-61 (telegrams, State Dept.
to U.S. Embassy in London, No. 175, Jan. 17, 1941; and U.S. Embassy
in London to State Dept., No. 225, Jan. 21, 1941).
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British Foreign Office suggested that it be deferred for inclusion in
the London Base Lease negotiations. In the meantime, Newfoundland, which
justified its position primarily on the distressed state of the terri-
tory's finances, accepted an interim arrangement. The United States
established a fund from which the dispossessed persons were reimbursed
for the costs of moving. This reimbursement was made without prejudice
95
to any final settlement on compensation.
In late January and early February 1941, the British Embassy in
Washington and the State Department reached agreement on compensation
procedures. Those procedures worked satisfactorily, but one of the
principle difficulties, agreement on property values, persisted. By
December 1945, for example, the government of Newfoundland had paid $2.2
million in compensation to owners of property (lands and buildings) which
the United States had appraised at $1.4 million. ' At Antigua and
Jamaica, owners held out for valuations which were excessive in comparison
to local appraisals, and even more so when compared to United States esti-
mates. ° In Trinidad, the debate focussed on the docksite area in Port
of Spain, where the United States had reclaimed a swampy waterfront area
and developed it into wharfage. The United States argued that as reclaimed
land, the area was Crown property and therefore required no compensation;
the local government demanded $22,000 per acre on the grounds that title
QQ
to reclaimed land vested in the local government, not the Crown.
From the United States point of view, the compensation problem was
95 » Foreign Relations, 1941 , Vol. Ill, p. 61 (Telegram, U.S. Embassy in
London to State Dept., No. 225, Jan. 21, 19&1).
96. See pp. 191-192 above for the procedures.
97. "Army Bases, Newfoundland," p. IX-2.
93. "Antilles Dept. Real Estate - Part I," pp. 77-78.
99. Ibid., p. 86.
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solved on August 9, 1943. On that date, under the so-called Reverse
Lend-Lcase program, Britain announced that it would bear the whole cost
"in connection with and including the purchase of lands for bases" in
the Caribbean, Bermuda and Newfound land. l(- J Britain thus assumed the
United States responsibility for compensating the owners of the private
property which was taken for the leased areas.
It is extremely difficult to cite a date on which any of the bases
were "established" in the sense of becoming an effective military activity
capable of defensive and/or offensive operations. Generally speaking,
the first forces had arrived at the major bases (Bermuda, Newfoundland and
Trinidad) by April 1961. Those at the smaller bases arrived later. The
bases were commissioned and capable of limited operations in the late sum-
mer and early fall of 1961, but it was the spring of 1962 before they were
ready to perform a full range of operations.
The gradual establishment of the bases is illustrated by the follow-
ing series of "landmark" dates and events at the Bermuda naval base. On
October 13, 1960, following receipt of authorization from the British
government, the seaplane tender Georg e^ Badge r arrived in Bermuda and began
conducting operations with three naval patrol seaplanes. The first
naval forces ashore were a detachment of Marines who arrived on February 26,
1961. The liarines raised the United States flag over Morgan's and Tucker's
Islands on March 1 but it was not until Captain Jules James, U3N, arrived
100. U.S. Department of State Bulletin, August 16, 1963 (Vol. 9, Mo. 216),
pp. 96-97. The agreement thus announced in a Press Release on
August 10, 1963 was formalized in the Claims Settlements Agreements
of torch 27, 1966 and July 12, 196S. These agreements are published
in Treaties and Other Int ernat ional Ac t s Series 1509 and 1770, re-
spectively. Cited hereafter as T .I. A. S.
101. "Navy Admin. History, Atlantic Fleet, vol. V," p. 17 footnote 18;




on April 7, 1941, that the base vas officially placed in commission.
On the following day, a force of five ships (an aircraft carrier, two
1 03heavy cruisers and two destroyers) arrived at: the base. In spite of
all this, the Naval Operating Base still consisted primarily of offices
in Hamilton and small facilities at various other places in Bermuda. It
was more than a month after the station vas commissioned before Captain
James could say that his forces were ready to make an immediate attack in
the event the base was fired upon.*^ In the same report Captain James
said it would be about a year before the station was established in the
leased area.
A similar situation prevailed at Trinidad. The base vas commissioned
in August 1941, but on December 7, the total naval force in the area con-
sisted of two converted yachts and four patrol seaplanes. At a small
station, such as Great Exuma, the gap between appearance and reality was
even greater. The Naval Air Station, Great Exuma, was commissioned on
May 15, 1942, but the first detachment of personnel (Marines, of course)
did not arrive until May 28. There were no aircraft at the air station
until August 29, and operations could not start until a seaplane tender
arrived on September 1. It was not until September 17 that the base vas
sufficiently developed to support air operations without the assistance of
a tender. 106
The wartime operations and contributions of the bases varied with
102. "liavy Admin. History, Atlantic Fleet, vol. V," pp. 15-17.
103. Ibid
. ; Samuel Eliot {'.orison, The Battle of the Atlantic: September
19 39 -Kay 1943
, p. 83.
104. Letter report to the President quoted in "Navy Admin. History, Atlan-
tic Fleet, vol, V,'» p. 17.
105. Conn, et al.. Guarding the U.S ., p. 413; Mori son, Battle of the At-
lantic, pp. 146-147.
106. "Navy Admin. History, C.S.F., vol. II," pp. 322-324.
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their location. The role of the Newfoundland bases was quite different
from that of the Bermuda bases, and the Caribbean bases together played
still another role.
The first r.ajor task accomplished by the Argentia Naval Base was to
support and provide a staging point for the movement of men and material
to Greenland and to Iceland. The Greenland contingent arrived at Argentia
in late June 1941 and remained for five days. The Iceland task force ar-
rived a few days later and departed on July 1. The primary mission of
the Newfoundland bases was convoy escort work and the associated anti-
submarine operations. All transatlantic convoy movements in the western
Atlantic were controlled by a Task Force Commander headquartered at
108
Argentia after September 1941. Eastbound convoys were organized in
Halifax or Sidney, Nova Scotia and sailed along their pre-determined tracks
under escort by Canadian and United States aircraft and ships. When south
of Newfoundland (at the Western Ocean Meeting Point) each convoy was joined
by its United States Navy ocean escort from St. John's or Argentia. Air
patrol and surveillance of the convoy and its projected path were main-
tained by aircraft based in Newfoundland, These air and surface escorts
continued with the convoy to a Mid-Ocean Meeting Point southwest of Ice-
land. The convoy was then delivered to Royal Navy escorts for the eastern
half of its trip, while United States escorts either accompanied ships en
route to the bases at Iceland or assumed escort duties with a westbound
109
convoy for the return trip as far as Newfoundland.
107. Conn, et_al, Guarding the U.S., pp. 452, 480.
103. "Commander Task Force Twenty-Four," volume II of "Administrative
History of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet in World 'Jar II" (an unpublished
series in the Navy Department Administrative History collection,
Navy Department Library), p. 70. Cited hereafter as "Navy Admin.
History, Atlantic Fleet, vol. II.")
109. Mori son, Bat t lc o f_ t he At 1 ant i c , p. 101.
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The first combat action for a Newfoundland-based unit occurred in
late October, 1941, A Royal Canadian Air Force bomber sighted a German
submarine and made an unsuccessful attack which was terminated by darkness.
Two days later, when the weather permitted a renewal of search operations,
a United States B-17 bomber from Newfoundland found the submarine and
scored a near-miss with a bomb before the submarine submerged and escaped.
The first two submarine sinkings of the war by United States aircraft were
scored by planes from Argentia on larch 1 and March 15, 19^2
,
Enemy activity in Newfoundland and its territorial waters never reached
much more than a nuisance level. There were suspicions that submarines
were using the island's bays and inlets for night surfacing and battery
charging. In March 1942 a submarine fired two torpedoes toward the en-
trance of St. John's harbor, one exploding off each side of the entrance,
and in September and December of that year, submarines were able to slip
into Conception Bay, northwest of St. John's, sinking two ore ships each
119
time. On two occasions submarines laid mines in Newfoundland waters.
Those laid by submarine U-213 at St. John's on May 14, 1942 caused no
damage and their presence was not known until it was disclosed by postwar
113
examination of German records. The minefield laid by U^220_on
October 9-10, 1943 at St. John's was detected when one of the mines broke
free and was sighted drifting. Minesweeping operations cleared another
34 mines, but the loss of two small freighters on October 19 has been
114
attributed to a pair of unswept nines from this field.
110. Cor.n and Fairchild, Framework of Hemis phere Defense, p. 387.
111. Arisen, _3at 1 1 e of^the. At l.ant i c , p. 154.
112. Dziuban, MijLitary P.clat iong Between the U. S.^and Canada
, pp. 174 and 175,
113. Morison, Batt le of th e Atl antic, o. 417.
114. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Atlantic Battle V.Ton; May 1943-May 1945,
volume X of History of United States ^aval fiP,era t*_orls.-in_-.'forld War II
(Boston: Little, 3rown and Company, 1956), p. 138.
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The German activity with which the Newfoundland bases and their
operational forces were primarily concerned was, of course, submarine
sinkings of merchant ships. Fro:n January to September, 1942, the sub-
marines had sporadic success in the waters near Newfoundland, Their most
successful months were January, 19^2, when 12 ships totalling 49,366 tons
were sunk, and September, 1941, when they sank 10 ships totalling 33,615
tons. H5 After September, 1942, the submarine attacks shifted eastward out
of the Newfoundland waters and into the mid-ocean regions. Aside from a
brief foray in January, 1945, when 4 ships totalling 24,531 tons were sunk,
the submarines had no further success in Newfoundland waters. H"
When the submarine attacks moved out of the region which could be
effectively patrolled by Newfound land -based aircraft, plans were made to
move the base of anti-submarine patrols from Newfoundland to the Green-
land bases then under construction. 3ad weather conditions at Greenland
caused this plan to be rejected. When the problems of convoy operations
were discussed at a major conference in Washington in i-arch, 1943, it was
decided to assign longer range aircraft to Newfoundland in order to reach
the areas of greatest submarine acitivity. This plan was implemented
by assigning B-24 aircraft to Gander, but by the time they had become an
effective force, the crisis had passed and the battle had moved further
1 18
eastward.
In the closing phases of the North Atlantic and European war, the
Newfoundland base complex played a supporting role. It continued to support
115. Mori son. Battle of the Atlantic , pp. 413-414.
116. Mori son, Atlantic Dattle Won, p. 369.
117. Conn, et a 1
.
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transatlantic convoys and convoy escorts and to serve as a staging point
for aircraft movements. When the Air Transport Command was created, it
assumed control of Harmon Field. As a result, aircraft staging operations
expanded considerably during 1944 and 1945, The Newfoundland airfields
were also major stopping points in the Air Transport Command's White and
Green projects after hostilities had ended in Europe. The White project
involved the return of aircraft and personnel to the continental United
States for redeployment; the Green project returned personnel eligible
119for discharge from the services.
Although their forces were frequently engaged in anti-submarine
operations during 1942, the Bermuda bases were somewhat removed from the
main campaigns of the war, German submarines found good hunting in the
waters of the Bermuda region during the first half of 1942. They took a
toll ranging from nine ships (56,608 tons) in January to nineteen ships
(109,216 tons) in 1-arch and eighteen ships (112,442 tons) in April, but
ion
the number of sinkings declined thereafter.
The Bermuda bases supported frequent air and sea patrols which,
when combined with the development of the convoy system, frustrated the
efforts of the German submarines and forced them to seek better targets
and opportunities in other areas. While the patrols from Bermuda thus
acted to inhibit the submarines* operations, they did not produce a sig-
nificant number of submarine "kills." Of tiie 24 confirmed encounters with
German submarines in 1942, only one sinking occurred. On June 30, 19&2,
119. Dziuban, Military Relations _ Between the U.S^ and^ Canad a , p. 192, By
July 15, 1945, White had returned 3,004 aircraft and 50,000 personnel;
by September 15 the total of personnel had risen to 80,000, Green
returned 160,000 personnel between June 15 and September 15, 1945,
In contrast, 350,000 personnel were returned by ship each month,
120, Korison, Battle of the. Atlantic, pp. 413-414.
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a Bermuda -based patrol seaplane was directed to the estirrated position of
a submarine which had been located by high frequency radio direction
finders. After missing the submarine with two demolition bombs and nar-
rowly missing it with a depth charge while it was idling on the surface,
the aircraft made a final pass and dropped a depth charge which caught in
the submarine's superstructure. As the submarine dove, the charge exploded
and ]M58 sank. 121
Bermuda also served as a logistics base for the mid-Atlantic area.
In this roln, the high point of usefulness occurred in October, 1942, when
the Bermuda Naval Operating Base provided support, services, personnel
and repairs for Task Force 22 as it was en route to the invasion of North
Africa. l" Bermuda supplied another form of support to the Atlantic cam-
paign by acting as the center of anti-submarine warfare training for the
Atlantic Fleet. An anti-submarine warfare training unit was established
at Bermuda in the fall of 1942, and it was later expanded to include a
"shakedown" training program for the fleet's new destroyers and destroyer
escorts. Le-~>
Wartime operations in the Caribbean area were largely a matter of
routine anti-submarine patrols and convoy escorts supplemented by frequent
search and rescue operations. A few bases had special functions. Antigua
and St. Lucia supported the surveillance of the French naval forces at
Martinique, a task for which Admiral Rodney had used St. Lucia some 135 years
121. Mori son, Batt le of the Atlantic, pp. 227-228.
122. "Navy Admin. History, Atlantic Fleet, vol. V," p. 63.
123. Ibid.
, pp. 69-70. "Shakedown" is the breaking-in period immediately




earlier. Aircraft stationed at Jamaica cooperated with forces at
Guantanamo, Grand Cayman Island and the Canal Zone to patrol the ap-
125proaches to the Panama Canal. The Army base at Atkinson Field,
British Guiana, served as a coordination center for United States and
Brazilian military forces during the months before Brazil declared war
on Germany. After Brazil became a co-belligerent, the coordination center
1 O f
was moved to Natal and Recife.
German submarines found the Caribbean to be very good hunting grounds.
From February through November 1942, they sank nearly 200 ships totalling
close to one million tons. Some of these ships were accounted for in
spectacular and bold moves. In February 1962, a submarine entered, the
Gulf of Paria and lay on the bottom off Port of Spain until dusk. It then
torpedoed two United States merchant ships anchored off the port and left
through the narrow Dragon's Mouth (west of Chaguaramas Peninsula) on the
surface and with all navigational lights burning. Another entered Port
Castries, St, Lucia, in l!arch 1962 and torpedoed the Canadian steamer
Lady Nelson and a brightly lighted cargo ship moored to a pier; fortunately
for the United States, the submarine failed to see a fully-loaded American
tanker that was in the harbor but blacked-out.^"
Early German successes in the Caribbean area were made easier by the
lack of anti-submarine forces at the Caribbean bases. Commands in the areas
124. "Beane Field: U.S. Base in St. Lucia," Spot light . October 1958 (Vol.
19, No. 10), p. 15; Mori son, Battle of the Atlantic, p. 33;
"Administrative History of the Caribbean Sea Frontier to VE-Day,"
(an unpublished manuscript history in the Navy Department Administra-
tive History collection, Navy Department Library), Annex 3. Cited
hereafter as "Navy Admin. History C.S.F.-VZ." Rodney used St. Lucia
in the Seven Years War, 1756-1763.
125. Mori son, Battle of the Atlantic, p. 153.
126. Conn, et al, Guard in*? the U.S. , pp. 320, 326.
127. Mori son, Bat tle of t he Atlantic., p. 413.
128. Ibid., p. 145.
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closer to the United States had been granted first preference in the
assignment of available aircraft, vessels and mines. The outlying areas
had to do without until production caught up with demand. Until con-
voys were organized in the Caribbean in July 1942, the Trinidad force
(still composed largely of converted yachts and small patrol boats) spent
most of its time rescuing the survivors of sunken ships. c During the
summer of 1942, however, both the Army and Navy began to build up their
anti-submarine forces in the Caribbean and especially in the Trinidad
region. Nevertheless, the number of sinkings continued at a high level and
the damages inflicted on the opposing submarine force were discouragingly
small. The first submarine "kill" was not recorded until August 22,
1301942. As autumn arrived and the patrol and escort forces grew both
in numbers and in proficiency, the submarines were gradually forced to
move eastward and make their attacks in the waters southeast of Trinidad
where vessels were frequently unescorted. 1Jl
The submarine offensive was interrupted in November 1942 as the
vessels which were normally deployed to the Caribbean were withdrawn and
assigned to the forces attempting to disrupt Allied operations in North
Africa. ^ The German submarine force returned to the Caribbean for its
last damaging campaign during July and August of 1943. In July alone,
submarines sank eight ships (35,096 tons), but the cost of this summer
expedition was high. Of the ten submarines sent to the Caribbean, five
1 33
were sunk there and two more were sunk en route back to Germany. They
were thwarted by improved anti-submarine techniques and especially by the
129. Mori son, 3attl e o f th e Atlantic, p. 147.
130. Conn, et al .. Guard in", th e U.S. , pp. 430-432.
131. Ibi_d.
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133. Korison, Atlantic 3-ttle Won, pp. 188-198, 369.
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United States ability to maintain constant air ant i -submarine surveillance
of an area after an initial contact had been made. This successful de-
fense against submarines was not without costs to the United States. On
August 3, 1943, for example, a Kariner seaplane based at Trinidad notified
its home airfield that it had sighted a submarine and was making an attack.
The position reported by the pilot was very closs to that reported to
Berlin by the U- 5 72 about 20 minutes earlier. Neither the aircraft nor
the submarine were ever heard from again; both are recorded as being lost
with all hands. 134
As ship targets became scarce, the submarines made a few attempts at
mining Caribbean ports. In July 1942, six mines were laid off Castries,
St. Lucia, but they were discovered by a ship and only sank one small
Coast Guard launch and damaged a British torpedo boat. A minefield
laid by U-218 off Trinidad on October 27, 1943, inflicted no damage; like
the field at St. John's, Kewfoundland, its existence was unknovai until
1 3^
revealed by a study of German records after the war. The same submarine
returned to the Caribbean in March, 1944 with another load of mines. It
attempted to enter the Gulf of Paria to lay the mines off Port of Spain,
but it was driven off by aircraft. It then proceeded to St. Lucia where
it laid two mines, neither of which caused any'damage. The U-218 next
moved to San Juan where it laid 15 mines on April 1, 1943, and then de-
l 7 7parted for Europe with air and surface defense forces in hot pursuit.
The final forays into the Caribbean were made by five German submarines
between March and July, 1944, but they were a complete failure. Two sub-
marines which entered the area in March were forced to depart after an
13^. ^orison, Atlantic Battle 'Jon, p. 195.
135. Morison, Battle o f t he Atlantic, p. 417.
136. Morison, Atlantic Ba ttle Won, p. 374.
137. Ibid




intensive search effort kept then submerged until near the point of ex-
haustion. The third submarine was the mine layer, U-218 , In June and
July, the last two submarines got a few targets but were forced to flee
when an escort aircraft carrier arrived on an anti-submarine "hunt and
kill" sweep. 133
Except for the operations against these five submarines, the Carib-
bean theater was turning more and more to a supporting role in 1944 and
1945. Minor outlying bases were being shut down and the major function
of the remaining bases was to support transient personnel and material
en route to the fronts. Trinidad became a major link in the Air Trans-
port Command's routes to Europe, Africa and Asia; and in conjunction with
» on
Atkinson Field in British Guiana, a link to South America. 1J
The cutback and deactivation of the leased bases actually began in
late 1943 when it became evident that the war would not spread westward
across the Atlantic. Supporting units were redeployed from the leased
bases to forward areas where their services were in more urgent demand.
One infantry regiment and its supporting units left Newf oundland in
June, 1943. ^ Three months later, the commander of the Argentia Naval
Operating Base made recommendations for reducing the size, capabilities and
mission of bis base. 1^ Unlike the other bases, however, construction work
continued at Argentia as temporary structures were replaced with permanent
ones. This work was performed pursuant to another of the commander's
recommendations and enabled the Argentia facility to operate for a much
13S. Korison, Atlantic Battle Won
, p. 297.
139. "Construction and Real Estate, Caribbean," p. 182; Craven and Cate,
Army A. F. in W.W. II, Vol. I, p. 329; Conn and Fairchild, Framework
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, p. 320.
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14?longer period than would otherwise have been possible.
In Bermuda, consolidation of facilities had begum in the last half
of 1943. Tenant activities at the naval and army bases were closed or
merged with other commands. By June 1945, the plans for a major cutback
had been completed. Among other things, they called for a return of
Ordnance Island (the submarine base) and other properties held on short
term lease, the reduction of the Naval Air Station to Naval Air Facility
in a semi -maintenance status, and the transfer of naval facilities at
Kindley Field to the Array Air Force for maintenance. * '-* All these steps
were carried out in the latter half of 1945.
A parallel contraction took place in the Caribbean area. The Army
garrison which had shrunk from 110,000 at the end of June, 1943 to 91,000
at the end of the year, was reduced to 67,500 by Kay, 1945 (about 10,000
men larger than it was on December 7, 1941). ' The area's naval facili-
ties were also reduced, and by the fall of 1944 only the major bases re-
145
mained operational. The Kaval Air Station at Great Exuma, having been
reduced to a single aircraft in August 1944, was engaged primarily in
aircraft search and rescue work. It lost its last plane in January, 1945
but continued to service transient aircraft until its disestablishment
in June, 1945.
U' 6
At Jamaica, the Coast Artillery and the Marine detachment left in
August, 1943. By the following December, most of the aviation responsi-
bilities had been assumed by the Maval Air Station at Guantanamo Bay,
142. U.S. i'avy, Building the Navy's Bases , Vol. II, p. 54; ".Navy Admin.
History, Atlantic Fleet, Vol. II," p. 175.
143. "Navy Admin. History, Atlantic Fleet, Vol. V," Chapter 7 (pp. 76-84).
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Cuba, and Jamaica's aircraft departed. The Naval Air Station was reduced
to caretaker status the following September. 1
The Antigua Naval Air Station was also downgraded to a Naval Auxiliary
Air Facility in February 1966, although patrol flights continued through
the following Kay. It was placed in a caretaker status on January 1,
1945. J The St. Lucia Naval Air Station closed even earlier. It was de-
commissioned and transferred to the Coast Guard as caretakers on September 1,
1963. The British Guiana Naval Air Station closed a year after that
at St. Lucia. 150
The base complex at Trinidad was slower to close, although it followed
a similar progression of consolidations and transfers. The main Army
aviation installation at Waller Field was in steady use by the Air Trans-
port Command until after the war, but the Carlsen Field complex with its
Navy lighter-than-air (blimp) facility was barely being maintained.
The naval base followed a gradual but steady process of consolidation,
deactivation and abandonment from early 1965 through 1949. It probably
would have resulted in complete deactivation by the end of 1950 had not
15?the Korean War erupted and caused its return to active operating status.
The difficulties encountered in the construction and operation of the
bases were numerous. While the specifics of the situations varied from
base to base, there were certain general problems common to almost all the
bases.
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In the construction phase, the first of the common problems was that
of supplying the bases with the building materials for development and
construct i Oil. This problem was mainly a function of transportation dif-
ficulties on several different planes. Most pressing in all cases was
the lack of shipping space for transporting the construction material and
equipment from the United States to the bases. Shipping space was at a
premium and many other projects had priority over base construction. In
July 1941, the Newfoundland bases were limited to 300 tons of cargo on
each scheduled trip (one every ten days). This was inadequate to the
task at hand, and even though the available space increased to 2,000 tons
per week in early 1942, many construction projects were delayed by the
need to wait for materials to arrive. L -JJ Trinidad f s development also
suffered from, a lack of shipping space within the Caribbean area.
The development of the convoy system increased the safety of individual
ships, but it also reduced the amount of shipping space available. Con-
voys operated on a less frequent schedule than many of the individual ves-
sels would have maintained if they had sailed independently. Convoys also
required indirect routing of ships in many cases. The shortage of shipping
space was aggravated by the fact that there was no regular commercial air
transport service to any of the leased-base sites.
The German submarine force also had a disruptive effect on the supply
of construction materials. Aside from the fact that sinkings intensified
the shipping shortage, on several occasions the submarines sank ships
loaded with construction material. At Newfoundland, 75 per cent of the
430,00 tons of material used in the construction phase had to be carried
153. "Army Bases, Newfoundland," p?.VI-7, VI-S.









to the island by ship, and about 3 per cent of the material shipped was
lost due to sinkings. The most serious single loss was the sinking
of the ship carrying all the heavy equipment needed to construct a now
road from Placentia to Holyrood. The road was required to link the
ISA
Argent i a sites with the Newfoundland Railway, J At Trinidad, a sinking
actually caused the cancellation of a project. Between April and Sep-
tember 1962 , five ships loaded with cargo for Trinidad were lost. One
of those ships carried all the materials for a second seaplane hangar
at the Naval Air Station. When the ship was sunk, the second hangar was
cancelled. 1 -)/
Even if shipping space was found and the ship made it safely to
the base-site colony, the difficulties were not over. In many cases they
were just beginning, since internal transport in the colonies was very
poor. It was often more difficult to move materials from the local port
to the construction site than it was to carry them from their place of
origin to the local port. At Newfoundland, the problem began with the
under-sized, crowded and antiquated facilities in the port of St. John's
1 5R
which made unloading the ship a challenge in itself. Once the material
was on the dock it had to be stored or moved to the construction site.
The latter could only be accomplished via the aged Newfoundland Railway
or by truck over dirt roads that were passable for only a small part of
the year, being snowbound or mired in mud the rest of the time.
The very remoteness of almost all the base sites aggravated the
155. "Army Bases, Newfoundland," p. VI-9; the value of the material lost
has been estimated at $550,960. Ibid ., and Dziuban, Milit ary Rela-
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effect of the priinitive internal transport facilities available. In
Jamaica, the rain base site was ^2 miles from the pierhead in Kingston.
There vas no good road between these two points and under local law,
only the Jamaican Director of Public Works could build roads on the
island. The United States had to pay Jamaica for building a road to con-
nect the base and the port. The Jamaica Railroad ran within five miles of
the main site, but again there was no connecting road so the United States
had to finance a rail spur to link the railroad to the base.*--^ 9
At Antigua, building materials arrived at St. Johns by ship. They
were offloaded into barges in the anchorage area and the barges were
towed around the island to a temporary pier. There they were off lorded
into trucks which hauled the materials over unimproved roads to the con-
t fin
struction site. Atkinson Field in British Guiana was not connected to
Georgetown by road and it was seven miles from the nearest railroad.
Small boats were used to transport construction materials and personnel.
Before quarters were available at the base site, local laborers had to
make a daily five-hour round-trip by boat between Atkinson Field and George-
town. 161
Many of these difficulties were overcome as new port facilities, roads
and highways were built, but they caused serious delays in the early stages
of construction. There were attempts to avoid these problems by using
locally-produced rather than imported materials in the construction process,
but these efforts were limited by the 1933 "Buy American" Act until the
United States entered the war and the provisions of that act were largely
159. "Construction and Real Estate, Caribbean," pp. 241-2&2.
160. Ibid., pp. 275-276.
161. Ibid.", pp. 264-266.
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disregarded. The use of Canadian lumber in Newfoundland and local
limestone and coral blocks in Bermuda were typical instances of using
local materials, ^:ore unique and ingenious was the use of local mo-
lasses as the stabilizing agent in the temporary runway at St. Lucia.
At Great 2xuma, the Navy used local stone for construction purposes; the
unusual feature there was the way the stone was prepared. Lacking heavy
crushing machines, large chunks of limestone and coral were collected all
over the island and taken to the base site where native women wielding
15/,
snail hammers broke them into pieces of usable size.
The second major problem in the construction phase was housing, for
there was no place for the construction force to live when it first
arrived. This problem was overcome in several ways. At Bermuda, tent
camps were established and several hotels which were vacant due to war-
time suspension of the tourist traffic were leased, 1 " 5 At both Bermuda
and Newfoundland, ships were used as floating quarters. S.S. Berkshire
housed 600 construction workers at Bermuda, while S.S. ??£&?_ Peck was
used as a barracks at Argent ia and U, S . A . T . Edmund_ B . Alexand er performed
the same function at St. John's.*-"" At Argentia, even local laborers
lived in water-borne quarters at first. They lived in fishing boats an-
chored in Placent ia Bay and "commuted" to work by. dory. The housing
162. This Act restricts the purchase of non-American goods by Public
agencies. The essential portions of its text are cited in U.S., Con-
gress, House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Report
to the Committee on Ways and Neans on United States Customs, Tariff
and Trade Agreemen t Laws and t heir Extensions , from the Subcommittee
on Customs, Tariffs and Reciprocal Trade Agreements (Washington: 1957),
pp. 186-187.
163. Conn, et al .. Guarding the U.S., p. 379.
164. U.S. Navy, Building the Navy's Bases , Vol. II, p. 33.
165. "Army Bases, Bermuda," p. V-3.
166. Ibid
.
; "Navy Admin. History, Atl tic' Fleet, Vol. II," pp. 3,4; U.S.
Navy, Building the Navy' s Bases, v'ol. II, p. 47; Dziuban, Military
Relations Between the U.S. and Canada, p . 96.
167. U.S. Navy, 3ui_lding the Navy's Bases , Vol. II, p. 47.
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problein was solved by making the construction of quarters one of the
first projects on the construction schedule at each base.
A third source of common difficulties during the construction phase
was the personnel problem. There were no trained supervisory personnel
and few skilled laborers at the base sites, so it was necessary for the
base contractors to hire such personnel in the United States and transport
them to the base sites. This was not an easy task because the draft was
cutting into the supply of manpower and skilled labor and supervisors
were in increasing demand at good wages in the United States. In order to
compete in the labor market, the base contractors were forced to offer
top wages plus incentive pay, home leave benefits and other inducements
for overseas work. The inevitable labor difficulties developed: con-
tractors hoarded skilled men for future jobs, employees broke their contracts
169
to get higher wages at other bases, and the turnover rate was very high.
All of these tended to disrupt the contractor 1 s work force and delay con-
struction. In some cases the contractors encountered a reluctance to ac-
cept jobs which required travel by ship. The Newfoundland base contractor
was confronted by such a problem after a submarine sank the Nova Scotia-
Newfoundland ferry. Except in Bermuda where labor was scarce due to a
high employment level at the Royal Navy Dockyard, United States personnel
formed only a small part of the total work force engaged in base construc-
tion. The large majority of the force was composed of local unskilled
labor. 171




169. "Army Bases, Newfoundland," p. VI-3 to VI-4.
170. Ibid., p. VI-9; Conn, et al ., Guarding the U.S., p. 333.
171. Antigua's work force was 81% local; Jamaica's was 93% local. The rest
fell between these two extremes, except for Bermuda which employed a
force composed of 1^% local and 86% United States personnel. Conn,
et a 1
.




This large pool of local labor caused more difficulties than did
the United States employees. The principal problem presented by these
laborers derived from the fact that they were untrained in almost every
aspect of the modem construction process. They were not prepared to use
modern techniques and equipment, and in many cases they seemed to be un-
willing or unable to be trained. The Antilles Division Engineer Office
reported that it required "three or four natives to accomplish as much as
17?
one continental American.'' In the Caribbean, and especially at Trini-
dad, the local labor force v:as further handicapped by illiteracy, diffi-
culty in understanding different English, United States and Trinidad ian
dialects, and the existence of a class system based on social status, em-
ployment classification, and place of birth (on or off the island of
Trinidad). 173
Newfoundland had its own peculiar labor problem, Kost of the local
laborers were fishermen with a different cultural pattern than that of
their supervisors and employers. They were inclined to take long weekends
(Friday through Monday) in order to spend all of Sunday at home. They were
accustomed to working only during the summer and some went home in Novem-
ber and stayed there until spring arrived; others worked in the winter at
the bases and returned to fishing in the summer. Under such circumstances,
the 20 per cent turnover rate was not considered excessive.
172. "Construction and Real Zstate, Caribbean," pp. 173-174.
173. U.S. navy, Building the I-iavy 's Bases, Vol. II, pp, 27-28. The social
classes happened to coincide in many instances with racial groupings,
a point which led many United States personnel to misinterpret the
system as one which was primarily racially oriented. See north Burn,
"United States Base Rights in the British West Indies, 1940-1962"
(Unpublished irh.D. Thesis, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Tufts University, 1964),. pp. 50-52.
174. "Army Bases, Newfoundland," pp. VI-4 through VI-8; Conn, et a 1
.
,
Guarding the U.S., p. 33 3.
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Collectivc bargaining and the War Department's policy of refusing
to recognize any union as the sole bargaining agent for local labor pro-
duced minor difficulties on several occasions. There was a brief debate
of the "union shop" question at Jamaica but it proved fruitless, and
there vas a short strike over similar issues at Trinidad. At Bermuda,
however, the Governor managed to have the local labor board act as an
intermediary and the problem of unions never arose, *
'
J
Another labor difficulty arose from the difference between the wage
rates paid to United States employees and those paid to local employees.
As noted above, "continentals" received very high pay as an inducement to
work under difficult conditions. By contrast, each base construction con-
tract contained a clause requiring the contractor to pay local laborers
the prevailing local wage rates. This scale was used to avoid a severe
drain on the local labor market and prevent a competitive increase of
wages which would have been disastrous for local employers. Although
the contractors usually selected the highest local wage rates as their
standard (thus placing a drain on the local labor supply), there was still
a huge difference between the pay received by a local laborer and by a
continental for the same job. '' This wage problem was never completely
solved, but its impact was gradually alleviated. Local wage rates were
175. Conn, et al t , Guarding the U.S., pp. 33 1-382.
176. U.S., Department of State, The Caribbean Islands and th e War : ^ A
Record of Progress in Facinr Stern Realities (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1943), p. 43.
177. Conn, et al. , Guarding the U.S ., p. 381, cites a situation in
British Guiana where the local laborers received $2,30 per day and
United States personnel received $10.00 per day for the same job.
Dziuban, Military Relations Between the U.S._ and Canada, p. 169,
points out, however, that in many cases the lower local wage rate
could be justified by the lower productivity of local laborers and
their high rate of absenteeism.
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allowed to rise slowly and when the contractors and their employees de-
parted, the difference between wage rates grew less conspicuous and
therefore less annoying to the local laborers.
Additional construction problems were produced by the very nature of
the sites. As was noted in the discussion of internal transport, the
base sites were in isolated areas, generally removed from the populous
centers of the colonies. This isolation combined with the primitive con-
ditions existing at the sites to produce a morale problem among the con-
1 TO
struction crews which was serious enough to lower their effectiveness. 1
As one writer observed with reference to Bermuda, the major morale prob-
lems derived from a lack of beer, which was temporary, and a lack of
179
women, which was permanent.
The topography and the vegetation of the sites also complicated con-
struction. The sites at Trinidad (Waller Field), St. Lucia and British
Guiana (Atkinson Field) were covered by virgin jungle which had to be
cleared before construction could start. In the first 2\ months of work
at Waller Field, only 3,000feet of runway had been cleared and partially
graded. lou At Bermuda, the base sites consisted largely of areas covered
by shallow sea water. Their development involved a tremendous amount of
dredging and filling. In addition to the 39 acres of land reclaimed at
the Naval Air Station, 16 million cubic yards of fill were dredged from
the bottom of Castle Harbour to form 750 acres at Kindley Field. 1 " 1 In
In Newfoundland, the Argent ia peninsula was covered by a layer of peat
from two to twenty feet thick. Over eight million cubic yards of it had
173. "Construction and Real Estate, Caribbean," p. 173.
179. Philip Goodhart, Fifty Ships that Saved the Wor ld, p. 228.
180. "Construction and Real Estate, Caribbean," p. 179.
181. Watson, et al ., Bermuda , pp. 122, 123.
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to be removed in order to erect buildings on a solid soil surface. *°2
Health conditions were also a source of difficulty. Trinidad, like
Jamaica, had a problem with malaria. Throughout the construction phase,
a force of about 200 men was continuously engaged in anti-malaria work:
spraying bogs with oil, digging drainage systems and filling depressions
with over two million cubic yards of dredged fill. 1-83
Another construction problem was presented by the climate at the
bases, which ranged from the intense cold of Newfoundland to the tropic
heat and humidity 6f the Caribbean. The Newfoundland weather affected
shipping as well as construction. In the summer, ships encountered severe
fog; in the winter, they were beset by ice and storms. At the 'Newfound-
land sites, the winter (November through April) was cold enough to pro-
hibit the laying of concrete for projects such as runways and foundation
footings for buildings, but it was not excessively cold. A greater ob-
stacle was presented by the fact that the ground was continuously covered
by snow. The prevailing high winds made it necessary to conduct constant
snow clearance operations to prevent drifting.
*
8^ The climate was equally
frustrating at Bermuda. In the summer workers could not be exposed to the
severe heat for very long and a significant amount of time was lost chang-
ing clothing after the frequent drenching rains which swept the area. In
the winter, high winds, cool temperatures and prolonged rains combined to
toe
delay the work. -^ Construction at Trinidad was also delayed by an ex-
tremely heavy rainy season in 1941.
A final problem encountered in the construct i or; process was related
182. U.S. Navy, Building the Navy's Bases , Vol. II, p. 48.
183. Ibid., p. 24.
184. "Army Bases, Newfoundland," p. VI -8.
185. "Army Bases, Bermuda," p. VI-5.
186. "Construction and Real Estate, Caribbean," p. 181.
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to the problem of acquiring land and compensating private property
owners: the removal of residents from the construction sites. In most
cases, uninhabited areas or regions of minimal population were chosen for
the base sites, so the problem only arose in a few places. In Bermuda,
in spite of the popular apprehensions expressed in the Bermuda Committee*
s
report, the resettlement of the dispossessed residents of St. Eavid's
Island took place gradually and without repercussion. Similarly, an en-
tire Trinidadisn village of several hundred people was relocated without
serious difficulties. 1 It was only at Newfoundland that there were
problems.*^ The situation was especially anncying when additional areas
were acquired at Stephenville (Harmon Field) under the second supplement
to the 99-year lease. The local government knew of the impending trans-
fer, as did many local residents. The government did nothing to prevent
those residents from establishing all sorts of businesses and buildings
on the prospective base site, actions taken solely for the purpose of ac-
189quiring large compensation awards from the United States. Because
those people were primarily motivated by this ulterior interest, and not
their desire to stay on the land, obtaining their physical removal was
not too difficult. Moreover, since the burden of their scheme ultimately
fell upon the British government, the situation need not be given further
consideration here.
In the field of operational difficulties, each base had different
specific problems, yet certain general problems were present at almost all
the bases. They were primarily problems of an organizational nature re-
garding the coordination of local defenses, operations and command.
187. U.S. Navy, Building; the Navy's Bases in W .W. II. Vol. II, p. 24.
18S. The real problem was financial. See pp. 245-246 above.
189. "Army Bases, Newfoundland," p. IX-4.
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The local defense problem arose from the shortage of British and
colonial defense forces at the base-site colonies in late 1940 and early
1941. Except for Newfoundland which, under Canadian auspices, had better
defenses than all the other sites, they ranged from no forces at all in
190
St. Lucia to light forces in Trinidad. The lack of independent local
defenses meant United States forces at the leased bases would have to
participate in any local defense effort. To do this efficiently, some
sort of coordination or planning to allocate defense responsibilities was
required. The subject was excluded from the London negotiations and trans-
ferred to Anglo-American military staff discussions held during the spring
and summer of 19^1. The two major defense issues were the role of the
colonial Governors and the command of the defense forces. As a result of
the discussions, Britain announced that although the colonial Governors
bore the title of Commander-in-Chief of the defense forces, they had not
been vested with actual command authority by the King and therefore were
191
not empowered to direct military operations. The staff conferences
also produced an agreement on the organization for coordinating local de-
fenses. Each colony was to establish two defense agencies, one to prepare
coordinated military and naval defense plans, and another to draw up a com-
bined defense plan which included and coordinated all subordinate military
and civil defense plans. The agreement also provided that the senior
192United States base commander would command the local defense force.
Implementation of the local defense plans varied. At Jamaica, the
mission and garrison of the United States base had been so drastically
reduced from original plans that the Canadian forces at Jamaica outnumbered
190. Conn, et_al_. , Guarding the U.S.
, p. 357.
191. Ibid., p. 416.
192. Ibid
. , p. £17. Although signed on August 30, 1941, the agreement and
its plans did not go into effect until December 12, 1941; also, U.S.




United States forces and the Canadian commander outranked his United
States counterpart. As a result, in January 1942, it was agreed that
the Colander of the Canadian and British troops would command the local
defense forces until such time as the strength and composition of the
United States forces warranted a change. Since the contraction of the
Caribbean theater began soon thereafter, these command arrangements were
IQ'l
never changed.
At Trinidad, the commander of United States Army forces had stead-
fastly resisted early efforts to include United States forces in local de-
fense programs controlled by the Governor. As a result, there was no
formal coordination of defense plans until after the agreements of
August 30, 1961 went into effect. Although it deviated slightly from the
agreements, the procedure used at Trinidad was successful, and coordinated
plans for port security, censorship, medical care, anti-aircraft defenses,
194intelligence, and other aspects of local defense were soon drafted.
At Bermuda, the United States Army commander had established a local
defense plan with the United States Navy commander soon after the Army
forces arrived on April 20, 1941. 5 Defense arrangements established
later under the agreements of August 30, 1941 were more complicated and
carried overtones of a serious rivalry among United States military services.
Responsibility for the defense of Bermuda was assigned to the Commander-in-
Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. In the event of an attack, direct command of
Bermuda's defense forces would be, assumed by either the senior officer of
the local defense force or, if he was senior to that officer, by the
Senior Officer Present Afloat in the United States naval forces at Bermuda.
193. Conn, et al. . Guarding the U.S. , pp. 419-420.
194. Ibid





If this duty fell to the Senior Officer Present Afloat, he was authorized
to use the local defense force to support the naval forces; if its fell
to the senior officer of the local defense force, he was authorized to
assign defense duties to the fleet units in Berir.uda provided those duties
196
would not interfere with larger fleet operations. This situation was
complicated by the fact that the Army commander (Brigadier General Alden
Strong), being senior in rank to the commander of the naval base (Captain
Jules James), was normally the senior office (and thus commander) of the
local defense force. The very nature of Bermuda's defenses, primarily
military or primarily naval, thus hinged upon the question of which
officer happened to be senior at the time defenses were mobilized. This
was clearly a very cumbersome and inefficient compromise arrangement.
The defense of Bermuda did not become a wholly naval responsibility until
late February 19&2, when Captain James was promoted to Rear Admiral, one
full grade above a Brigadier General. Rear Admiral James thus became
senior officer and commander of the local defense force.
Intertwined with the local defense problem was that of unity of com-
mand. This difficulty existed on two levels: internationally between
British and United States forces, and intranationally among the various
branches of the United States and British forces. Internationally, the
unity of command issue was resolved by the Anglo-American military staff
conferences mentioned earlier. By another agreement of August 30, 19&1,
Britain and the United States agreed that a unified command could be
established on instruction from the two governments when there was an
attack on the territory, or automatically whenever Britain and the United
196. Conn, et al. , Guarding the U.S. , p. 5&4.

-273-
197States were "mutually associated in a war against a common enemy."
In each case, cor.rp.and was to be exercised by the officer command ing the
strongest force in the territory or the one from the nation with the
greatest strategic or tactical interest in the territory. Subject to
later review, it was agreed that United States commanders would lead the
I no
combined forces at all but the Newfoundland and Bahamas sites.
Although the unity of command and local defense agreements were
negotiated and signed during the summer of 1941, they did not go into ef-
fect at once. The arrangements were not approved by the United States
Army-Navy Joint Board until September 19, 1941. The Secretaries of War
and the Navy made minor changes before they approved the agreements and
submitted them to the President on December 1, and the President waited
until December 12, 1941 to sign them. Since the United States was then a
belligerent associated with Britain in a common war against Germany, the
provisions of the agreements, including unified command of local defense
forces, went into effect immediately.* 99
The problem of unification of command and division of responsibilities
within the national forces was less easily solved. The source of the
problem in most cases was not really command itself but the access to and
control of resources which accompanied command. Each time the unity of
command issue was raised, the circumstances were similar, and "one com-
mander was looking with longing eyes at the means [to accomplish a mission]]
under the control of another." In some cases this interfered with the
prosecution of tne war. Both the Army and the Navy were developing air
anti-submarine techniques in what soon became a competitive atmosphere.









Since the Navy's Caribbean Sea Frontier commander exercised unified com-
mand over anti-submarine operations in that area, Army units sent to re-
inforce the Caribbean air garrison were retained under the technical
control of their parent command so they were not "lost" to the Navy. 4
Consequently, the new forces were not properly integrated into the estab-
lished command and operating procedures, operational effectiveness was
reduced, and technique improvements which might have been achieved by a
cooperative approach were lost. It was not until mid-1963 that this
problem was resolved by assigning responsibility for air anti-submarine
warfare to the Navy, but by then the Caribbean theater was in its declin-
ing stage and the clear division of responsibilities had no significant
202impact on the war in that area.
Another command problem and interservice dispute persisted in Bermuda
throughout 1941. It resulted from an uncertainty regarding the mission of
the Bermuda base. If that mission was to control the seas in the west-
central area of the North Atlantic, then the base belonged under unified
naval command; if its purpose was to protect the continental United States
from attack, then as the Army's General Headquarters argued, an Army of-
ficer should exercise unified command at Bermuda.™3 vihile this point was
debated, a related issue arose. The Navy insisted that the primary mission
of its patrol bombers stationed at Bermuda was to support fleet operations
(under Navy control). The Army argued that the bombers should be assigned
primarily to local defense missions (under Army control). These
difficulties were not settled until the responsibility for defending
201. Conn, et_a_l
.
, Guarding the U.S., pp. 43^-435.
202. The Army Air Force was assigned the primary responsibility for develop-
ing and conducting strategic bombing in exchange for its loss of the
anti-submarine mission. Ibid
., pp. 635-436.
203. Conn, et a 1
.






Bermuda was placed completely in the Navy*s hands early in 1942.
The problems of local defense and unity of command at both the
national and international levels were more serious at Newfoundland than
elsewhere. Attempts to define and allocate responsibility for the defense
of Newfoundland had begun at least as early as October 1940. The basic
Canadian-United States defense plan prepared at that time omitted any men-
tion of unified command and organization, probably because there was no
205
agreement on those points. The United States offered to correct this
omission by assuming control of the Newfoundland forces or by assigning
command responsibility to Canada until such time as United States forces
were preponderent in the area, but neither suggestion was acceptable to
Canada. 206
The problem of command at Newfoundland was not solved when joint war
plan ABC-22, the first detailed plan to implement the joint basic defense
plan, was prepared. A3C-22 assigned primary defense and command responsi-
bility to the sovereign state, but since neither the United States nor
Canada was sovereign in Newfoundland, its defense was declared to be a
common responsibility, to be shared by the United States and Canadian Armies
and the Royal Canadian Air Force. Coordination was to be arranged through
901
mutual cooperation. Unfortunately, numerous complicating factors pre-
vented effective coordination through cooperation.
One of these complicating factors was the number of individual com-
mands or forces present in Newfoundland: the United States Army and Army
Air Force Newfoundland Base Command; the United States Navy Operating Base
and the convoy control headquarters at Argent ia; the Royal Canadian Navy








Nevfound land Force; the Canadian Army Force, Newfoundland; and the Royal
Canadian Air Force Group Number One. In spite of a theoretical separa-
tion of defense responsibilities along national lines (the Newfoundland
Base Command was only responsible for defending United States facilities
in Newfoundland), as a practical matter, if Newfoundland had been attacked,
all five commands would have responded. Limited liaison to reduce dupli-
cation of effort took place in accordance with the provisions of A3C-22,
but it did not lead to the preparation of a single defense plan for the
island.
The next attempt to settle the Newfoundland defense problem came from
the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defense. In December
1941, the Board's twenty-second recommendation suggested that joint defense
efforts be decentralized by having local commanders prepare mutually agree-
able combined defense plans for their respective areas. This proposal
avoided the question of over-all command and command relationships and
actually depended upon the same methods invoked by ABC-22: voluntary
cooperation. Nevertheless, efforts to implement this recommendation pro-
duced some notable progress as several local joint defense plans were
drafted.
Another factor contributing to the international difficulties over
command and defense responsibilities was the lack of unity within the
national forces in Newfoundland. The Canadian Army and Air Force maintained
rather hostile relationships without any unified command. Neither force
could act except after consultation and approval by higher authorities
outside Newfoundland. The United States Army and Navy had not yet resolved
208. Dziuban, Mi litary_Relations Between the U.S. and Canada
, p. 116.
Except as otherwise noted, the following discussion of command re-





their dispute over the exercise of unified command in the North Atlantic
area, and the decision to assign unified command of air anti-submarine
operations based in Newfoundland to the Navy was the source of additional
hard feelings.
The first step along the path which ultimately solved the problem at
Newfoundland was taken by the Newfoundland Commission. In February 1942,
after proposing a defense council on which the Commission, Canadian forces
and United States forces would be represented, the Commission complained
to Canada that coordination by cooperation had been unsuccessful and
implied that lack of a unified Canadian command structure in Newfoundland
was a major obstacle to further progress in defense planning. In the fol-
lowing month, the Canadian Prime Minister announced that the Canadian Army
would assume unified command of all Canadian forces in Newfoundland, The
Army promptly established a joint operations center to coordinate Canadian
forces, and by the end of 1942 the coordination problem had been eased by
United States representation and participation in the joint operations
center. It soon proved possible to coordinate operations and planning to
such an extent that the command question faded from active concern.
To conclude the account of the Newfoundland situation on an optimistic
note, it appears that the command and defense planning difficulties had
little effect at the lower echelons and in the operating forces, at least
within the naval services. In the summer of 1941, when the United States
Navy commander at Argentia was assigned unified command of all ocean es-
corts in the Western Atlantic area, Canada's Newfoundland Command and
several Canadian coastal commands were placed under the direct control of
a United State naval officer. This could have been a source of irritation
to the Canadian forces because all the Canadian commanders had two years
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of war experience, whereas the United States commander had little or
no war experience and was technically still a non-belligerent. The
potential friction in this situation nev^r materialized. The commanders
210involved were "realists and diplomats." Their staffs established and
maintained excellent liaison. They soon developed a program for taking
the neophyte United States personnel to St. John's where experienced
Canadians taught them how to "master the intricacies of the convoy-and-
211
escort system."
Among the general problems which arose during the construction and
operation of the bases was the difficulty of establishing and maintaining
good social relations between United States forces (including contractors
and their employees) and the local residents. This problem existed at
all overseas bases in varying degrees, but its effect was aggravated by the
geographic isolation of the bases under consideration here. At least
part of the problem was caused by inadequate attention to the emotional
needs of men on foreign duty, especially when compared to the efforts
made to ensure their physical comfort. As expressed by an Army historian:
Too little cognizance was taken of the incapacity of
Americans generally to adapt their ways to those of
strangers or to take comfort and serious interest in
unfamiliar surroundings. Too little attention was
given to preparing the men for the antipathy of a local
populace, however friendly, toward any foreign garri-
son, however well-intentioned.^'-^
The problem of social relations was most serious at Bermuda where con-
struction workers caused quite a disruption of life. While many of the
209. Joseph Schull, The Far Distant Ships (Ottawa: Queen«s Printer, 1952),
p. 96; Conn, et al , Guarding the U.S. , p. 542.
210. Schull, Far Distant Ships , p. 96.
211. Ibid ., p. 97.
212. Conn, et al ., Guarding the U.S ., p. 403.
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vorkers were accompanied by their families (before December 1941) and
led orderly, normal lives, life aboard the barracks-ship Berkshire has
213been likened to that of a frontier town. The tendency of these
workers to devote their non-working hours to drinking, gambling and
looking for women led to frequent disturbances and disorders and an in-
crease in prostitution. The situation was so bad that in September 1942,
when S. S. i-'auretania announced it would have sufficient passenger space to
remove all of the remaining contractors* employees (over 1,000 persons),
Admiral James noted in the base War Diary that his staff was "turning
9 1 A
handsprings of joy."
The military personnel were less of a problem at Bermuda. -This was
due no doubt to the fact that they were subject to military discipline
and also because they received considerably lower rates of pay. Although
they were less conspicuous than the civilian workers, even the military
personnel were considered "out of key with 3ermudian life" and "a dis-
cordant element."
The military personnel at Bermuda needed recreation activities and
this led to another serious problem of social relations. Attempts to
operate a United Service Club in Hamilton led to bitter recriminations
and hard feelings. The club was financed by the United States but operated
first by a charitable organization and later by a 3ermuda committee. Goods
sold in the club, including beer, were subjected to the full burden of
Bermudian taxes and prices rose until the club became "a raffish beer
joint." When the United Services Organization (USO) refused to assume
213. Frederick Lewis Allen, "Bermuda Base," Harper* s Magazine , September
1943 (Vol. 187, No. 1120), p. 346.
214. "Navy Admin. History, Atlantic Fleet, Vol. V," p. 23.
215. Allen, "Bermuda Base," Harper's Magazine , September 19£3, p. 346.
216. "Kavy Admin. History, Atlantic Fleet, Vol. V," p. 27.
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operating responsibility for the club unless it stopped selling beer,
the Commandant of the Haval Operating Ease decided to establish a service-
operated club. His request for permission to establish a tax-free, service
recreation area was approved. The first area was soon established at
Riddle's Bay and another was opened later at Elbow Beach. Throughout, the
source of the difficulties had been the fact that the Berniudians thought
the recreation and service agencies should be operated as profit-making
commercial ventures. Their attitude strongly ressembled the position taken
by colonial representatives on financial issues during the London negotia-
tions. The military commanders disagreed with this idea; they considered
the operation of recreation facilities to be an essential service to the
troops and one which should be rendered for the purpose of improving
217
morale, not raking a profit. This divergence of viewpoints could not be
accommodated by compromise and military-operated recreational facilities
offered the only arrangement satisfactory to the United States forces.
Social antipathy between 3ermudians and United States forces was
also aggravated by local fears that United States policies of racial seg-
regation might be implanted in the colony. This was considered especially
dangerous since the merit-based local class system had incidental color
overtones at the extremes; there was fear it would be interpreted as a
system which was primarily racial. 10
The severe social stresses in Bermuda, as at the other bases, were
temporary. By 1943, when the worst causes of friction, the undisciplined
construction workers, had departed, relations were beginning to improve.
217. "i,'avy Admin. History, Atlantic Fleet, Vol. V," p. 31.
218. 'A. Adolphe Roberts, "Caribbean Headaches," The Nation , September 20,
1941 (Vol. 153, No. 2), p. 251; Eric Williams, "Crossways of the
Caribbean," Survey Graphic , November 1942 (Vol. 32, Ko. 11), p. 514.
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Local residents took pride in the role played by the local base and they
began to realize that their initial fears regarding the bases, especially
on the segregation and racial questions, had not been justified. Local
life was not totally disrupted, the bases were not eyesores, and colonial
219independence had not been damaged.
Recalling Ambassador Winant's prediction, there were several in-
stances in which the personal character of base commanders had strong in-
fluence on the development of relations with local authorities. ^ u In
selecting the first commanders for the bases, it appears that the posses-
sion of diplomatic skills, the ability to cooperate with officials of a
different country, and the ability and willingness to follow traditional
channels of diplomacy and international relations were not major deter-
minants. As with most military assignments, professional competence and
the exigencies of the service were the main selection criteria. It is
most likely, however, that this situation was the result of an inability
to assign personnel of the appropriate temperament rather than an unwilling-
ness to do so. Personnel records rarely contained the data needed to
identify officers with the desired character traits and qualities; there
221
was no choice but to rely on the usual assignment criteria.
Bermuda was one of the bases at which the personal character of the
commanding officer had a significant influence. After being ordered to
duty as the Commandant of the Bermuda liaval Operating Base, Captain (later
Rear Admiral) James arrived to find that there was no Naval Operating Base
and only the barest beginnings of an air station. Captain James proceeded
to exert all his authority and influence to create a genuine operating
219. Allen, "Bermuda Base," Harper's Magazine , September 1963, pp. 368-369.
220. See pp. 217-218 above for Ambassador Winant's remarks.
221. Conn, et al ., Guarding the U.S. , p. 608.
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base, and in the process he irritated many people. When Admiral King,
then Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, visited Bermuda to in-
vestigate rumors that Captain James was becoming persona non grata with
local officials, he reported to the Chief of Kaval Operations that such
tales were groundless and that local relations were good.222 Admiral
King acknowledged that Captain James* "zeal and energy sometimes outran
his tact and discretion," but under the circumstances, he could find no
293great fault in such conduct.
Overall, however, the situation at Bermuda was far less trying than
it could have been if less competent and understanding personnel had been
involved. Instead of the customary military officer, the British appointed
a tactful civilian, Lord Knollys, Governor of Bermuda in August 1941, The
title of the senior Royal Navy officer at 3ermuda was changed from Commander-
in-Chief, Atlantic-West Indies Station, to Senior Kaval Officer, Western
Atlantic, so that the job could be assigned to an officer junior to the
United States naval commander. Rear Admiral Ingram C. Sowell, who relieved
Rear Admiral James, was likeable and cooperative and willing to maintain
the necessary degree of control over United States personnel; his Army
counterpart, Brigadier General Alden G. Strong was also cooperative, diplo-
99Zi
matic and able to maintain good relations with the local government.
At Trinidad, relations between the United States Army commander and
the Governor were so bad that they eventually resorted to retaliatory
225
measures against one another. Both men were blunt and outspoken and
222. King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King , p. 340.
223. Ibid
.
224. Allen, 'Bermuda Base," Harper's Magazine , September 1943, p. 347.
225. Conn, et al . , Guarding the U.S. , p. 406. When the Governor of Trini-
dad refused to grant a right of audience to United States military
counsel at the local courts in Trinidad (a violation of the Base
Lease Agreement, Article VII), the Commanding General retaliated by
refusing to permit the service of process on United States military
personnel ( a violation of Article VI of the 3ase Lease Agreement).
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each believed that the prestige of his own government required an un-
yielding attitude toward the other. On at least five occasions the Array
commander had to be directed by higher command to comply with an agree-
ment made in June 1941 and conduct his relations with local authorities
via the United States Consul at Port of Spain. The problem was re-
solved early in 1942 when both of the conflicting personalities were re-
placed. General Talbot was relieved by an officer with more rank and
experience in January 1942 and Governor Young was replaced shortly there-
after. By April 1942, it was reported that the "atmosphere was noticeably
clearer."227
Criminal jurisdiction and the division of responsibility established
by the Base Lease Agreement of March 27, 1941 were the source of another
set of problems at the bases. Neither the local officials nor the United
States authorities fully understood or accepted the concurrent jurisdic-
tion situations which were possible under the agreement. Consequently,
the waiver or exercise of jurisdiction in such cases often led to criticism
and popular disapproval. Two particular incidents stand out. Both in-
volved charges of murder committed outside the leased area by a member
of the United States forces. The first occurred at Antigua. When a
United States Marine was charged with murder, both the United States and
Britain acknowledged the existence of concurrent jurisdiction. The United
States asked local authorities if they objected to a trial by United States
Court-martial (i.e., the United States asked Britain to waive its juris-
diction) and they replied that they did not object. The United States also
agreed that it would not dispute a British statement to the effect that
226. Conn, et alM Guarding the U.S. , p. 406.
227. Ibid
. , p. 419, quoting the report of an inspection by Under Secre-
tary of War Robert F. Patterson.
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recognition of United States jurisdiction did not constitute a complete
abandonment of local or 3ritish jurisdiction in this or similar cases.
This statement reassured local residents who had foreseen a practical
return to the Schooner Exchange concept with foreign military forces
228
totally exempted from local jurisdiction.
In the scwnd case, which occurred in Trinidad, there probably would
have been little difficulty if the procedure used at Antigua had been
followed. Instead, when a United States soldier was charged with murder-
ing a civilian outside the leased area, the Acting Governor resisted
pressure from the legislature and did not raise the question of juris-
diction. When he finally requested that the Army commander issue a
letter to "quiet any public agitation," the base commander replied with
a promise that the accused would be tried by a United States Court-martial
and that the colonial government would be invited to send representatives
to the trial. The point at issue--the existence of concurrent juris-
diction--was not mentioned. Before the base commander's letter was de-
livered, the Governor returned to Trinidad and immediately asked the
United States Consul to prepare a letter similar to that used at Antigua
acknowledging dual jurisdiction. At this point, administrative delays
complicated the situation. The Consul at Trinidad had received no in-
structions on such concurrent jurisdiction situations so he referred the
Governor's request to the State Department. Meanwhile, preparations for
trial by court-martial began. A few days before the court was scheduled
to convene, the Governor of Trinidad admitted it was too late to do
228. Conn, et_al
.
, Guarding the U.S.
, p. 405.
229. The Secretary of the Colony was Acting Governor while Governor Young
was off the island.
230. Conn, et_al_
.




anything except issue a full waiver of jurisdiction. He agreed to do so
if the United States Consul would republish the base commander's announce-
ment of pending court-martial proceedings (i.e., the Governor was forcing
formal relations with the base commander to be conducted via the Consul).
The Consul did so and the Governor waived jurisdiction.
The day after the trial began, the Consul* s action in referring the
question to Washington took effect as the War Department directed the base
commander to postpone the trial until the Governor's original proposal
(the Antigua procedure) could be completed. This was obviously impossible,
so the trial proceeded on the basis of the waiver of jurisdiction by
local authorities. The entire situation was aggravated still further when
the court-martial acquitted the accused and local authorities were power-
less to hold a re-trial. As a result of this incident, the Governor de-
manded that in any future instances of concurrent jurisdiction, a procedure
for notifying the local government via the United States Consul be estab-
lished and adhered to and that a procedure assuring ample time for waivers
231
of jurisdiction be established.
Reluctance of local legislatures to implement the provisions of the
Base Lease Agreement of March 27, 1941 was another persistent problem in
the development and operation of the bases. Since the Base Lease Agreement
was not a treaty but an executive agreement, it was not automatically in-
corporated into colonial law. The Agreement was actually inferior to local
laws and where there were laws which conflicted with provisions of the
Base Lease Agreement, they remained in effect until repealed by the local
legislature. The attitude taken toward such conflicts was consistent in
large measure with the positions taken by the colonial representatives at
231. Conn, et_al
.




the London negotiations. There was a tendency to protect local interests
and ir.ake the bases a source of revenues for the local treasury. Instead
of enacting a general law repealing all acts repugnant to the Base Lease
Agreement, the colonial legislatures treated each conflict situation when
and if it arose. 232
At Trinidad, stamp taxes on steamship tickets and bank checks were
ruled applicable to checks and tickets used by United States personnel
even though this violated Articles XIV and XVII of the Base Lease Agree-
233
ment. The refusal to grant the right of audience and the retaliatory
refusal to serve process at Trinidad have already been noted.
At Bermuda, the problem focused on customs duties and wharfage fees.
Although the Base Lease Agreement was signed on Karch 27, 1941, the
Bermuda Assembly did not pass an act to allow remission of customs duties
until June 27, 1941. 23^ Even then the law did not meet the full obliga-
tions of the Base Lease Agreement because the local authorities tried to
impose the taxes whenever they could muster the slightest justification.
Household goods and personal belongings were taxed. Bulk petroleum prod-
ucts not consigned directly to the United States Army or Navy were sub-
jected to duties, and fuel oil purchased in steel drums rather than in
bulk was taxed on the grounds it fell into the taxable category of "sundry
235
merchandise." An attempt was even made to levy import taxes on items
which the Navy Exchange at the Naval Air Station had purchased from the
Admiralty Prize Court. These goods had been impounded from passengers
and vessels which stopped at Bermuda en route to the United States. 3





235. "Navy Admin. History, Atlantic Fleet, Vol. V," p. 36; Conn, et al..
Guarding the U. S., p. 404.
236. "Navy Admin. History, Atlantic Fleet, Vol. V," p. 36.
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The Bermuda government also continued to apply wharfage fees on
all goods going to the leased areas, whether unloaded through the local
port facilities or directly into the leased areas."' The United States
finally obtained an agreement to limit wharfage charges to those occa-
sions when Bermuda's wharfs were actually used. Duty-free import arrange-
ment received severe criticism when commissary and exchange privileges
were expanded and there was an immediate decline in local business and
official revenues as local sales and the taxes from food imports decreased .233
Investigations by United States authorities failed to substantiate the
accusations that duty-free goods were passing into local markets.
Bermuda seems to have been especially slow to pass legislation sup-
porting the Base Lease Agreement. Prime Minister Churchill visited Bermuda
in January 1942 and when he addressed the members of the Bermuda Assembly,
he "pleaded with them to give their assent and all their support to the
239
establishment of the United States naval and air bases in the islands
According to Mr, Churchill, "they did not demur;" however, it was not
until 1951 that the 3ermuda Assembly passed an act to implement the Base




The construction, development and operation of the United States
bases had a major impact on the social and economic life of the colonies
in which they were situated. In the social area, the primary impact of
the bases was the introduction of modern life and modern techniques of
237. "Navy Admin. History, Atlantic Fleet, Vol. V," p. 42; Conn, et al. t
Guarding the U.S.
, p. 404.
238. "Navy Admin. History, Atlantic Fleet, Vol. V," p. 3S.
239. Winston 3. Churchill, The Grand Alliance , volume 3 of The Second
World War (London: Cassell and Company, 1950), p. 626.
240. Ibid
.
; Bermuda, Public Act No. 52, 1951 ; Also see Great Britain,
Colonial Office, Report on Bermuda for the Years 1951 and 1952
(London: H.M.S.O., 1953), pp. 3, 35.
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construction and management to the colonies. Traditional patterns of
life at the isolated island sites were forced to adjust to the twentieth
century's increasingly rapid tempo. All the sites acquired some degree of
"Americanization. "^ L They also acquired daily air and radio communica-
tions with the rest of the world, reducing both their geographic and their
intellectual isolation. These changes had long-term implications for
almost every aspect of local life. Modernization was accompanied by the
problem of "rising expectations" among the population; it spawned nation-
alistic sentiments that bode ill for the future of colonial relations in
some cases and for the continued occupation of the bases in others. An
irreversible process of accelerated change was begun.
Individual sites were affected in different ways by the bases. At
Bermuda, the adjustment required by the resettlement of the residents of
the leased areas was much more profound than it was elsewhere due to
242
Bermuda's dense population.
In many cases, the bases were accompanied by an improvement in the
health of the local population. In Newf oundland this occurred through
the /work of military medical officers and the United States Public Health
Service facilities which were operated on the island. They were particularly
effective in correcting dietary deficiencies and reducing the number of
tuberculosis cases. -* In the Caribbean area, reclamation and sanitation
projects and anti-malaria campaigns such as those conducted at Trinidad
and Jamaica improved the general level of health.
The bases had their most significant impact in the economic field.
241. Watson, Bermuda , p. 124.
2 -. D. W. 3uchanan, "Defense Outpost for North America," Canadian
Geographic Journal , September 1941 (Vol. 23, No. 3), p. 107.




The war generally tended to depress the colonial economies. Bermuda lost
its tourists because of wartime travel restrictions and because the
passenger liners which offered regular trips to Bermuda were requisitioned
for war service. 2 Newfoundland* s economy was hit by the loss of ship-
ping facilities and the increased danger involved in offshore fishing
during hostilities. As a major exporter of fish, Newfoundland was also
hurt by the drastic reduction of international commerce during the war.
The war was depressionary in the Caribbean, too. The Bahamas and other
islands lost their tourist trade, and the lack of shipping halted the ex-
port of agricultural products such as Janaican bananas which were cus-
tomarily sold in Britain. 2^
Construction of the United States bases offset many of these negative
effects of the war. As the United States employed local labor to a maxi-
mum extent, unemployed Newfoundland fishermen became laborers at the bases
while Jamaican field hands and their counterparts in St. Lucia, Trinidad
and other tropical sites made similar occupational changes. Local
laborers employed in base construction were paid the local wages prevail-
ing for similar work, but as the supply of labor became scarce, the wage
rates crept upward in an effort to draw more people into the labor
market. ' Total wage bills rose and spending in the local economy increased.
This, combined with the higher costs of shipping (especially insurance)
caused the cost of living to increase at most of the base sites, * This,
244. Allen, "3ermuda Base," Harder* s rla^azine , September 1943, p. 347.
245. U.S., Department of State, The Caribbean and the War
, p. 6.
246. "Seane Field," Snot light , October 1953, p. 15; Dziuban, Military Re-
lations Between the U.S. and Canada
, p. 169; U.S. Department of
State, The Caribbean and the ',,'ar
, pp. 6, 37,
247. Wages were also increased surreptitiously by over-classifying laborers
to semi-skilled or skilled categories and by liberal use of overtime
work and overtime pay. Burn, "U.S. Base Rights in the British West
Indies," p. 27.
248. R.A. KacKay, ed,, Newfoundland; Economic, D iplomatic, and Strategic
Studies (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 127; Allen,
"Bermuda Base," Harper f s >-agazine , September 1943, p. 347.
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of course, induced laborers to demand higher wages, and suddenly all the
elements of a classic inflationary spiral were present. Fortunately, the
spiral did not develop.
Although base construction offset much of the war-induced unemploy-
ment, it did so at the expense of the traditional economic patterns of
the colonies. Agriculture and the native craft industries which had been
the basis of St. Lucia's economy before the war were virtually wiped out
in order to provide sufficient labor to build the bases. **' Newfoundland's
fishing industry suffered similarly, as did the tropical food producers in
the Caribbean.
Base construction also tended to inflate the local economy through
the sheer magnitude of the local spending which it induced. Not only were
local laborers spending the pay which they earned at the bases, but United
States construction personnel and military forces were also spending a
considerable proportion of their pay in the local economy. In addition,
the builders maximized their purchases of building materials from local
suppliers, further swelling the local economy. The exact amount and the
direct effect of all this spending is very difficult to determine. At
Bermuda, it has been estimated that the contractors paid salaries of nearly
a quarter million dollars per week during the construction phase, while
service personnel stationed at Bermuda received close to a million dollars
250per month. Since the portion of this income which was spent in the
local economy was devoted largely to the purchase of imported goods on
which Bermuda applied a high import tax, local government revenues were
also protected from the drastic decreases which the war alone would have
249. "Beane Field," Spotlight , October 1958, p. 15.
250. Jim Bishop, "Our $50,000,000 Base at Bermuda," Collier's . September
9, 1944 (Vol. 114, No. 1), pp. 69, 70.
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caused. * At Newfoundland, in August 1941, local laborers were receiv-
ing an estimated $3 million per month in wages for construction work at
the bases. One economist has made calculations which indicate that
employment of local labor, induced rises in general wage rates and
stimulated spending by personnel stationed in Newfoundland combined to
at least double Newfoundland's national income. 25 -^
At the end of the construction phase, there were forecasts of wide-
spread unemployment and recession at the base-site colonies. Plans were
made to offset the sudden decline in employment at the bases, and in com-
bination with several unforseen events, they were successful. Trinidad
and British Guiana, for example, planned public works projects as needed
to absorb free labor, but at St. Lucia, the end of base construction was
expected to be beneficial because it would ease a severe labor shortage in
256
what remained of the agricultural sector. At Bermuda, the effect was
less noticeable because a much smaller proportion of the construction
force was composed of local labor. In addition, the Bermuda bases con-
tinued to employ a substantial number of local personnel after construction
255had ended. t"JJ The transition from base construction to normal economic
activities was also eased by the fact that the changeover took much longer
than had been anticipated at first. Buildings and facilities were turned
over to the military commanders as they were completed and instead of
terminating all work on a given date, the scale of construction activity
declined gradually. 256
251. Jim Bishop, "Our $50,000,000 Base at Bermuda," Collier's , September 9,
1944, p. 69; 3uchanan, "Defense Outpost," Canadian Geographic Journal ,
September 1961, p. 110.
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The difficulties accompanying Che termination of construction were
eased somewhat by two fortuitous factors. Especially beneficial to New-
foundland was the fact that the price of fish on the world market began
to rise. This drew fishermen back to their trade at the same time that
shipping became safer and more reliable. *~ J The end of construction also
coincided with a severe labor shortage in the United States and Canada.
This shortage led to an easing of immigration regulations and a consequent
importation of labor from Newfoundland and the Caribbean area.^58
The presence of the United States bases had a noticeable effect on
the food supply in the Caribbean area, biost of the islands depended on
imported food supplies to a large extent, so the shipping shortage caused
a food shortage. The bases aggravated this shortage by making it necessary
to feed more people (construction workers and service personnel off duty,
natives from other islands imported as laborers) and at the same time, they
diverted labor away from food production. By raising the level of local
incomes, construction and operation of the bases also caused an increase
in per capita demand for food. 259 ^ one occasion at Antigua, the food
shortage became so serious that the Army base began supplying flour to the
local population in order to keep the people healthy and strong enough to
O f,r\
work. One of the positive long-term effects of the war and, to some
extent, the bases, was a diversification of local food production in re-
sponse to the wartime food shortages. The local agricultural output now
satisfies a broader variety of the public's needs than it did before the
261
war.
257. KacKay, ed., Newfoundland , pp. 128, 225.
258. Ibid ., p. 128; U.S., Department of State, The Caribbean and The War ,
p. 38.
259. U.S., Department of State, The Caribbean and the War , p. &.
260. Ibid ., p. 5.
261. Ibid ., pp. 30-31.
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The net effect of the bases on the base-site colonies was varied.
At the smaller sites where the bases were closed before the war ended,
the only effect was a small amount of modernization. °2 ^t t he larger
bases which are still in use, the effect has been and continues to be
much greater. Bermuda still receives an estimated $2 million annually
from military personnel stationed there or stopping there as transients.
Employment of local personnel at the Bermuda bases, which had declined
from about 800 in 1946 to about 250 in 1948 had risen to about 500 by
1965. 264
At Newfoundland, the housing, feeding and entertaining of United
States forces had reputedly become the island's fourth largest industry
by 1952. The economic impact of the bases at that time is reflected
in the following data: 3,500 Newfoundlanders were employed at the bases
and were paid $9 million in annual wages. The United States purchased
nearly $3 million in goods and services on the local market, paid $100,000
to charter a ferry serving the island, and paid $16,000 in tuition aid to
schools attended by dependents of United States military personnel. Mili-
tary personnel contributed another $87,000 per year to the local economy
as rent for off-base housing. The size of the Newfoundland base complex
and the tempo of operations there have been reduced considerably since the
Korean War period, but it still plays an influential role in the economy.
Perhaps the most lasting impact of the bases will be produced by the
physical facilities which were established at the base sites: airfields,
262. Great Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Report on the Bahama Islands
for the Year 1946 (London: K.M.S.O., 1947), p. 3.
263. Watson, Bermuda
, p. 124.
264. Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report on^ Bermuda, 1946 , p. 4; same
Report
. . . for the Year 1943 , p. 4;' Watson, Bermuda , p. 123.
265. "Fourth Industry," Time , November 17, 1952 (Vol. 60, No. 20), p. 45.
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power plants, machine shops, sewage systems and many other innovations
which brought the colonies closer to the ntr'ern world. Bases iray have
been closed and United States forces may have departed, but many of the
bases* buildings and facilities have been put to use by the local govern-
ment. Beane Field on St. Lucia and Atkinson Field in Guyana (British
Guiana) are now primary commercial airports. The Uaval Repair Facility
at Trinidad is now a commercial shipyard and the machine shops at Antigua
are part of a government training school for industrial labor.
When the war ended, the United States plans for maintaining and
operating overseas bases were unsettled. In September 1945, Navy Depart-
ment officials suggested that Argent ia and 3ermuda might be among the half
dozen major bases which the Kavy would want to retain in the Atlantic area,
but they said no final decision had yet been made. °" a month later,
senior naval officers testified before a House committee that the Puerto
Rico-Virgin Islands complex would be the only major base in the Atlantic
area to be retained by the Navy. Argent ia, Trinidad and Bermuda were to
remain operational (along with Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Coco Solo, Canal
Zone) as secondary bases. All the other bases received in the Destroyers-
Bases Exchange were to be inactivated, placed in a caretaker status or
7fi7held for emergency use only.
Following World War II, the strategic value of the bases changed con-
siderably as the nature and source of the strongest threat to United States
security changed. As one analyst saw the situation in 1946, Newfoundland
and Bermuda still had "considerable strategic importance," but most of the
266. George Connery, "Navy Lists Post-War Bases Wanted," (Washington) Post ,
September 6, 1945.
267. "Post-War Naval Bases," (Washington) Post , September 21, 1945.
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other bases had "very limited strategic usefulness" and were not worthy
of expensive maintenance.
There has been no consistent pattern to the postwar employment of
the bases. At Newfoundland, the Army Air Corps continued to operate
Harmon Field as a major terminal in the Military Air Transport 3ervice*s
transatlantic flight service. It was not closed until it became obsoles-
cent in the age of long range jet tranports which could make non-stop
transatlantic flights. The Argentia Naval Operating Base and its com-
ponent air station had been reduced in strength by the end of the war and
they were deactivated soon thereafter. The naval complex was reactivated
in 1954, however, and it is currently used to support naval operations in
269
the North Atlantic region.
Both the naval and air bases at Bermuda declined in size and activity
following World War II, but when the Korean War broke out, they were
rapidly expanded. 3y 1953, the United States garrison at Bermuda had
grown to 10,000 men while the Royal 2\Tavy force had declined to a head-
270
quarters staff of 10 men. During the Korean period major expenditures
were made to improve the air facilities at Bermuda and to fit it out as a
271base for the Strategic Air Command. It has since been reduced to a
terminal for the Military Air Transport Service plus weather and scientific
research installations. The Bermuda Naval Station has also had its activi-
ties scaled down considerably since the mid-1950 f s. In 1965 its mission
263. Hanson J. Baldwin, "Wanted: An American Military Policy," Harper's
Magazine, Jay 1946 (Vol. 192, No. 1152), p. 407.
269. There are reports among naval personnel in the fleet and at the
Pentagon that the Argentia base will soon be closed. I have found no
documentary evidence to support this opinion, although my researches
have been limited to unclassified materials and I would expect such
documents, if they existed, to be classified.
270. Goodhart, Fifty Ships that Saved the World , p. 231.
271. The construction bill for Fiscal Year 1952 included over $12^; million
for construction at Kindley Field, 3uel U. Patch, "Overseas Bases,"
Editorial Research Rcoorts, July 9, 1951 (Vol. II, 1951), pp. 437-433.
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was to provide support for two squadrons of ant i -submarine aircraft and
to give limited support to fleet units operating in the area. As the
Navy's seaplane program was phased out, the 3ermuda squadrons were changed
to land planes and moved to Kindley Field. The force has since been re-
duced to a single squadron. The Naval Station also supports the research
and development activities centered at 3ermuda. These research activities,
especially in the field of undersea warfare, have been greatly expanded
since I960.*'
After the war there was a gradual reduction in the size of the Trini-
dad base complex and its operational capabilities. Waller Field was closed
273
in late 1949 and in early 1950 it was demolished. J The Trinidad bases
were saved from complete inactivation by the Korean War, which caused the
naval base to be redeveloped and returned to use as an operating base.
Trinidad was also incorporated into the Atlantic Missile Range, As a re-
sult, several tracking and communications stations were erected and the
Naval Station was required to support the tracking and test ships engaged
in missile research. Following extensive negotiations with the local
government and the West Indies federation, the size and lease-life of the
United States bases at Trinidad and other places were significantly reduced
in 1960 and 1961.
The bases at Antigua were also developed as a missile tracking site
during the 1950»s, but most of the leased area was unused and it was re-
turned to local administration under the 1961 treaty with the 'West Indies.
The facilities at Beane Field, St. Lucia, were deactivated shortly after
272. Watson, Bermuda , pp. 122-123.
273. Great Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Report on Trinidad and Tobago
for the Year 1969 (London: H.M.S.O., 1951), p. 10.




the war but they were returned to service from 1955 to 1957 as a missile
275tracking station. This reactivation disrupted island life because the
best pasture lands reverted to United States control, forcing abandon-
ment of a dairy development program. There was strong local opposition
to a 1953 proposal to reopen Beane Field and use the radar sites as a
communi cat ions station. Local residents were pleased when the United
States dropped this proposal, since it permitted the base buildings to
continue in their civilian uses as a handicraft center and a fishery
U I 276training school.
The Base Lease Agreement has been revised several times since it was
signed in 1961, The first change was effected in February 1943, although
277
it had been the subject of verbal agreement as early as June 1946. 3y
an exchange of notes Britain and the United States agreed to open the
airfields at Bermuda, Antigua, St. Lucia and British Guiana to civil air-
craft on a carefully controlled basis, and the airfields in Trinidad and
Jamaica were opened as alternate fields for use when bad weather existed
278
at primary airports. The agreement preserved all important United
States rights at the airfields, including the right to close the fields
to civil traffic whenever security considerations made it necessary. The
Newfoundland airfields at Stephenville and Argentia were opened to com-
mercial traffic in June 19^9. At that time, the United States and Canada
agreed to permit commercial aircraft to use those fields as alternate
landing sites provided such use did not interfere with military operations
279
or endanger security. The agreement relating to the civil aircraft
275. "Beane Field," Spotlight , October 1953, p. 15.
276. "Off Again, On Again," Spotlight . October 1953 (Vol. 19, No. 10), p. 14,






facilitics at Bermuda has been modified twice since 1948. In April
1951, the section of Kind ley Air Force Base allocated to Bermuda for use
as its commercial airport was transferred to the local government for the
remaining life of the lease and all provisions for unilateral termination
?80
of civil operations were deleted. In May I960, the commercial facility
was enlarged by transferring three additional acres to the Bermuda govern-
ment
,
There have also been many exchanges of notes and letters to provide
for use of parts of the leased areas by the local governments. In most
cases, these agreements have permitted agricultural development in decom-
989
missioned base areas. coc A 1949 agreement concerning Trinidad also dis-
posed of many other unsettled questions regarding the leased areas, while
a 1954 agreement returned part of the land area to the Trinidad government
JO 1)
for use as a public recreation area. A similar agreement with Britain
in October 1947 was used to establish the seaward limits of the leased area
284
at Argent ia, Newfoundland.
A fundamental change to the Base Lease Agreement was made in August
1950 when Articles IV and VI of the Agreement were superseded by new juris-
285diction provisions. This amendment applied to all the leased areas
except those in Newfoundland, which had becoma an integral part of Canada
in April 1949. The new jurisdiction provisions were quite complex. Per-
sonnel subject to United States jurisdiction were divided into five
categories, each having a different jurisdictional status. The United
280. T.I. A. 3. 2232.
281. T.I. A. 5. 4^89.
282. Burn, "U.S. 3ase Rights in the British West Indies," pp. 63-66; State
Department Press Release 390, i-iay 15, .1952.





States e::ercised its most extensive jurisdiction over members of its
own armed forces; its rights were least extensive over members of British
or colonial armed forces. The amendment also established four classes of
jurisdiction based on the place the offense was committed, the nature of
the offense and the identity of the offender. The instances in which the
United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction were reduced to a minimum
and concurrent jurisdiction was expanded. Cases of concurrent jurisdiction
could be disposed of only by a mutual or joint agreement. The jurisdic-
tional arrangement produced by the new articles was similar to that estab-
lished in 1952 under the NATO Status-of -Forces Agreement. 286
In forch 1950, pursuant to a recommendation of the Canadian-American
Permanent Joint Board on Defense, the Base Lease Agreement was modified to
reflect Newfoundland's union with Canada. Four portions of the agree-
ment were changed insofar as they related to Newfoundland. The taxation
provisions were cancelled and replaced by a Canada-United States tax agree-
ment, a change which eliminated many tax and customs exemptions previously
extended to contractors. Household goods of personnel stationed at New-
foundland remained exempt only if they entered the territory at approxi-
mately the same time as the personnel. The regulations controlling United
States Fost Offices in the leased areas were changed to further limit the
classes of personnel entitled to use them and to limit the destination of
mail handled through them. Finally, the jurisdiction provisions were
changed. The United States agreed to waive most of its rights to exercise
jurisdiction over non-United States personnel, and at the same time,
Canada's Visiting Forces Act was extended to Newfoundland. There was little
286. The jurisdiction provisions and changes are analyzed in Stambuk,
American Nilitary Forces Abroad , pp. 62-66. The NATO Status-of-Forces




practical effect on the jurisdiction actually exercised by the United
States, but even the limited impact of the latter change was short-lived.
On April 30, 1952, Canada and the United States agreed that the NATO
St:atus-of-Forces Agreement would apply to all United States forces in
288
Canada, including the leased areas. The Base Lease Agreement was pre-
served to the extent that it pertained to matters not covered by the
NATO Status-of-Forces Agreement, but when the NATO treaty went into effect
on August 23, 1953, the jurisdiction provisions of the Base Lease Agree-
ment were suspended for the life of the NATO treaty.
The greatest change in the Base Lease Agreement resulted from the
efforts in the late 1950* s and early I960*s to form a federation known as
The iJest Indies. This move led to the negotiation of a new treaty which
replaced the 3ase Lease Agreement for Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia and
Trinidad. Although attempts to federate the island colonies in the West
Indies had been made sporadically since about 1700, the final federation
movement can be dated from a colonial conference at Jamaica in 1947. 89
The West Indies, composed of the ten British territories in the West Indies,
was officially established on January 3, 1958. By that time, a dispute
about the naval base on Chaguaramas Peninsula, Trinidad, was already in
progress.
After extensive studies in 1956 and 1957, the federation's pilot
group, the Standing Federation Committee, decided that the only suitable
site for a federal capital was the leased area occupied by the United
States Naval Station. The committee therefore requested the British
288. T.I.A.S. 3074.
289. 3um, "U.S. Base Rights in the British West Indies," p. 85. The
establishment and subsequent dissolution of The West Indies is pre-
sented in detail by Burn. He also gives a detailed study of the
dispute over Chaguaramas and the political pressure involved in
negotiating the Defense Area agreement.
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government to ask the United States to relinquish the area to the federa-
290
tion for its capital. The United States refused to release the site,
claiming that the Trinidad Naval Station was an essential strategic base
and that development of a new base at a different site would be too costly.
At a series of meetings between United States, British and West Indian
representatives in London in July 1957, it was agreed that a United States
naval base in the eastern Caribbean was necessary, but the West Indian
delegation refused to accept the United States position that the Chaguaramas
site was the only suitable location. A Joint Commission was established
to investigate the problem further. This Commission met from January until
torch 195S and then reported that the existing base at Chaguaramas ful-
filled all the requirements of the necessary eastern Caribbean naval base.
It listed five alternate sites which could be developed into bases at
costs ranging from $132 million to $248 million and it estimated that it
would require 5% to 10 years to build such an alternate base. Noting that
it was not possible to partition the existing base or to abandon part of
the leased area without hampering the base's capabilities, the Commission
291
concluded that Chaguaramas was "the most suitable site for a naval base."
The British and United States governments considered the matter
settled, but West Indian officials, led by Dr. Eric Williams, Chief Mini-
ster of Trinidad, rejected such a conclusion and pressed for further dis-
cussions. The United States refused to reopen the talks, but gave
290. U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Unite:! States Defense
Policies in 1957 , 85th Cong., 2d sess., House Document No, ^36
(Washington, 1953), pp. 33-34; U.S., Congress, House of Represen-
tatives, United States Defense Policies in 1958 , 86th Cong., 1st
sess., House Document No. 227 (Washington, 1959), pp. 35-36; Burn,
"U.S. Base Rights in the British West Indies," pp, 105-106.
291. Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report of the Chaguaramas Joint
Commission, Colonial No. 333 (London: H.N.S.O., 1958), p. 20.
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assurances through Britain that it would "be prepared to review the
Chaguaranas situation in say ten years* time" and to consider modification
of the Base Lease Agreement in accordance with the procedures established
by Article XXVIII thereof. 292 This did not satisfy the West Indians, and
293
a long period of bitter dispute and frequent harrassment followed.
When The West Indies was formed in 1958, it was expected to achieve
independence in about five years. This jeopardized the future of the
United States bases in two ways. There was a possibility that The West
Indies, when independent, would refuse to accept as binding the 19A1 Base
Lease Agreement; there was also the possibility that continued dispute
over the bases would make political conditions and local relations so bad
that the bases would become untenable and effective operations would be
obstructed by local hostility. In light of these possibilities, the
United States decided to re-negotiate the base agreement. This began
with a series of informal talks with Dr. Williams in early 1959, but the
discussions proved fruitless. During the latter part of 1959 and the
first half of 1960, a series of Anglo-American and Anglo-West Indian talks
reached agreement on organization and representation for a formal conference
to re-negotiate the Base Lease Agreement. In June 1960, it was agreed that
talks would consist of two phases. The first would be a formal tri-partite
conference among the United States, Britain and The West Indies at London.
The second phase would be a series of local discussions at each of the base
sites. A third phase, the formal conference for signature of the new
292. Burn, "U.S. Base Rights in the 3ritish West Indies," p. 110, citing
a statement to the Legislative Council of Trinidad and Tobago by
Dr. Eric Williams on June 20, 1958.





agreement, was added later.
The first stage negotiations were held in early November 1960. The
United States announced that it would "release uncondtionally" a major
portion of the areas leased under the 1941 agreement and retain only
those areas "essential to the discharge" of United States defense obliga-
tion. J Agreement in principle on this point having been reached, the
negotiations moved to the second phase. In that phase, the negotiators
decided on the areas to be retained or relinquished and they drafted the
agreement under which the retained areas would be occupied.
The most important part of the second phase took place at Tobago,
where the general agreement was drafted and the Trinidad sites, including
Chaguaramas, were discussed. These discussions were held in late
November and early December 1960, after which the negotiations moved to
St. Lucia, Antigua and Jamaica. Phase two was completed by mid-December.
It produced an agreement by the United States to abandon approximately
80 per cent of the areas which it had acquired in 1941, areas which were
296
not then in use and which were not expected to be needed in the future.
As a result of the negotiations, the United States delegates agreed
to recommend that the United States aid the development of facilities at
Port of Spain, the rehabilitation of the Trinidad Railroad, the initiation
of land reclamation projects, and the establishment of a College of Arts
and Sciences (complete with a comprehensive library of Americana) at the
294. Burn, "U.S. Base Rights in the British West Indies," pp. 135-138;
Eric Williams, History of the People of Tr i nidad and^ Tobago (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 275; Hispanic American Report ,
December 1960 (Vol. 13, No. 10), pp. 702-703; U.S. Congress, House
of Representatives, United Stat es Defense Policies in_1960 , 87th
Cong., 1st sess., House Document No. 207 (Washington, 1961), p. 46.
295. U.S., Department of State, Bulletin , Nov. 28, 1960 (Vol. 43) , p. 822.
296. Ibid ., January 9, 1961 (Vol. 44, No. 2), pp. 44-45 (Department of
State Press Release No. 698 dated December 15, 1960).
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University of The West Indies at Trinidad. The United States also agreed
to provide St. Lucia with nearly $350,000 to develop the southern part
of the island and to give Jamaica economic and technical assistance in
education, water supply and low income housing projects.
The final phase of the negotiations was held at Port of Spain in
February 1961, when The West Indies and the United States signed an
298
executive agreement on defense areas within the federation's territories.
In this agreement, United States interests at the base sites were generally
preserved, although the United States had considerably less autonomy
299
within the leased areas, now redesignated as defense areas. The local
governments were authorized to exercise extensive regulatory and police
powers within the defense areas except for "security areas" which could
be established inside the defense areas. The jurisdiction clause of the
agreement established a complex system of concurrent jurisdictions very
much like that of the T-ATO Status-of-Forces Agreement. It provided for
primary and secondary jurisdiction in most instances and established pro-
cedures for requesting and waiving jurisdictional rights.
The defense agreement drastically shortened the life of United States
rights in the defense areas. Instead of expiring in 2039, the rights were
subject to review in 1968 and again in 1973. Unless there was a specific
agreement to continue the status of defense areas, United States rights
297. Hisoanic American Report , February 1961 (Vol. 13, No. 12), pp. 885-
886; Department of State Bulletin, January 9, 1961, pp. 42-44
(Communique of December 8, 1960). See Williams, History of Trinidad
and Tobago
, pp. 275-276 for Trinidad's proposals on these points.
298. T.I. A.S. A 7 34.
299. The detailed provision of the 1961 agreement and an analysis of the
differences between it and the 1941 agreement are contained in Burn,
"U.S. Base Rights in the 3ritish West Indies," pp. 146-150.
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therein would terminate at the end of 1977. ^
The details of the defense areas were contained in a series of annexes
to the defense agreement. At Antigua, the United States retained two areas
on each side of Parham Harbor for missile tracking and oceanographic re-
search stations. It also received the right to unrestricted use of
*1A1
Coolidge Field by government aircraft. W1 At Jamaica, the United States
abandoned all of the areas leased in 1941. It retained only a small site
on Portland Peninsula which had been acquired by an informal and unpublished
exchange of notes in 1959. It was the location of a LORAN (Long Range Aid
TOO
to Navigation) station. J^ At St. Lucia, the United States abandoned all
the leased areas except several small sites near Vieux Fort and Beane
Field which were used as a missile tracking station. 3^ The leased area
for the naval air station at Gros Islet Bay had been returned to Antigua
in 1959. 304
At Trinidad, the United States released about 21,000 acres of the
leased area. Several parts of the area, mainly those containing a tropical
fruit plantation, were to be vacated by 1963. Several other sections were
designated as "Stand-by" areas which the United States could reoccupy on
request in an emergency. The small naval facility at Teteron Bay was to
300. T.I.A.S. 4734. The end of 1977 is also the terminal date for the
agreements establishing Oceanographic Research Stations in the West
Indies. The only other postwar base agreement related to the West
Indies concerns the Long Range Proving Ground (Missile Tracking Sta-
tions) and it is to remain in force until 1975, with one year's
notice required to terminate it thereafter. Burn, "U.S. Base Rights
in the British West Indies," pp. 75-76.
301. T.I.A.S. 4734, Annex A.
302. Ibid .. Annex C; Burn, "U.S. Base Rights in the British West Indies,"
p. 145.
303. Ibid ., Annex D.
304. The Kew York Times , March 6, 1959. See Burn, "U.S. Base Rights in
the British West Indies," pp. 66-68 for the reasons the United States
agreed to relinquish this site. Also see Great Britain, Colonial




be made available to the federation for training its military and police
forces and the fleet anchorage area was to be opened to local traffic.
The remaining large area on Chaguaramas Peninsula was to continue as a
305
naval base under United States control.
The United States thus retained those parts of the leased areas which
it had actually been using in the period prior to 1961. The object of
the greatest controversy, Chaguaramas, was retained by the United States
and The West Indies still had no site for its federal capital.
After internal difficulties caused The West Indies to be dissolved in
1962 before it attained independence, Trinidad and Jamaica became inde-
pendent states. As such, they have accepted as binding the obligations of
the federations 1961 agreement. Antigua and St. Lucia remained British
dependencies. Since Britain explicitly sanctioned the signature of the
1961 agreement in a note to the United States, it has now accepted responsi
bility for fulfilling the provisions of that agreement with respect to its
dependencies. In both cases, the United States rights under the 1961
agreement appear to be secure.
305. .T, I.A.S. £734, Annex E.

CHAPTER VIII
Current Status of the Bases; Summary and Conclusions
As of the spring of 1967, the status of the bases and base rights which
the United States acquired in the Destroyers-Bases exchange is as follows:
Newfoundland , The facilities at Fort Pepperrell (later Pepperrell
Air Force Base) were turned over to a joint Canadian-Newfoundland board on
August 11 , 1961. The site was abandoned in accordance with Article XXI
of the Base Lease Agreement of March 27, 1941, but under a Memorandum of
Understanding signed on July 2S, 1961, the United States reserved certain
2
rights at Pepperrell and the adjacent area. On December 7, i965, the
United States notified Canada of its intention to abandon Harmon Field
pursuant to the provisions of Article XXI of the Base Lease Agreement.
This abandonment became effective on December 31, 1966. Of the remaining
facilities, those at St. John's were returned to local administration at
the end of the war; Fort KcAndrew, at Argentia, was closed at about the
same time, and only the naval base at Argentia remains operational.
Bermuda , The United States abandoned several annexes to the Kind ley
Field site in 1962 and 1966, but the principal parts of Kindley Field and
the Naval Base in Great Sound are still operational bases.
Bahamas , In September 1962, one acre of the Great Exuma leased area
was returned to the local government for use as a school. Although the
1, Letter from Assistant Legal Adviser, State Department, to author,
February 16, 1967, Except as otherwise noted, this letter is the
source of the statement of current base status,






Great Exuma air station has been closed since June 1945 and the local
authorities have been administering the leased area under the non-user
provisions of the 3ase Lease Agreement, it appears that the United
States still has all its original rights to the leased area except for
the abandoned acre.
Jamaica . As at St. Lucia, Antigua and Trinidad, the base rights at
Jamaica were superceded by the provisions of the Defense Areas agreement
with The West Indies on February 10, 1961. When Jamaica became an inde-
pendent state on August 6, 1962, it assumed the obligations of the Defense
Areas agreement. On Karch 19, 1964, the United States notified Jamaica
that it was relinquishing the Jamaica Defense Area because it was no longer
required. All United States bases and base rights in Jamaica have thus
been terminated.
Ant i g ua , The Antigua leased areas were replaced by much smaller
defense areas under the agreement with The West Indies. There have been
no changes to those areas since 1961 except for a general easement for
Atlantic Missile Range operations which was negotiated in September 1964.
The Antigua installation consists of operational test, electronics and
tracking stations used in missile testing.
St. Lucia , As noted earlier, the naval air station site was abandoned
in 1959; the remaining leased areas were replaced by smaller defense areas
In 1961. In August 1964, the United States abandoned the remaining defense
areas but retained certain options on the use of Beane Field. J
Trinidad. The large leased areas having been replaced by smaller
defense areas in 1961, the Naval Station was the only remaining operational
3. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5641 and 5642.
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facility at Trinidad. In December 1966, the United States released to
Trinidad, subject to certain emergency recapture provisions, the dry-
dock facilities at the Naval Station. It has since been announced that
the entire Ilaval Station will be inactivated by June 30, 1967. ^ There is
no indication whether or not the defense area status of the site will be
ended.
British Guiana . All the United States bases in British Guiana were
closed after the war, but Atkinson . Field was used for occasional opera-
tions. When this colony became the independent state of Guyana in May
1966, the United States relinquished its rights to the leased areas but
retained a right to use Atkinson Field (now Guyana's international airport)
for at least 17 years.
The Destroyers-Bases exchange grew out of a series of earlier pro-
posals to transfer old United States destroyers to Britain, to acquire
bases in the Atlantic, and to liquidate British debts left over from World
War I, In the summer of 1940, Britain, in its war against Germany, needed
more destroyers to protect its economic lifelines; the United States had
old destroyers which were of marginal value to national defense. The
United States wanted off-shore bases in the Atlantic to protect the Western
Hemisphere (especially the Pinama Canal) from invasion by an aggressive
Germany; Britain had territorial possessions in the Western Atlantic in
which those bases could be located. These were the ingredients of a
mutually beneficial exchange.
Immediate consummation of such an exchange was prevented by British
^ T.I.A.S . 5736
5. Kavy Times , January 25, 1967.
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and United States domestic considerations. The United States government
was faced with formidable legal restrictions on the transfer of defense
material such as destroyers. The British government was reluctant to
incur the public disapproval which it thought would greet a straight-
forward swap of British soil for over-age ships. President Roosevelt
finally concluded that he could transfer the destroyers but only as part
of an exchange which would have a beneficial effect on national defense.
Prime Minister Churchill was willing to give the bases to the United
States and trust that the United States would respond with a gift of de-
stroyers, but he did not want to make a quid pro quo exchange.
These two positions were blended in a compromise proposal by the
State Department Legal Adviser, Green Hackworth, Ke suggested that
Britain could give the United States the right to establish bases at New-
foundland and at Bermuda, and that the United States could exchange its
old destroyers for base rights at six additional sites in the Caribbean.
On this basis, the transaction was formally completed on September 2, 1940.
Public reaction to the exchange was generally favorable in both
Britain and in the United States, largely because of the different gloss
which the President and the Prime Minister placed on the transaction when
each announced it to his people. President Roosevelt portrayed it as an
exchange of old ships for strong bases, a net gain for hemisphere and
national defense. Prime Minister Churchill emphasized the gift aspect of
the transaction and stressed the political significance of the exchange
as an American step away from neutrality. In the United States, the
principal criticism of the exchange was aimed not at its effect, but at
the way in which it had been accomplis'ied : by an executive agreement
rather than a treaty, without prior notification to Congress, and on the
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basis of some labored legal interpretations by the Attorney General. At
the international level, the Axis powers criticized the exchange as a
breach of neutrality and a violation of international law, but they re-
frained from iraking it a casus belli
.
The notes exchanged on September 2, 1940, actually contained only
part of the transaction. Although not publicly described as such, the
British pledge not to scuttle or surrender the British fleet was certainly
part of the real quid pro quo » as was the additional military equipment
(aircraft, weapons and ammunition) which the United States later gave to
Britain.
The destroyers were quickly transferred to Britain at Halifax, Nova
Scotia, between September and November 1940; they began their service in
the Royal Navy later that year, and in 1941 they made a significant con-
tribution to the British convoy escort force. As newer ships came into
service, the old destroyers were relegated to use as spare parts, barracks
ships and target vessels. Most of them had been destroyed or scrapped
within a few months after the war ended.
Converting the base rights acquired in the exchange into actual bases
was a much slower process than transferring the ships. In September and
October 1940, a Board of Experts headed by Rear Admiral John W # Greenslade,
USN, visited the designated British possessions and made the initial selec-
tion of the sites to be leased. Soon thereafter, informal agreements per-
mitted the United States to start construction and, in some cases, operations,
early in 1941 and before formal leases had been prepared.
Negotiation of the base leases took place in London from late January
until late March 1941. The principal problem which the negotiators had to
overcome was a conflict among national interests: the United States wanted
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to exercise quasi-sovereign powers in and near the leased areas;
Britain desired to preserve its sovereignty by limiting American rights
and powers; and the local governments wanted to minimize the impact of the
bases and, if possible, make them a source of revenue. After intensive
negotiations, two central issues, defense and the extent of United States
powers, were referred to the Prime Minister for decision. He approved a
grant of sweeping powers to the United States, but only after he had
analyzed the probable course of future events and concluded that British
and American interests were so closely tied that they would be allies,
not enemies, in any future conflict. The Base Lease Agreement, granting
the United States for 99 years substantially all of the powers it had re-
quested, was signed on Karch 27, 1941.
The bases were developed in the face of severe obstacles. The
shortage of shipping space made it difficult to get materials to the
sites; primitive conditions at the isolated sites, poor transportation
facilities, and an inadequate supply of skilled labor further complicated
the task, Nevertheless, the bases were built and they became operational
in 1941. Through the most difficult part of the war, they provided sup-
port for convoys, convoy escorts, and air anti-submarine patrols. As the
tides of war shifted in favor of the Allies and hostilities moved further
eastward, the scale of operations at the leased bases was reduced and
some of the smaller installations were closed. The larger bases remained
open to support movements to and from the forward areas.
With the war's end, most of the bases were closed and their facilities
were abandoned, converted to civilian use, or allowed to revert to agri-
cultural use. After the war, the threat to American security was no longer
transatlantic; it was a transpolar threat against which leased bases in the

-313-
Atlantic had little value. The progressive inactivation of the remaining
bases vas interrupted by a resurgence of activity at Bermuda, Newfound-
land and Trinidad during the Korean War, but the scale of operations has
been tapering off ever since.
Today, the base at Trinidad is in the process of closing up; after
June 1967, only the snail electronics and missile testing facility at
Antigua will remain under the Defense Area agreement with The West Indies,
successor to the Base Lease Agreement in that region. With Newfoundland's
remaining naval station at Argentia rumored to be closing, the naval and
air facilities at Bermuda seem to be the only leased bases with a reasonably
certain future. After 27 years, therefore, little remains of the Destroyers-
Bases exchange. The ships are gone and nearly all of the areas leased for
99 years have been abandoned.
On the basis of this study of the Anglo-American Destroyers-Bases ex-
change, it is possible to draw several conclusions. The first is that the
exchange was beneficial to the United States. The destroyers were not
really lost; they just went to war a year earlier than the rest of the Navy.
The bases were expensive to build and their direct contribution to the
victory in World War II was small, but they were a valuable insurance policy
of sorts. As it happened, the war remained centered in Europe, it did not
spread to the Western Hemisphere and the continental United States was not
attacked. As a result, the bases were limited to the performance of routine
patrol, escort and surveillance missions. Had events gone differently,
however - if Britain had been defeated or Germany had invaded South America -
the leased bases would have been an invaluable segment of American defenses,
a string of Atlantic >!altas. We should be grateful that the bases were
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never called upon to perform their ultimate defensive chores.
The exchange was certainly beneficial to Britain. The operational
contribution of the old destroyers was, at best, a proverbial "drop in
the bucket" compared to the total war effort. For Britain (and for the
United States as well) the most profound aspect of the exchange was its
political implication: it represented an American commitment to the
British war effort. It marked the United States shift from neutrality
to friendly non-belligerency and the start of a process that led to
eventual alliance. Public acquiescence in the exchange encouraged the
President to pursue his program of aid to Britain and paved the way for
the Lend -Lease plan.
Considering the events of the intervening years, it must also be
concluded that the principal impact of the exchange fell not on Britain
or the United States, but on the territories where the bases were built.
The exchange is only a minute incident among the major events which have
marked the Anglo-American partnership, but at the base sites, it is a
historic event. Instead of a depression induced by wartime trade disloca-
tions, the base-site territories experienced an economic boom fed by base
construction and operation. The primitive, simple life was shattered by
modern ways as the drowsing colonies were brought abruptly into the
twentieth century. Old economic patterns were altered and incomes and
standards of living were raised. Airports brought daily contact with the
rest of the world; they also symbolized a new way of life that included
innovations such as automobiles, electricity, sewerage systems and public
health programs.
The introduction of modern life ar.d communication with the rest of
the world also encouraged the development of nationalism and independence
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movements. Therein lay the most important potential "cost" element to be
weighed against the "benefits" which accrued to the United States through
the exchange. The presence of United States bases could have ignited
xenophobic nationalism, and if the United States had remained at the bases
in the face of local opposition, the bases would have become a political
liability. Military advantages would have been counterbalanced by a
vulnerability to charges of imperialism and colonial exploitation. The
United States avoided this situation by acknowledging the declining mili-
tary value of the bases and yielding to local demands for changes. It was
far better to abandon bases of marginal value and rights obtained through
hard negotiating than it was to pay the political consequences of retain-
ing them.
From the vantage point of 1967, it can thus be concluded that the
Anglo-American Destroyers-Bases exchange was a wise move when it was made
in 1940; both parties reaped benefits from it. Over the years, it has
produced long-term effects which were beneficial to the territories in
which the bases were located. By relinquishing its rights when conditions
made it prudent to do so, America has improved its relations with the base-
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